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Modern life is such that, confronted with the most mechanical, the most 
stereotypical repetitions, inside and outside ourselves, we endlessly extract 
from them little differences, variations and modifications. Conversely, 
secret, disguised and hidden repetitions, animated by the perpetual 
displacement of a difference, restore bare, mechanical and stereotypical 
repetitions, within and without us. In simulacra, repetition already plays 
upon repetitions, and difference already plays upon differences. 
Repetitions repeat themselves, while the differenciator differenciates 
itself. The task of life is to make all these repetitions coexist in a space in 
which difference is distributed. 
        (Deleuze, Difference xviii) 
 Central to the development of this dissertation is the study of the relationship 
between text and interpretation. The project seeks to explicate, as much as possible, the 
main aspects of reading and meaning-making. Though I wish to offer a proposition that is 
both scholarly and sophisticated, this dissertation contributes to its topic by tackling what 
may come across as ‘simple’ or ‘naive’ questions. As such, I do not consider certain 
issues that are often associated with a discussion on hermeneutics. These include attempts 
to state the conditions of true interpretation, deduce the constituents that contribute to 
what appears to be valid understanding and examine the relationship between 
hermeneutics and praxis. Despite being pertinent issues, they are not featured as central 
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concerns in a dissertation where the objective is to deliver a perspective on the becoming 
of hermeneutics. The present thesis seeks to delineate the ‘being’ of meaning-making.  
 As I plan to deliberate over hermeneutics and its nature, my dissertation hinges 
upon the study and assembly of constituents that may lead to an understanding of how 
interpretation ‘is’. In light of this intention, the dissertation focuses on specific themes 
and not selected texts, or particular theorists. With the exception of Chapter Four: An 
Interpretation of Deleuze Reading Proust, which opens the second section of this 
dissertation, to a large extent, I have minimised the inclusion of textual descriptions, as 
well as application of practical criticisms. This is because substantial material has been 
documented for the purpose of illustrating and evaluating the interpretative. That is, 
philosophers and literary theorists amongst others have expended a considerable amount 
of time and effort in the critical examination of making meaning. Research that studies 
the ‘being’ of interpretation (i.e., interpretation studied as an ‘entity’) appears lacking in 
contrast. Therefore, The Hermeneutic Nexus seeks to contribute towards the field of 
hermeneutic research by addressing this apparent scarcity. I would like to advance a 
rigorous discussion that preoccupies itself with thinking about the existence of the 
interpretative.  
 Although I try to be comprehensive in terms of including, as well as analysing 
themes that are relevant to the dissertation, my reflection is necessarily limited. While 
this inadequacy is, in part, a consequence of my incapacity, it is a ‘lacking’ that also 
demonstrates the polysemic nature of interpretation. Therefore, the dissertation will be 
preoccupied with studying the reciprocity between ‘text’ and ‘interpretation’. 
Specifically, the discussion will examine the interrelationship(s) between perception, 
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experience and thought. I frame this affinity against the notion of ‘making meaning’ 
because I intend to posit an association between the interpretative and the yet-to-be-
determined. I propose that the link between ‘interpretation’ and the ‘undeterminate’ is 
demonstrated through the valorisation of the ‘absent’, which will be argued as 
consequential of reading, processing and responding to the phenomena.  
 Generally, the corpus of work central to my research is contributed by theorists of 
a continental origin. They, include Friedrich Nietzsche, Henri Bergson and Gilles 
Deleuze. In my interpretation of the works offered by these theorists, I seek to examine 
the ways in which their concepts rethink, reproduce and re-establish connections that 
relate to a question: What does it take to pursue a discourse of thought that corresponds to 
a construction of meaning? The hypotheses put forth in the dissertation are unified by a 
trio of closely related concepts: perception, thought and meaning-making. That is, how 
does ‘perception’ initiate a ‘thought’ which contributes to ‘meaning-making’? 
 The project is an attempt to produce a sustained thesis that accounts for the 
‘plural-ness’ of the interpretative. Instead of elaborating theories that are devoted to the 
study of hermeneutics, the dissertation, presents the  ‘differencing’ and ‘deferring’ as 
elements that contribute to the task of making meaning. In the context of this dissertation, 
the ‘force’ that will come to characterise the means for interpretation is the becoming of a 
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The Hermeneutics Nexus arose out of my desire to undertake a project which 
investigates the nature of interpretation. Specifically, the current endeavour focuses on 
delineating a concept that will contribute to an understanding of the relationship between 
a text and an interpretation. In other words, this dissertation seeks to elaborate, as well as 
outline a ‘main idea’ which ultimately explains ‘how to interpret’. Because I wish to 
reflect on the practice of meaning making, I will be deliberating over how meaning is 
made so as to examine the nature of how meaning is made. Essentially, The 
Hermeneutics Nexus is about explicating the being of interpretation. Nevertheless, this 
dissertation is neither an attempt to map out the de rigueur of an interpretative practice 
nor a critique of the theoretical models available when researching into the subject of 
hermeneutics. Rather, the work here hopes to lay bare concepts that will help elucidate 
‘what is it for interpretation to be’.  
 Consequently, central to my research topic is the speculation of what interpreting 
might be about. Instead of charting conditions that contribute to an interpretation, or a 
meaning, the aim here is to decipher ‘what does it take to make meaning’. This, in turn, 
implies that interpretation is a ‘process’ and not an object or thing. In short, an on-going 
yet-to-be-ness, or becoming, orientates The Hermeneutics Nexus.  
 Although this premise brings to light a number of difficult provocations, it is, 
basically, a simple assertion. The thesis at hand postulates that the being of interpretation 
involves ‘creation’ rather than ‘discovery’. This is to say, every exposition of ‘being’ and 
‘interpretation’ posits the proliferation of new beings and interpretations. Consequently, 
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in context of this dissertation, thinking about ‘what might interpretation be’ will lead to a 
string of concepts that are ‘poststructuralist’ in essence. That is, meaning is perpetually 
being made within a continuous unfolding. So, concepts including the restless, plural and 
producing will be significant in the development of arguments to come.  
 Further, interpretation and its ‘undeterminateness’1 preclude the ‘repeating’ as 
well as ‘differencing’. Here, ‘repeatable difference’ is, for the lack of a better word, 
privileged over ‘identity’ because it creates all that there can be. If the intention of this 
thesis was to examine the being of interpretation so as to ‘discover’ its constituents, the 
purpose would be to outline the nature or essence of ‘what there is’ (i.e., identity). But, 
this thesis interprets interpretation to be “the art of forming, inventing and fabricating 
concepts” (Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy? 2). Therefore, ‘repeatable difference’ 
creates concepts for interpretation. This production is the result of responding to the 
speculation of ‘what is there’, which opens up a multiplicity of possibilities. By putting 
the repeating and differencing into action, every concept perpetuates possibilities which 
are, in turn, reworked into other possibilities.  
The principle of creation leaves the act of interpretation unfinished and yet-to-be-
determined. It is a force that sees to the manifestation of an infinite trace of possibilities 
to come. Thus, the fundamentals driving the ‘forth coming’ are the ‘creating’ and not the 
‘created’, the ‘producing’ and not the ‘produced’, the ‘interpretable’ and not the 
‘interpreted’. So, the being of interpretation is described by a repeatable difference that 
works to (inter)relate more and more creatings, producings and interpretables. For 
                                                 
1 Instead of using ‘indeterminate’, the dissertation coins the neologism ‘undeterminate’. This is because 
‘indeterminate’ appears to suggest that it is possible to determine something as some thing (i.e., things can 
be quantified and tested). However, in context of this discussion, the undeterminate points to a ‘yet-to-be’ 
(i.e., a be-come-ing that is to be considered with the notion of ‘not-there’: the no-thing).  
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reasons that may appear logical only towards the end of this dissertation, the current 
disposition assumes that creation stays necessarily uncreated if it is to create. Because 
creativity is about the presentation of potential possibilities, the motion ‘to create’ implies 
a ‘not present’. 
 If the being of interpretation is characterised by an unfolding creativity, its 
ceaseless realisation is dependent on a ‘to be present’. Subsequently, the notion of the ‘be 
coming’ points to an infinity which liberates any creation (i.e., interpretation) from being 
determined. A reference to Gilles Deleuze and his explication of the concepts difference 
and repetition puts the present discussion into perspective. Deleuze acknowledges that 
two lines of research occupy his attention in Difference and Repetition (1968): 
[. . .] one concerns a concept of difference without negation, precisely 
because unless it is subordinated to the identical, difference would not 
extend or ‘would not have to extend’ as far as opposition and 
contradiction; the other concerns a concept of repetition in which physical, 
mechanical or bare repetitions (repetition of the Same) would find their 
raison d’être in the more profound structures of a hidden repetition in 
which a ‘differential’ is disguised and displaced [my italics]. These two 
lines of research spontaneously came together, because on every occasion 
these concepts of a pure difference and a complex repetition seemed to 
connect and coalesce. The perpetual divergence and decentring of 
difference corresponded closely to a displacement and a disguising within 
repetition [my italics].  
         (xviii) 
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According to Deleuze, the ‘diverging’ and the ‘displacing’ initiate a ‘differentiation’ that 
“connects and coalesce[s]” all that ‘can exist’: “raison d’être” (i.e., ‘reason for Being’). 
So, it is possible to determine something as some ‘thing’ only because things, symbols 
and concepts are marked as yet-to-be-determined—the undeterminate. For instance, x can 
be presented as ‘x’ because it is not-yet-presented (i.e., unpresented) in the first place. So, 
the presentability of x is dependent on a “hidden repetition”. And this ‘differentiality’ 
refers to an ‘absent’ that ‘decentres’ and ‘disguises’. Thus, x becomes ‘x’ within the event 
of a differentiating sameness. Because the effect of a spontaneity is brought about by 
pure differencing and complex repeating, that which ‘can be’, or ‘is to be’, is determined 
by its own condition of (im)possibility: the repeatable differencing of a “repetition of the 
Same”. 
 Hence, because the possibility of interpreting something as some ‘thing’ is 
already in place, it is possible to interpret. That is to say, the ‘yet-to-be-ness’ of the 
undetermined admits a potential (i.e., the condition of something being possible). For 
instance, Gottlob Frege posits that idioms employ different markers to reference certain 
specific meanings. Further, a marker retains its assigned meaning(s) even though the 
relationship between the two is not a given. He says,   
I adopt this fundamental idea of distinguishing two kinds of symbols [. . .] 
in order to make it generally applicable in the wider domain of pure 
thought. Accordingly, I divide all the symbols I use into those that can 
give us ideas of various things and those that have a fully determinate 
sense. The first kinds are letters, and their main task is to be the expression 
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of generality. For all their indeterminateness, it must be laid down that in a 
given context a letter retains the meaning once given to it. 
         (Frege 1) 
The above citation shows that Frege admits to “adopt[ing]” a particular methodology for 
the purpose of understanding and interpreting a “given context”. By choosing to make a 
distinction between two categories of symbols/markers, which will help to deduce the 
meaning of non-linguistic and linguistic expressions, he exercises a kind of ‘authority’. 
For instance, he envisages a concept which distinguishes between “pure thought” and 
“fundamental idea”, “generality” and “fully determinate”, and ‘unknowable’ and 
‘knowable’, which sets the conditions for processing an interpretation. An inclusive 
survey of occurrences that take place within a phenomenon, Frege’s method advocates, 
anticipates and produces a synthetic construct. As such, meaning-making involves setting 
up a premise and looking for another premise to validate it. This synthesis demonstrates 
Deleuze’s assertion concerning the perpetual divergence and decentring of a difference 
that corresponds closely to a displacement which recurs within the repetitive (Difference 
xviii).  
 And so the above example, which outlines Frege’s explanation of how 
symbols/markers are deployed, exemplifies the complication involving hermeneutical 
research. That is, in what ways can the relationship between a 
representation/symbol/marker and a meaning be determined? For instance, ‘d-o-g’ refers 
to a domesticated carnivorous mammal that has, amongst other characteristics, prominent 
canine teeth, a slender muzzle and (mostly) erected ears. In context of the English idiom, 
‘d-o-g’ is presented and re-presented as ‘dog’ and not anything else. Otherwise, 
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representation will not be able to repeatedly present that which is thought to exist in a 
phenomenon. Consequently, to a certain extent, truth must be a precursor of 
representation. But, ‘d-o-g’ is ‘dog’, if, and only if, it is true that d-o-g’ is indeed ‘dog’. 
So, it is only within the boundary of the English idiom that ‘d-o-g’ is ‘dog’ (i.e., a fixed 
representation of something as some thing).  
 As such, any representation can only produce a version of what is considered as 
‘true’. Furthermore, taking into account that there will always be two, followed by three, 
followed by four . . . truths, more and more versions are set to come. Because this ‘come-
ing’ is essentially an undeterminable surplus, it cannot be conceived through a dogmatic 
representation. Therefore, the representations that are, and will be, associated with ‘d-o-
g’ are neither marked nor bounded by strict parameters (i.e., ‘d-o-g’ = ‘dog’). In other 
words, ‘representation’ does not (and, in the first place, cannot) encapsulate the 
spontaneity of a marker, which tends to differ and defer2. And so, apart from ‘dog’, 
‘mammal’ and ‘companionship’, ‘d-o-g’ will come to reference more and more other 
meanings.  
 To-date, though research on the subject aims at addressing the theory and practice 
of interpretation, the valuable findings do not clear up the problems shrouding it. In an 
attempt to present a perspective of the hermeneutic nexus, this dissertation plans to 
propose the ‘yet-to-be-determined’ as a condition for describing how meaning is to-be-
made (c.f., Frege and his analytic philosophy demonstrate one way of making meaning). 
In addressing the yet-to-be-determined, the interpretative is situated (with)in the 
                                                 
2 On representation, Deleuze says, “[It] fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has 
only a single centre, a unique and receding perspective, and in consequence a false depth. It mediates 
everything, but mobilises and moves nothing” (Difference  55-56).  
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interpretative. It posits that the making of meaning is inherent within the making of 
meaning. Specifically, the argument will refer to the concept of ‘immanence’. On the 
whole, the thesis foregrounds a ‘withinness’ from which meaning-making systematically 
assembles, effects and unfolds.  
 Inevitably, this dissertation explores its area of interest from a particular angle. As 
the thesis is concerned with the reciprocity between text and interpretation, it includes 
specific concepts and studies selected issues that will contribute to the subject of meaning 
making. It would like to derive a quasi-paradigm, a ‘method’ of initiating the 
interpretative, through which the activities of reading, processing and understanding are 
engaged.  
 In spite of the wish to lay out a method of interpretation, its elucidation is 
encumbered by an enigma. After all, the problems that are associated with the subject of 
hermeneutics are plenty and varied. In order to articulate the concerns that are of 
importance to the topic of this dissertation, a brief survey of its genesis needs to follow. 
For a start, the hermeneutic tradition can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy. 
Both Plato and Aristotle advocated hermeneutice, the Greek version of the now Latinised 
marker, as a theory of interpretation. Although Plato was first to deploy hermeneutice in 
several dialogues, which dealt with the contrast between sophia and hermeneutic 
knowledge, it was Aristotle who further developed the concept by relating it with 
semantics and logic.  
 The application of hermeneutics as an access to studying the problematics 
involving textual understanding continued through the Middle Ages and Renaissance. By 
and large, these eras were preoccupied with the task of finding a correct way to analyse, 
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explain and interpret the Bible. Hermeneutic inquiry took on a new direction under the 
influence of Schleiermacher, Droysen and Dilthey. Generally, hermeneutics was 
deployed as a strategy for justifying what objectivity might be. That is to say, apart from 
being a method developed for the purpose of interpreting a distinct genre (e.g., the Bible), 
hermeneutics evolved into a field of study in its own right.  
 The theories which Martin Heidegger expounded contribute to the development of 
what may be thought of as ‘modern’ hermeneutics. To a large extent, his work, which 
maps out the fundamental conditions of Man’s existence, highlights the correlation 
between hermeneutics and ontology. Because he saw hermeneutics as a way of 
interpreting and envisioning life, it no longer remained as a method for understanding, or 
a thrust at communication. Although Heidegger did not deal explicitly with hermeneutic 
issues after the publication of Sein und Zeit (1927), his arguments found continuity in the 
work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
 Presently, a staple feature of literary study is the appropriation of hermeneutics as 
an interrogation of the receptive and interpretative. Theorists whose investigations are 
characterised as ‘hermeneutical’ or ‘interpretative’ include Paul Ricoeur, Jürgen 
Habermas and Andrés Ortiz-Osés. Broadly speaking, they seek the means to bridge the 
gap between ‘ontological’ and ‘critical’ hermeneutics.   
 The desire to interpret is complicated by the fact that a single work can yield a 
variety of disparate texts3. Because a piece of work can yield many texts, so to speak, the 
focus of contemporary hermeneutics is to examine how one interpretation relates to 
                                                 
3 Roland Barthes argues that the concept of ‘work’ is juxtaposed with that of ‘text’. According to him, “The 
text is experienced only in an activity of production” and so a “work can be held in the hand, [while] the 
text is held in language” (Barthes 193).  
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another. This ‘adjusting’ between an interpretation and other interpretations anticipates a 
reciprocity that frames the sustainability of a hermeneutic dynamism. Hence, in context 
of this dissertation, a ‘plural-ness’ constitutes the interpretability of some thing as 
something. 
 The orientation of this dissertation is to think about the interpretative in terms of 
the producibility and dynamism of a text. As interpretations relate with other 
interpretations within a network of undetermined possibilities, this ‘yet-to-be-ness’ 
anticipates a chain of ceaselessness, which is determined by the ‘absent’. Therefore, this 
dissertation purports that hermeneutics is the study of how a text opens up a space of 
possible possibilities, which, invariably, undermines ‘definitive’ interpretations. A 
disposition that favours differing, the thesis argues that the reciprocity between text and 
interpretation is always deferring. So, interpretation presents itself as a version of itself. 
Ultimately, this shifting determinateness is indebted to a ‘bountiful void’, or ‘nothing’. 
This discussion posits that a ‘no-thing’ precludes the momentary representation of every 
thing as something. In a metaphoric sense, there seems to be no escape from Cypher’s 
returning extension of its camaraderie to Exegesis. 
 The interpretative is a fabrication of the ‘uncompletable’ which presents itself 
through a chain of cannot-be-presented (i.e., the ‘unpresentable’) interpretations. As such, 
meaning-making is characterised by a repeating difference as well as a repeatable 
differencing. This premise acknowledges that there is always another meaning ‘to be 
made’. Therefore meaning making defers within itself. And, meaning-making presents 
itself within a passing when it momentarily becomes in a becoming. Therefore making 
meaning differs within itself. Thus, exacerbated by undeterminateness, hermeneutics 
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cannot be approached via mechanical applications of pre-determined criteria. As a result, 
features salient to a text are reinterpreted again and again without a ‘final interpretation’. 
On account of this ‘non-conclusiveness’, hermeneutic research is often burdened with 
descriptors, such as ‘pointless’, ‘tautological’ and ‘vague’. However, can the association 
of hermeneutics with ambiguity be a case of mere misunderstanding?  The example of a 
sorites paradox sheds some light.  
 Suppose that Mary is playing with a heap of sand. If she removes one grain of 
sand from the pile, it still remains ‘a heap’. If she continues to remove single grains of 
sand from the heap, when does the heap of sand stop being a ‘heap of sand’?  To see 
where this example leads, it needs to be illustrated more precisely and so assuming that 
the heap consists of 100,000 grains of sand. If 100,000 grains of sand is considered a 
‘heap’, so would 99,000 grains, 98,000 grains, 97,000 grains, and so forth. As grains of 
sand continue to be removed from the heap, soon there will be but three, two and one 
grain left. Certainly, one, two, or three grains of sand cannot be considered ‘a heap’. This 
situation calls for an analysis of three plausible premises: i) regardless of the quantity, all 
collections of sand are ‘a heap’; ii) regardless of the quantity, all collections of sand are 
not ‘a heap’; and iii) to reject certain aspects that are found in premises (i) and (ii). In an 
attempt to resolve the paradox involving the marker ‘heap’, several perspectives have 
been generated. These include theories offered by Bertrand Russell (i.e., the creation of a 
‘logically ideal language’), Timothy Williamson (i.e., the ‘epistemic’ response) and 
Michael Dummett (i.e., the notion of ‘supervaluation’, which deals with subjunctive 
premise and vagueness).  
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 The ambiguity raised by sorites paradoxes, such as the one mentioned above, is an 
outcome of re-thinking assumptions that have been taken as granted. Further, this cross-
examination eventually leads to a (contrived) resolution of inconsistencies. Ultimately, 
paradoxes raise problems only to seek and arrive at unified solutions, which eliminate 
inconsistencies. Since a similar/common problem afflicts any one category of paradox, 
the solution offered in one specific case-study is automatically applied to all others of the 
same type.  
For instance, in order to make sense of the paradox of the heap, Russell, 
Williamson and Dummett aim to deduce how the marker, ‘heap’, is to be interpreted. In 
this context, the problematics of interpretation is read as ‘semantic’ in nature. Hence, the 
interpretative is studied as an interpretation of symbols and markers (e.g., how do they 
relate to the world, to the subject and the object). This perspective promotes hermeneutics 
as a discourse that strives ‘to interpret’. 
 While the application of interpretation as a tool for making meaning is a worthy 
cause in its own right, the dissertation at hand is more concerned with studying the 
‘being’ of interpretation, or ‘of’ interpretation itself. Thus, the project sets reasoning out 
the ‘nature’ of interpretation as its goal. This intended objective appears naive especially 
since research to date appears incapable of satisfactorily solving many issues that 
confront the subject. In fact, a persistent dilemma impedes any attempt to understand the 
interpretative nature of hermeneutics. Can meaning ‘be made’ if in the first place the act 
of meaning-making is to rely on a body of ‘yet-to-be-made’ prior knowledge?  
 Nevertheless, even if it is really a case of rigorous hermeneutic circularity, the 
causality does not explain itself; it needs to be explained. Thus, the dissertation looks 
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forward to delivering a proposition that can mitigate the hermeneutical dilemma, whilst 
maintaining its integrity as a subject about interpretative possibilities. Also, as the project 
progresses towards delineating the (plausible) entities of meaning-making, it also seeks to 
observe how principal constituents function and interconnect. 
 A number of issues have surfaced in the midst of investigating arguments that 
help shape the prospective view which this dissertation is to undertake. Although they 
were all equally legitimate considerations, the following three top the lengthy list. They 
are ‘what contributes to the concept of perception’, ‘what contributes to the concept of 
experience’ and ‘what contributes to the concept of thinking’. The crystallisation of these 
three issues into but one anticipates an inquiry that involves an explication of the 
‘unpresentable’. Furthermore, this ‘cannot-be-presented’ is correlated to the notion of 
‘no-thingness’.  
 The three considerations mentioned above frame the development of this 
dissertation because it wishes to develop an argument that will approximate the 
interrelations between representations of subject and object when situated in an event of 
interpreting meaning. Therefore, the task at hand focuses on presenting, analysing and 
inscribing ideas that are related to perception (i.e., perceiving), mental image (i.e., 
thought) and meaning-making (i.e., the ‘absent’). That is, how does ‘perception’ initiate a 
‘mental image’, which contributes to the process of making meaning? From the outset, 
the discussion will like to state the following. The ‘force’ that will come to characterise 
the means for meaning making is the becoming of a be-coming: a be-come-ing that will 
see to the perennial birthing of a non-presence: No-thingness.  
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 The concerns that occupy this dissertation are worthy of time and effort because 
thinking about hermeneutics is not merely about devising more and more standards 
against which competing interpretations are weighed and measured. Also, the thesis, as it 
is intended, wants to highlight the limited sense of speaking about ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ 
methods of interpretation. This is particularly so when even agreeable and recognised 
foundations of knowledge generate a fundamental predicament. That is, if it is impossible 
to affirm any method of interpretation as ‘true’, is meaning making to be understood as 
‘relative’ then? If this is the sole recourse, where will such a conclusion, which purports 
that all interpretations are equally valid, eventually lead?4 Hence, instead of examining 
premises that will eventually lead to the situation of having to deal with an impasse, the 
discussion decides to take an alternative path. In short, the dissertation will put forward 
arguments that bear the mark of ‘restlessness’. This ‘transitoriness’ highlights a ‘to-be-
ness’ which frames meaning making.  
 The disposition to construct more and more new idioms is a legitimate tendency. 
After all, the practise of hermeneutics appears to generate a propensity ‘to create’. 
According to Frege, the relation between names or signs would hold only in so far as they 
named or designated something; it would be mediated by the connexion of each of the 
two signs with the same designated things (56). So, markers do not necessarily reflect 
actual representations of how things are. For instance, ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’ are equations 
that carry different implications. So, in order to equate ‘a’ with ‘a’, ‘a = a’ must be known 
a priori. And, in the case of ‘a = b’, the relation between ‘a’ and ‘b’ depends on the 
                                                 
4 Maria Baghramian explores the connection between the relative and interpretation in Relativism (2004). 
See pp. 152-155; 165-170; and, 245-249.  
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meaning(s) that is(/are) assigned to ‘a’ and ‘b’. However, if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are regarded as 
‘equal’, ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’ cannot be different then. 
Frege points out the arbitrary “connexion” between representation and 
interpretation when he says, “Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible 
event or object as a sign for something” (57). Since the correlation between a sign and its 
signification(s) is arbitrary, an interpretation is defined through its difference from other 
interpretations—‘many interpretations can be made’. For instance, a sentence like a = b 
would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of designation. Thus, the 
act of interpretation expresses no proper knowledge (57).  
 In order to demonstrate how signs are polysemic in essence, which leads to an 
overdetermined signification in turn, a brief analysis of an excerpt from John Donne’s 
“The Flea” follows.  
  Marke but this flea, and marke in this, 
  How little that which though deny’st me is; 
Mee it suck’d first, and now sucks thee, 
And in this flea, our two bloods mingled bee; 
Confesse it, this cannot be said 
A sinne, or shame, or losse of maidenhead, 
Yet this enjoyes before it wooe, 
And pamper’d swells with one blood made of two, 
And this, alas, is more than wee would doe.  
         (Gardner 57) 
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In this first stanza of the poem, the marker ‘flea’ is deployed to connote several things. 
For a start, the speaker uses the flea as an instrument of persuasion. Clearly, a speaker-
listener relationship is established because the poem opens with someone saying “Marke 
but this flea”. As the speaker proceeds to present his argument, the flea takes on the 
image of a ‘host’ through which the relationship between the speaker and his lover is 
‘consummated’5. He says, “marke in [. . .] this flea, our two bloods mingled bee” [my 
italics]. By the end of this clause, apart from the abovementioned, ‘flea’ is made to 
connote at least two other meanings.  
 First, ‘flea’ is reduced to being “but” a flea. This lack of worthiness is exacerbated 
when the speaker says, “How little that which though deny’st me is”. In context of the 
argument to come, he seems to trivialise physical intimacy as the act is compared to the 
‘mingling of blood’ within a menial flea. Second, the flea sucking “mee” and “thee”, 
which leads to the exchange of bodily fluids, suggests intercourse of some kind. 
Altogether, the speaker argues that since the both of them have already consummated “in 
[the] flea”, why should the lover “deny’st” him something as “little” as her virginity. 
 In fact, the speaker continues to belittle the “losse of maidenhead” as he tries to 
convince his lover to accept his initiation. He asserts that the rupture of the hymen 
“cannot be said/A sinne, or shame” because even a flea “enjoyes” her blood “before it 
wooe[s]”—the speaker presents an illogical argument here as the loss of maidenhead is 
inevitably linked to the commitment of sin (i.e., religious context) and the bringing on of 
shame (i.e., social context). The stanza ends with a hint of resentment as the speaker airs 
his dissatisfaction that “alas”, in comparison to him, the flea enjoys a more “pamper’d” 
                                                 
5 In the second stanza of the poem, the speaker says, “This flea is you and I, and this/Our marriage bed and 
marriage temple is [. . .]” (l. 12-13).  
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relationship with the lover. By expressing his regret that the moment shared between the 
flea and his lover is “more than wee would doe”, the speaker appears to be jealous of the 
flea, which is “swell[ed] with one blood made of two”.  
  The above short analysis of stanza one of “The Flea” shows Donne’s use of 
irony, wit and wordplay—metaphysical conceit. For instance, ‘flea’ is a metaphor for 
several unlikely personifications. These include the ‘flea’ being all at once an instrument 
of persuasion, a temple of consummation, an expression of a moral stance, and a love 
rival. This reading of Donne’s work exemplifies the difficulties involving interpretation. 
For a start, the ‘undecidability’ and ‘inter-text-uality’ that are borne out of a work seem to 
deliberately resist determination6. Though the critique of a work reaches an interpretation 
at one point or another, the outcome is in no way a conclusion. This is because the unity 
and coherence that are associated with the notion of a conclusion are challenged by an 
arbitrariness that mediates between signs and signs, and significations and significations, 
and interpretations and interpretations7.  
 The differencing and deferring between signs, significations and interpretations 
point to a ‘repression’. And, this ‘force’ presides over an unfolding of differences and 
deferences within entities themselves. This is to say, a certain rigorous logic (pre-)exists 
to effect the openness—the unconstructiveness—of a text (i.e., the ‘yet-to-be-
constructed’ text). Consequently, the central concern of this dissertation is to develop a 
                                                 
6 With regards to the practice of reading, Jacques Derrida says, “Within the closure, by an oblique and 
always perilous movement, constantly risking falling back within what is being deconstructed, it is 
necessary to surround the critical concepts with a careful and thorough discourse—to mark the conditions, 
the medium, and the limits of their effectiveness and to designate rigorously their intimate relationship to 
the machine whose deconsruction they permit [. . .]” (Grammatology 14). 
7C.f., Frege, “But this relation would hold between the names or signs only in so far as they named or 
designated something. It would be mediated by the connexion of each of the two signs with the same 
designated things. But this is arbitrary” (17-18).  
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proposition, a theory of meta-interpretation, which will explain the nature of meaning-
making. In view of this intention, the discussion understands interpretation to be an 
activity that initiates a self-reflexive discourse. Furthermore, this ‘looking inward’ is 
sustained through a web of intricate connections, which inter- as well as intra- relate 
signs and significations. Thus, every sign/signification/interpretation exists only in 
relation to other signs/significations/interpretations. Thus, a text circulates within the 
unfolding of a discourse itself.  
 Subsequently, a surplus of possible interpretations underscores the creating of an 
interpretation. This polysemousness suggests that meaning-making is not dictated by 
traditional boundaries, such as those prescribed by determinism and logos8. Because 
interpretation, as described here, is neither tied down nor confined by a specific 
signification, the process of transforming a piece of work must remain ‘not-
determinable’. For instance, the interpretation of “The Flea” is not defined by the 
language in the poem. If this is the case, ‘f-l-e-a’ will refer to ‘flea’ and nothing else. 
However, due to an absent present (e.g., the determinable or logos-centric) the 
interpretability of ‘f-l-e-a’ falls short of itself and is thereby irreducible. In short, ‘f-l-e-a’ 
refers to a yet-to-be-ness: flea: an absence.   
 The outcome of contesting significations and marginalising differences is the 
constitution of ‘other’. The negotiations within a vocabulary of meanings assign the 
interpretation of ‘this’ as ‘this’ and not ‘that’. All is well, except for the likelihood that 
regardless of its pedigree of exposition, any representation is but a re-presentation of an 
                                                 
8 A deterministic, or logos-centric discourse subscribes to an ‘unalterable’. The idea that something is 
determinable or pervasive points to a structure that is in essence, orderly. In other words, all events result as 
an effect of a central effect.  
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‘other’. That is, the unpresentable re-presentation—a possibility which suggests that 
perhaps representation is ‘othered’ by ‘nothing’. The void opened up by no-thingness 
precipitates an unconditional ‘beyond’ that is maintained through a steadfast 
multiplication of ‘other(s)’ within an other-ring. The continuous unfolding of a borderless 
othering is regarded as a mirror of infinitude. This is a valid assertion because 
interpretation in all its varied forms, including deliberating, believing and calculating, is 
always expressed in the form of the ‘other’ (i.e., ‘that’) and not the represented (i.e., 
‘this’). In short, interpretation is of a singular pluralness. 
 When speaking about the plurality of the interpretative, it seems appropriate to 
consider the relationship between interpretation and thinking. That is, how does thinking 
foster meaning-making? The act of thinking (e.g., reasoning, believing and 
understanding) appears to be closely associated with the inclination ‘to interpret’. 
However, it is difficult to establish why a certain object generates a certain image, which 
culminates in a certain interpretation. In other words, what binds a tangible object and 
intangible concept together?  
 Does thinking x dispose the thought to interpretation ‘x’? The wish to explain how 
the mind interprets something contributes to the inception of several theoretical 
frameworks, which result from the employment of formal logic, as well as concepts that 
relate to mental representation and visual images. Generally speaking, these approaches 
seek to explicate the issue ‘How does a subject interpret’.  For instance, formal logic is 
deployed to understand how representation functions. Therefore, propositional and 
predicate calculus and inferences are some of the means that have been developed to 
articulate knowledge. These methods contribute to the development of a logic that is 
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‘formal’ in essence. They refer to the language of formal logic that is based on semantics 
and/or a deductive system. Subsequently, there are two aspects to the interpretation of x 
as ‘x’. The deductive aspect of an idiom codifies the (possible) inferences that are 
assigned to x. And, the semantic aspect of the same idiom codifies the (possible) 
meanings that are assigned to x.9 So, x is ‘x’ because the logic underlying the reading of x 
constitutes a deducible and thus valid interpretation. But, how do deducibility and 
validity, which validate formal logic, relate to correct interpretation?   
 In The Language of Thought (1975), Jerry A. Fodor puts forward two arguments. 
First, thinking involves the manipulation of symbols. And second, the expression of a 
thought involves the correspondence of conventional symbols (e.g., perceptual 
experience) to a mental language (i.e., an interiority) 10. The arguments that Fodor 
advances convey two salient points. On the one hand, it is possible to interpret because 
the structure of thought—thinking—parallels that of language—expression. Thus, the 
interpretation of x as ‘x’ equates x to ‘x’. And on the other hand, it is possible to allocate 
meanings to markers because they are devoid of an intrinsic meaning to begin with. Thus, 
the interpretation of x as ‘x’ is dependent on the meanings that are assigned to it. 
However, this theory, which seeks to outline a language of thought, appears inadequate. 
If it is a necessity to explain why x is interpreted as ‘x’, it must also be necessary to 
explain how x is interpreted as ‘x’. That is to say, if a mental language validates the 
                                                 
9 With reference to the following titles:  
i) Frege, Gottlob.  Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege.  Eds. Peter  
Geach and Max Black.  Oxford: Blackwell, 1960; 
ii) Montague, Richard.  Formal Philosophy.  Ed. Richmond H. Thomason.  New Haven: Yale UP, 1974; 
and 
iii) Quine, W.V.O.  Philosophy of Logic.  Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970.  
 
10 With reference to Fodor’s concept of language learning. The discussion regards the expression of a 
thought as the manifestation of an interpretation.  
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interpretation of x, something else must validate this very ‘mentalness’. But, if the mental 
is acknowledged as some thing that is ‘intrinsically present’, then, similarly, the 
interpretation of x must be accepted as ‘x’ without the need for any justification (i.e., x is 
‘x’). After all, if ‘mental language’ can be left as a non-derivative, so can the motion ‘to 
interpret’.  
 At its best, the language of thought hypothesis, which Fodor, Zenon W. Pylyshn 
and Gary F. Marcus advocate11, explains experiences that are empirical by nature. These 
include how thought is being produced and how thinking is being systemised. Because 
interpretation, like the understanding of x as ‘x’, consists of constituents that are syntactic 
and semantic in structure, the language-of-thought-type of method is useful in defining 
contents that are ‘propositional’ in essence. However, x is ‘x’, only if it means that x is 
‘x’12. That is to say, the ascription of what x may come to represent becomes dependent 
on a structure of intentions through which it is interpreted. And this premise raises a host 
of issues which require detailed analyses. They include the following: Can the specificity 
of an intention be justified? How does a specific ‘some thing’ correlate with a specific 
intention? Can ‘incorporeal’ substances, such as experience, memory and sensory 
process, be ‘known’? Consider this proposition: If there is no adequate way to re-
represent the incorporeal, perhaps this ‘not-there’ is to be re-presented as a ‘nothing’. In 
context of this dissertation, this ‘nothingness’ refers to a ‘no-thing’. 
                                                 
11 Arguments that support the language of thought hypothesis can be found in the following works: 
i) Fodor, Jerry A.  The Language of Thought.  Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1975; 
ii) Pylyshn, Zenon W.  Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science.  
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986; and 
iii) Marcus, Gary F.  The Algebraic Mind :integrating Connectionism and Cognitive Science.  Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 2001.   
 
12 With particular reference to the propositional content which ‘that-clauses’ bear. For instance, Fodor 
believes that x is ‘x’.   
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 The idea of ‘no-thingness’ may seem to convey an air of deliberate convolution. If 
this criticism, which censures against critiquing for critiquing’s sake, is an accurate one, 
then the theory of interpretation put forward here will no longer fulfil its central mission 
of responding to Socrates’ question, ‘What is x?’ Hence, there is no intention of coining 
new idioms and meanings unless they contribute to the description of how ‘x’ may come 
about. Basically, the dissertation will attempt to delineate entities that have a direct 
impact on the construction of an interpretation. Therefore, the discussion seeks to tackle 
issues including ‘what does it take to perceive’, ‘what is the role played by a subject’ and 
‘how does meaning make’. This is to say, on a whole, the thesis intends to reinterpret the 
recurring arguments that concern a study of interpretation.   
 On the assumption that the trace of thought/s leads the precipitation of thought 
right back to a non-present, maybe x is characterised by a disguised transposition within 
itself. As the discussion outlines the discourse that articulates x, it seeks to posit 
conditions which lead up to knowing x, albeit always insufficiently. Therefore, thinking 
about thought dispenses a restless spontaneity, whereby from thought, to thought, to 
thought . . . ∞ there is only an absent thought. As such, the thesis proposes that thought 
can only be ‘made present’ if, and only if, it can be immanently presented as a ‘there is’. 
So, the presence of a non-presentable thought can be represented by the marker thought. 
Nevertheless, the intention behind this apparent scepticism is not to deny the legitimacy 
of information classified as ‘reliable knowledge’.  
 The occurrence of an event, like ‘a thought’ and ‘an interpretation’, is composed 
by a series of undisrupted happenings. That is, the realisation of something taking place is 
marked by moments that unfold within those very moments themselves. For instance, 
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processes, such as the thinking of ‘x’ and the interpreting of ‘x’, are made up by moment-
within-moment transformations which are connected (i.e., a moment is causally related to 
another moment) and intentional (i.e., moments exists within moments because they can 
be represented). Because an event seem to be an expression of a coherence that appears to 
be ‘specific’, it conveys a sense of ‘there is’. So, x indeed represents x and nothing else. 
Nevertheless, can x be determined as x when the potentiality that arises from the 
synthesis of xs, within xs, within xs . . . ∞ points to a momentariness as well as 
transitoriness that predicate an infinity? So, can x indeed represent x and nothing else? As 
such, ‘there is x’ ought to be re-presented as ‘is there x ’. In other words, from xs, within 
xs, within xs . . . ∞ there is only the x-less. Ultimately, the return to x sets itself against all 
appropriations of it as ‘is’. 
 Yet, can x be observed through the absent? Also, how can the absent supplement a 
presence, which, in turn, presents a possibility of possibilities? Can presence enter into 
the present when its very constitution perpetrates an ‘other-ing’ that determines a 
relentless departing from itself? Consider this possibility: Because absence is an 
accompaniment to the ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ of x, the making of x cannot exist anywhere 
else other than within the presence of that which is not-there. For instance, as a 
constitution of thought’s interiority, thinking takes place in a condition that is essentially 
present (i.e., a ‘there is’). However, because of this very ‘interiority’, the presentness of 
the thought is situated within an unpresentable (i.e., a ‘not-there’). With reference to the 
infinitude opened up by —ing, in a metaphoric sense, this (non)presence is likened to a 
converging junction, whereby crossroads opened up by the problematics of meaning-
making may meet. In a way, because absence anoints becoming, this re-present-ing in 
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itself refracts all possible representations of thought (or x for that matter). That is, being 
singular plural13. Hence, the plural incarnations of thought conflate within the singularity 
of the thought-less. That is, a One/Many14.  
 In order to elaborate on what ‘One/Many’ may come to mean, this discussion 
turns to examine the concept of ‘manifold’15. Though the intention is not to explicate 
‘what does manifold constitute’, for the purpose of advancing the argument to come, it is 
probably useful to include a general understanding of the term here. The concept of 
manifold is explained through its association with topology, geometry and algebra. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari, who reference Charles Lautman’s interpretation of 
Riemann, the manifold is  
[. . .] pure patchwork. It has connections, or tactile relations. It has 
rhythmic values not found elsewhere, even though they can be translated 
into a metric space. Heterogeneous, in continuous variation, it is a smooth 
space, insofar as smooth space is amorphous and not homogeneous. We 
can thus define two positive characteristics of smooth space[/manifold] in 
general: when there are determinations that are part of one another and 
pertain to enveloped distances or ordered differences, independent of 
magnitude; when, independent of metrics, determinations arise that cannot 
                                                 
13 Nancy, Jean Luc.  Being Singular Plural.  Eds. Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery.  Trans. Robert 
D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne.  Stanford: Stanford UP, 2000. 
 
14 The idea of One/Many presented here does not particularly reference, or intentionally reinterpret theories 
that Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas posit. The thesis elaborates on its use of the concept, One/Many, in the 
following paragraphs.  
 
15 C.f., The Continuum edition of Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s book, A Thousand Plateaus (2004). With 
specific reference to this piece of work, the idea of manifold can be traced back to the theories put forth by 
G.W. Leibniz and Bernhard Riemann.  
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be part of another but are connected by processes of frequency or 
accumulation. 
       (Thousand 536) 
This is to say, a ‘thing’ not only exists independently, but also bears certain specific 
characteristics. For instance, a manifold of some things that comprise a set of defined 
properties help x become x. However, the independence that a ‘thing’ possesses does not 
translate into disconnectedness from other ‘things’. That is, a manifold of some other 
things contribute to the set of defined properties which help x become x. To a large 
extent, this proposition points to a process that is both relational and transversal in nature. 
The ‘relating’ and the ‘transversing’ assemble the heterogeneous within a homogeneity, a 
singularity within a pluralness, a one within a many-ness. Thus,  
the two spaces in fact exist only in mixture: smooth space is constantly 
being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is 
constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space [. . .] An aggregate 
of intrication of this kind is in no way homogeneous: it is nevertheless 
smooth, and contrasts point by point with the space of fabric (it is in 
principle infinite, open, and unlimited in every direction; it has neither top 
nor bottom nor centre; it does not assign fixed and mobile elements but 
rather distributes a continuous variation) [my italics].  
        (Deleuze and Guattari,  
Thousand 524-525) 
 
 The One/Many fosters the creating of a thing through its singular becoming, 
which anticipates an aggregation of (re)connections. Subsequently, the potential of any 
thing to become some thing is realised through a network of things that inter- and intra-
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relate. The result of this (re)assembling is an unfolding of new potentials, connections 
and ‘things’. The following example will help explain the many-re-un-folding of a thing.  
 Within the “smooth space” which Deleuze and Guattari talk about, there exists a 
heap of events waiting to happen. But, unless these events-in-the-waiting are 
contextualised by a particular occurrence, they will remain as mere ‘some things’. So, 
assuming that every event corresponds to a set of x and y axes, then, a series of events 
will chain up to form some ‘things’. The diagram illustrates the concept of smooth space. 
 
Clearly, events come together to signify ‘things’ when they connect through the process 
of intra-and inter-relation. Therefore, events that are found along the x2 and y2 make up 
‘x2’and ‘y2’, while those that are found along x3 and y3 make up ‘x3’and ‘y3’. This 
statement bears three implications. Firstly, the x and y axes in the diagram describe a co-
relation between an event and other events. Secondly, the organisation of events under 
certain conditions (in this case, a condition that forms the x- and y-axis respectively) 
demonstrates an assembling that maps the heterogeneous within a homogenous. So, an 
event only becomes ‘an event’ under a specific circumstance. Thirdly, events are free to 
re-relate, reproduce and refold. For instance, d∞2, d∞3, d∞4 . . . d∞ are inter-changeable 
because they are intra-related. In other words, the two dots that cut to create a specific 
intersection, for example, d∞2, occur ‘accidentally’. Since the dots that make up d∞2, d∞3 
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and d∞4 originate from the same heap of yet-to-organised events, their ability to represent 
something must be ‘not determined’ (i.e., d∞2, d∞3 d∞4 . . . d∞). The ‘inherent-ness’ 
between points that intrachange and interrelate highlights an open-ended synthesis which 
randomly ‘become’ within a many-fold16. Essentially, this manifold represents the 
realisation of many as one and the manifestation of one as many.  
 The concept of One/Many, which foregrounds the notion of a pure interiority, 
raises an immediate issue. How can ‘one’ be ‘many’? That is to say, ‘one’ being singular 
is the ‘one and only’, while ‘many’ being plural represents ‘more than one’. However, 
because ‘one’ encompasses ‘many’ within itself, the unfolding of the multiple folds into 
an inside. By virtue of this inward manifestation of one-many, the creativity that 
constitutes One/Many entails that one is nothing more than a fold of the many.  As such, 
events like d∞2, d∞3 d∞4 . . . d∞ are determined by a re-un-folding of the differing and 
deferring which produces the same, but never the exact same. As such, One/Many is a 
signifier of itself and becoming itself a signifier.  
 Hence, the notion of One/Many points to a creation that produces possibilities 
and, ultimately, the infinite. And, this creativity is sustained by a missing which can be 
understood as an abstract gap that is quasi-causal in essence. In other words, all the 
significations that One/Many produces are becomings which are extended from a no-
thingness. Further, this no-thing precedes, demarcates and determines every possible 
possibility, or be-come-ing. For instance, in order to interpret x as ‘x’, its interpretation is 
based on the premise that there is, so to speak, no ‘x’ to begin with. Further, the 
interpretation of x must engage the lawlessness of a no-thing that is invariably dependent 
                                                 
16 The subject of immanence will be discussed in detail later.  
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on the ‘absent’ in its germination. Hence, a performing —ing is central to the expression 
of any event as some thing. That is, a perpetuality sustains the re-representation of events 
as they assemble to be-come an event: a doubling of be-ing and be-come-ing. 
 Although, currently, the explication of becoming and ‘doubleness’ comes across 
as vague, the discussion wishes to point out that these two concepts contribute to the 
understanding of making meaning. Interpretation, like the creation of an event, is 
subjected to the run-of-the-mill, moment-to-moment precipitation, or ‘unfolding’. While 
‘undecidability’ appears to be prevalent of interpretation, the process of making meaning 
cannot be summed up as ‘relativistic’ or ‘indeterminate’.  
 Though there is more than one way of interpreting what relativism may come to 
mean, the discussion at hand identifies the position that is undertaken by Karl R. 
Popper17. He asserts that “One of the components of modern irrationalism is relativism 
(the doctrine that truth is relative to our intellectual background)” (Popper 33). According 
to Popper, the thesis of relativism legitimises the indifferent, nihilistic and anarchistic. On 
the one hand, when construed as positive, these characteristics accredit relativism to be 
egalitarian18. On the other hand, when viewed negatively, these very same qualities also 
deem it tautological. Similarly, the indeterminate seems to imply that there is no way of 
verifying the accuracy or inaccuracy of any thing19. This no-right-approach endorses a 
                                                 
17 With reference to Karl R. Popper, The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality.  
Ed. M.A. Notturno.  London: Routledge, 1994. While Popper’s perspective on the relative is supported by 
others, including Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty, their viewpoints—that relativism tends to lean towards 
the indifferent, nihilistic and anarchistic—do not come across as clear as his.  
 
18 With reference to Robert Nozick’s comment that “relativism is egalitarian” (19).  
 
19 Other texts that explore: 
i) The notion of determinism:  
Honderich, Ted.  A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience, and Life-hopes.  Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988; and 
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circularity, whereby a conclusion serves as a premise as well. However, the 
undecidability that the present discussion posits neither culminates in a perspective which 
is relativistic, nor involves the indeterminate. As such, the ‘undecidable’ has nothing to 
do with the cannot-be-determined. Hence, maybe, the ‘undecidable’ connotes the 
‘undeterminable’, or ‘yet-to-be-determined’.    
 The ‘undetermined’ brings to mind, the notion of mimicry. Here, ‘mimicry’ 
represents the doubleness of a be-coming that ensures the fission and fusion of the many 
potentialities, which are propelled by the be-come-ing. As meaning-making resists the 
determination of ‘is’, it gravitates towards a restless ‘be-come-ing’ to ‘be-come’. So 
meaning becomes, albeit momentarily. Thus the drafting of apparatuses that are meant for 
the exemplification of abstract relations between states of inertia and movement is a 
consequence of thinking about meaning making. The undeterminate effects and affects a 
relay that is both self-perpetrating and self-perpetuating. Nonetheless, what is the value of 
an automated diffraction and refraction apart from leaving behind a playful trace of 
exhilaration—or, anxiety—which always conveys an undetermined text? In other words, 
how can the undeterminable contribute to ‘knowing’? Before tackling the issue of ‘how 
to know’, the discussion needs to first gain an insight on the making of meaning. And so, 
it will have to examine the issue of what constitutes signification. Specifically, what can 
‘to signify’ come to mean? 
 The dissertation intends to assert the following argument. The process of 
signification is a continual rebirthing to a presence, whereby the yet-to-be-determined—
                                                                                                                                                 
ii) The notion of indeterminism: 
Anscombe, G.E.M.  “Causality and Determination”.  Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and 




the undeterminable—is determined. Therefore, ‘to signify’ connotes the infinite. This 
undeterminateness highlights a tendency which the interpretative exhibits. That is, the act 
of interpretation cannot, via pre-determined categories, be mechanistically deduced. 
Nevertheless, does categorisation serve no purpose other than to create more and more 
artificial boundaries? The discussion proceeds to examine this issue by studying the 
subject of the unconscious and conscious. 
 In The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Immanuel Kant responds to the 
“problematic idealism of Descartes, who declares only one empirical assertion (assertio), 
namely I am, to be indubitable” (326) with a theorem that states “The mere, but 
empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of 
objects in space outside me” (327). In other words, Kant posits that “the consciousness 
of my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other 
things outside me” (327). He cites the example of being aware that his existence is 
determined in time. According to Kant, time represents the a priori, a pure intuition, 
which is discoverable only within the subjective consciousness. Because the intuitive is 
transcendental in essence, it neither needs to be validated by the empirical (e.g., 
Descartes) nor inductive reasoning (e.g., Hume). Kant explains his argument: 
[. . .] the representation I am, which expresses the consciousness that can 
accompany all thinking, is that which immediately includes the existence 
of a subject in itself, but not yet any cognition of it, thus not empirical 
cognition, i.e., experience; for to that there belongs, besides the thought of 
something existing, intuition, and in this case inner intuition, i.e., time, in 
regard to which the subject must be determined, for which outer objects 
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are absolutely requisite, so that inner experience itself is consequently 
only mediate and possible only through outer experience. 
         (328) 
Thus, according to him, an a priori synthesises the interpretations that come about due to 
the conscious act of perceiving. That is to say, a pre-existing set of (intangible) conditions 
prescribes ‘a holistic impression’ on an existing (tangible) conscious, thereby constituting 
‘I’ as ‘I’. Thus, consciousness is the channel via which unconsciousness is reasoned out. 
Though the intention is to make sense of the ‘intangible’—in this case, the unconscious—
Kant asserts that, regardless of the approach, the actual dynamics of this 
unobservable/unknowable can never be stated. At best, ‘the ways of knowing’ (i.e., the 
methodologies devised to gain knowledge) can only serve as artificial means for 
interpreting the phenomena. Although Kant draws up a boundary between the ‘knowable’ 
and ‘unknowable’, it is obvious that one qualification sustains the other—for without one, 
there will be no other. In view of their intimate correlation, perhaps, a pair of binary 
opposites is really a unit in itself? Perhaps, “Everything that happens is hypothetically 
necessary; that is a principal that subjects alteration in the world to a law, i.e., a rule of 
necessary existence, without which not even nature itself would obtain. Hence the 
proposition ‘Nothing happens through a mere accident’ [. . .] (Kant 329).  
 The above discussion appears to foreground a connection between a ‘singular’ 
and the ‘plural’. In fact, a single some thing appears to be made up of a plural of some 
things. Similarly, the open-endedness of that which makes meaning is consolidated 
through a force that unites. For instance, though markers belonging to a specific idiom 
have the potential to take on more and more interpretations, collectively, they form a 
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peculiar locus of meaning(s). This, in turn, results in the expansion and convergence of 
greater and wider unit/ies within a unity itself. And, the fruition of unit/ies is sanctioned 
by a ‘virtual-ness’. So, the continuity of this ‘virtuality’ is granted freedom to unfold in 
its own excesses. By the constitution of a no-thing, the ‘virtual’ is a differentiation of the 
same. That is, a ‘self’ which repeats from itself, through itself, within itself.  
 Subsequently, the no-thing is characterised by the intangibility of the tangible. 
And this ‘absence’ maintains the mode of self-sufficiency within which signification 
operates. Of course, this does not imply that markers are absent of signification. For 
instance, ‘t2’ is interpretable as ‘t2’ because the qualifying ‘other’, such as ‘t3, t4, t5 . . . t∞, 
negates, as well as, defines it. As the finite embraces the infinite by determining ‘what is’ 
through ‘what is not’, the singularity of an ever-returning repetition unfolds within a 
folding. The infinite is a successive demonstration of the ‘not-being-there’: No-thingness. 
 The notion of the ‘no-thing’ is well studied by many eminent philosophers. 
Although their philosophical trajectories are marked by extensive differences, Spinoza 
and Hegel theorise that every existence belongs to some kind of universality and 
‘ceaselessness’. Moreover, just as the marker ‘t2’ is qualified by a host of ‘other’s, 
including t3, t4, t5 . . ., the infinite is correlated with at least one ‘other’, the finite. 
Consequently, the finite needs to prevail when inquiring into the infinite because it is the 
mode by which the immeasurable infinitude corresponds. And so, the infinitude of 
infinity sees to the intelligible perpetuation of ‘t’ (e.g., in the realm of virtual- time and 
space) and the finitude of the finite sees to the sensible manifestation of ‘t’ (e.g., in the 
realm of actual- time and space).  
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 For instance, the making of ‘t’ is attributed to a time and space within the context 
of an absent time and space—the immanently incorporeal. An orientation that is imbued 
in ‘materiality’, it departs from the Platonic world of ideas, which distinguishes between 
the sensible and intelligible. The co-relation of meaning making/signification to 
materiality is an attempt to think of the ‘virtual’ as an ‘actual’ process. So, though the 
incorporeal sustains an infinite temporality, the immanent attests to its momentary 
actualising. As such, the passing on of ‘t’ being ‘t’ in a ‘real’, ‘physical’ and ‘observable’ 
sense serves as a guideline for all the possible passings of all ‘ts’ to come. 
 Fundamentally, the dissertation studies the problematics encircling meaning-
making in context with some ‘thing’. This ‘thing’ can be thought of as being ‘material’ in 
essence. Besides, this materiality facilitates the causal-like unfolding of the yet-to-be-
determined, like ‘t2’, ‘t3’, ‘t4’ . . . t∞. With particular reference to theses belonging to 
Nietzsche, Bergson and Deleuze, the paper sets out to put forward a thesis of (pure) 
affirmation. Nevertheless, this logic of withinness is not an end in itself. Rather, it is yet 
another way of thinking about, as well connecting different relations with-in the 
iterability of a singular plural: —ing. 
 Some final words are needed before closing this introduction. The two main 
components, Section One—Of Interpretation and Section Two—Interpretations, of the 
dissertation are not written in a sequential order. Section two, which consists of an 
interpretation of Deleuze reading Proust, an interpretation of time and an interpretation of 
space, was written first when I tried to deploy Deleuze and the notion of time and the 
concept of space as resources for thinking about the critical trajectories, methods and 
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frames of inquiry related to hermeneutics. The purpose of this necessary detour is to 
rethink the correlation between meaning-making and interpretation.  
 Section One—Of Interpretation, which opens the dissertation proper, is written in 
a sequential order. This first section is comprised of a brief address, followed by three 
chapters: first, Thinking about the Nature of Perception; second, Thinking about the 
Nature of Mental Images; and third, Thinking about the Nature of Meaning-making. As a 
whole, Section One elaborates on the interrelations between ‘subject’ (i.e., the nature of 
perceiving), ‘object’ (i.e., the nature of constructing mental images) and ‘activity of 
interpreting meaning’ (i.e., the nature of making meaning). The affinity between subject, 
object and interpretation will be examined from a perspective that associates 
representation with no-thingness. The focus of Section One is to deliver a set of 
fundamentals that will help in the establishment of a logic of interpretation. Although the 
chapters of the first section unfold sequentially, this order may come across as 
deliberately ‘disordered’ or ‘fragmented’. Hence, to a certain extent, in spite of the 
intended ‘order’, Chapters One, Two and Three can be read in any sequence.  
 Section Two—Interpretations is based on reviews of related theoretical 
considerations and literary works. The discussion will attempt to interpret theories and 
materials that inform interpretation. As such, techniques of interpretation are applied to 
the specific texts, like Deleuze’s Proust and Signs (1972), the notion of time and the 
concept of space. The purpose for this inclusion is two-fold. First, to provide a general 
overview of research that pertains to the topic of interpretation and second, to highlight 
some of the issues which remain problematic presently. As mentioned above, all in all, 
the material that is found in Section Two serves as groundwork for the ‘main’ ideas that 
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are presented in Section One. Therefore, inevitably, there are some repetitions between 
Sections One and Two. 
 With a noticeable degree of naiveté, connections are pieced together in hope of 
delivering a perspective on how thinking is the (absent) addresser, addressee and 
addressed all at once. The dissertation asks simple questions in relation to the problems it 
wishes to tackle and revisits the basics of its topic time and again. As such, instead of 
generating interpretations of works that are being offered by specific theorists, the 
discussion intends to study the fundamental issues that are connected to the subject of 
meaning making. This is to say, the dissertation looks to explicate the problematics as 
well as concepts that are associated with the subject of interpretation. It is intentional that 
this exposition seeks to deliver a thesis that is free from any single perspective or origin. 
This is because central to the proposition it wishes to assert is the notion of ‘becoming’ 
rather than ‘being’. Hence, though an inquiry is initiated, perhaps, nothing resembling an 
answer or solution is offered. Meaning-making, in the present study, is a self-reflexive 
discourse: that is, as a fully-realised and self-contained entity, what the interpretative is 
constituted of and how it stands in relation to all other ‘things’.  
 In this dissertation, the study of hermeneutics for itself leads to the following 
speculation. The act of interpretation tends to exhibit characteristics that are typical of 
something which is perpetually in the process of creating some things. These 
characteristics include slipperiness, tentativeness and inventiveness. As a consequence, 
an interpretation is always layered with a multiple of other interpretations. At the heart, 
then, of the hermeneutic nexus is differment and deferment not essence. Once again, in a 
metaphoric sense, indeed, there is no escape from Cypher’s reign.  
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 Before embarking on any critical or theoretical formulation, the nature and the 
object of the current project must first be restated. One of the dissertation’s main aims is 
to describe the means for pursuing an understanding and perception of interpretation in 
relation to the ontological context of the ‘absent’. Though this objective is central to the 
thesis, it is in no way the entire project. Ultimately, the purpose of establishing a notion 
of ‘the lacking’ is to facilitate an analysis of the constitutions that may become of 
interpretation. The hypothesis wants to foreground the perennial birthing of a non-
presence. That is, a ‘no-thing-ness’ which is consequential of reading, processing and 
responding to a phenomenon.  
 Clearly, the investigation assumes that there is a ‘nature’ to speak about when 
inquiring into the interpretative. In context of this dissertation, this ‘presentness’ refers to 
the ‘being’ of interpretation. Nevertheless, how can the making of meaning be thought of 
in a unitary sense, an ‘a’, when its existence, as delineated in this paper, is dependent on a 
surplus, which results from continual movement and change? Perhaps the overabundance 
of this singularness can be described as “an errant and even ‘delirious’ distribution, in 
which things are deployed across the entire extensity of a univocal and undistributed 
[b]eing. It is not a matter of being which is distributed according to the requirements of 
representation, but of all things being divided up within being in the univocity of simple 
presence (the One—All)” (Deleuze, Difference 46). Here, the notion of “the One—All” is 
interpreted to be a multiplicity of multiplicities. For instance, a garden is made up of 
various elements, including flora and fauna. While it is possible to make out a list of the 
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things that contribute to the characterisation of ‘garden’, there is no way of determining 
what constitutes ‘g-a-r-d-e-n’ exactly. This is because, in order to signify, ‘garden’, like 
all other symbols, must be a marker for the yet-to-be-determined.  
 The process of meaning making establishes the condition that meaning is ‘to-be-
made’. Because meaning ‘can be made’, the interpretation of signs is not based on a one-
on-one relationship between a sign and its referent. For instance, ‘garden’ can, at the 
same time, refer to ‘flora’, as well as ‘fauna’ and ‘living organisms’. Therefore, ‘garden’ 
is a sign that may be employed to denote a host of possible meanings. And, signs, such as 
‘garden’, ‘gardens’ and ‘gardenia’, bear separate sets of meanings because they signify 
through a ‘difference’. That is, a sign means something as it differs from other signs, 
which, in turn, differ from yet other signs. Thus, the meaning(s) that a sign refers to is 
constituted by a chain of differentiations. Accordingly, this sequence sees to the 
connection between signs and signs, whereby a sign is an independent entity as much as 
it is dependent on other entities20. As a sign is defined through its difference from other 
signs, the meaning(s) that it can be made to signify constantly shifts, inter-relates and 
circulates. Subsequently, the multiple-ness of a sign is not a many-fold confluence of 
something that is merely unified. Instead, it is a singular diversity that exists in itself and 
is conceived of through itself. So, every signification is connected to and is connected 
through other significations. For instance, different significations express what the sign 
‘g-a-r-d-e-n’ may come to mean; namely, a tapestry of flora, fauna and other living 
organisms. Because the singularity of a multiplicity cannot be reduced to any one ‘thing’, 
                                                 
20 Further down, the thesis argues that the connection between signs and signs is actually marked by a 
‘withnessness’. i.e., the re-connection and re-constitution within signs and signs.  
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the process ‘of interpretation’ must be conceived as a potential that produces producing 
relations. In short, it is a be-coming that cannot become. 
 In context of the current argument, it is evident that difference, deference, 
repetition, and becoming characterise the (to-be) producibility of interpretation. As a 
matter of fact, the steadfast resistance against that which ‘becomes’ points to a reliance 
on an inclusive no-thingness. This is to say the study of interpretation rests ‘within-itself’. 
Of course, as a key concept, interpretation-in-itself compels the following two questions. 
Is the notion of in-itself ‘fundamental’ since its innerness sanctions the interpretable? If 
this is indeed the case, can the dynamism of an ‘other(-)ing’ come to mean anything 
then? These two issues which concern ‘of interpretation’ point to a correlation between 
be-ing, the continuity of possible existent-s, and be-ing, the continuing of possible 
existence. The present argument postulates that the condition ‘to be’ affects the be-ing of 
be-ing. Subsequently, the material in this dissertation looks to address these issues by 
examining the ‘being’ of the ‘within’. That is, since the be-come-ing virtually becomes 
without actually becoming, the passing of such a transition is immanent. Therefore, 
immanence designates a relation between some ‘thing’, in this case, the ‘interpretative’, 
and the interiority of the ‘other’, which will be explained in the course of this present 
discussion.  
 Hence, Section One, Of Interpretation, will be an inspection of how the 
interpretative relates, orders and represents creatively. The opening paragraphs of this 
section suggest that the continuity of the interpretable is underscored by a manifestation 
of an ‘itself’ that can never be realised. Although interpretation-in-itself is not reducible 
to ‘a context’, the forces that help to produce its creation involve a specific orientation, or 
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milieu. Thus, the intention here is to consider the subject in relation to the question, 
“How does thought correspond to the construction of a meaning?” In order to respond to 
this question, the discussion will study three concepts: perception, thought and 
interpretation. In short, how does ‘perception’ initiate a ‘thought’, which will contribute 
to an ‘interpretation’? 
 As stated in the first paragraph of this section, the discussion posits that ‘of 
interpretation’ is closely linked with the absent. And, the description of this affiliation 
will be carried out in the three chapters to come. Namely: Thinking about the Nature of 
Perception; Thinking about the Nature of Mental Images; and Thinking about the Nature 
of Meaning-making. The discussion views that the analysis and construction of a 
‘perception’, a ‘mental image’ and a ‘meaning’ rest upon a ‘non-presence’, or, more 
decidedly, a ‘no-thing’. 
 The explication of complications involving perceiving, thinking, meaning-making 
and no-thing finds an affinity with the theories of Nietzsche, Bergson and Deleuze. The 
discussion deems their self-styled discourse, which couples a renewed logic of sense with 
multiplicity, as laying the foundation for considering the ‘yet-to-be-thought’. Hence, the 
present (re)interpretation of Nietzsche, Bergson and Deleuze’s work, which is necessarily 
situated, extrapolates three things. First, thought exists within a ‘gap’. That is, the 
difference which relates the relationship between a subject and an object. Second, 
attention is being paid to events that are in the making. Third, the subject is a construct of 
both difference and event. In order to see how these assumptions contribute to the 
assertions that this dissertation makes, Chapter One will address the question, ‘How do 
difference, object and subject cohere?’ 
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Chapter One: Thinking about the Nature of Perception 
 
 
 Thinking about the Nature of Perception considers the connection between an 
object and a subject’s perception of it. By means of studying the phenomenon as it 
appears to its subjects, interpretation, an important activity central to existence and 
knowledge, is considered. The study of how a thing is perceived and how it is interpreted 
concerns the uncovering of constitutions, connections and significances that correlate 
perceiving with understanding. Because perception accompanies a subject’s 
interpretation of his/her surroundings, this process of ‘reading’ and ‘understanding’ 
yields a way of exploring how the former, in turn, is the phenomenon. In other words, the 
subject is not simply an ‘end-product’ which is constituted by the social fabric. S/he plays 
an active role in determining that constitution as well.  
 For a substantial period of time, philosophers and theorists have raised questions 
concerned with the subject of perception. These include ‘Is perception associated with 
matter?’ ‘How is perception related with the senses?’ and ‘How does matter correlate 
with sense?’ For instance, the knowledge that ‘any carnivorous mammals of the Felidae 
family’ are called a ‘cat’ requires the sensibility of a mind. But can ‘matter’, like ‘cat’, be 
posited as ‘material’ when its assumption is made based on an ‘ontological’ substance, 
like the ‘mind’? This foregrounds an ambiguity. Is matter real/material, or can it be 
considered as abstract/ontological? Besides, if the ‘mind’ intervenes in the interpretation 
of ‘matter’, should other components belonging to the same category not have the same 
level of influence as well? (e.g., ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’)? In context of this discussion, 
 46
explanations that offer perspectives on ‘how the world is’ serve little purpose. This is 
because where perception ‘arises from’ remains debatable 
 Since the present discussion does not intend to decipher what constitutes ‘is’, 
phenomenological descriptions, including ‘undeniable knowledge’ and ‘experience in 
itself’, play a limited role in this discussion. Thus, at this juncture, it is necessary to state 
that the premise asserted here does not result from referencing theses that aim to explicate 
‘things in themselves’. However, the notion that consciousness is always conscious of 
something remains significant. After all, intentional consciousness predicates how 
knowledge is constituted. Moreover, bearing in mind how a ‘gap’ readily keeps the ‘to-
be-perceived’ from becoming ‘the-perceived’, it is a case whereby the intentionality of 
consciousness is in constant denial of itself. And if this is indeed one of the conditions for 
knowing, a description that originally privileges the phenomenological principle is 
converted into one that rallies behind epistemological investigations (i.e., the 
(un)determining of the knowable within the (un)knowable). 
 This chapter will study the nature of perception in three sub-sections. Namely, 
‘The Method’, ‘The Constituents’ and ‘A Theory of Perception’. Altogether, these sub-
sections take into consideration how a ‘gap’ acts as an ‘invisible force’, which governs 
the perceptibility of the perceptible. First, the method for thinking about perception is 
considered. Second, the constituents that make up the method are delineated. Third, a 
theory of perception, which draws on the findings concerning its method and 
constituents, will be delivered. Conclusively, this theory of perception proposes the 
(non)presence of a presentable perception. Though reminiscent of Bergson’s theory of 
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pure perception, the material ahead looks to extend the familiar by making an observation 




 By now, it should be apparent that conditions and determinants of perception 
resist delineation. Consequently, questions relating to the features of perception, such as 
‘what exists’, ‘what are its constituents’ and ‘what enables an interpretation of it’, do not 
yield answers easily. After all, how is it possible to observe the unobservable and to lay 
the conditions of the unconditioned? The marginal headway made since Pre-Socratic 
days attests to the difficulty posed by the issues mentioned above. Instead of clarifying 
and organising knowledge, methodology after methodology is met with objections 
because there is no consensus for verifying the way to know. In order to validate this 
assertion, it is necessary to take a brief look at two hypotheses that have been drawn up 
for the purpose of determining the nature, possibility and scope of knowledge (i.e., 
epistemology). 
 According to Adam Morton’s guide to the theory of knowledge, the study of 
epistemology yields two extreme views: “radical externalism” versus “deep scepticism” 
(2). He says,  
So there are three central questions that the theory of knowledge tries to 
answer.  
 What qualities should our beliefs have? 
 What qualities do our actual present beliefs have? 
 What qualities could our beliefs have? 
       (Morton 9-10) 
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In order to examine the various possible answers to these three questions, Morton 
considers two concepts, ‘externalism’ and ‘scepticism’. He explains that 
The first would be extreme error-avoidance, avoiding at all costs acquiring 
any false beliefs at any stage of trying to understand the world. The other 
would be the choice that contrasts most dramatically with this, extreme 
ignorance-avoidance, and avoiding at all costs having a shortage of the 
beliefs [. . .] The extreme error-avoider would argue that if we build our 
beliefs up carefully, avoiding getting any false ones, we will eventually 
get true and useful beliefs on any topic we investigate. And the extreme 
ignorance-avoider would argue that beliefs that contradict the evidence are 
not going to be useful, so that in trying for useful beliefs we will end up 
with beliefs that are as near to true [. . .]. 
         (Morton 77)  
In any case, regardless of whether a theory seeks to ‘avoid error’ or to ‘avoid ignorance’, 
the aim is to explain why a ‘process’ may result in the acquisition of reliable knowledge. 
Further, both the error-avoider and the ignorance-avoider wish to determine the way in 
which information can be processed and communicated so as to establish true knowledge. 
For instance, in order to guard against having false beliefs, the error-avoider proceeds to 
separate fact from fiction by gathering knowledge that can be justified via reasoning 
and/or an assembly of evidence. And, in order to be certain that valid reasons are given 
for all beliefs, the ignorance-avoider strives to ensure that justifications are as true as they 
can be.  
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 Although classification, such as the two categories mentioned above, is an 
undertaking that renders merits, it remains inadequate when explaining how knowledge 
comes about21. To a large extent, this shortcoming is the result of a problem which is the 
tendency for categories to gravitate towards methods that are reductive in essence. This is 
to say, the desire to locate the ‘core’ that constitutes knowledge has led to an impasse. A 
system of classification demarcates categories which are used to evaluate the similarities 
and differences between the one category and another. Since a category is like a template 
of some kind, it is presumed to be constant and unchanging even when fresh evidence is 
discovered and new theories are to be considered. Because all possibilities are being 
categorised as one thing or another, the act of classification becomes dogmatic, restrictive 
and reductive. For instance, the error-avoider believes that empirical evidence alone, such 
as the perceivable, touchable and audible, serves as proof of truth. But this approach does 
not take into account that certain knowledge cannot be gathered ‘externally’. Likewise, 
the ignorance-avoider believes that true knowledge is gained by discovering exactly how 
every belief is supported by the available evidence. However, can all beliefs be supported 
by evidence? And is it not possible that false beliefs become true when new evidence is 
discovered?  
 Fraught by debatable reasoning and summations, such as those mentioned above, 
the problematics that involve knowing cannot be resolved through a system that seeks to 
classify. Though the act of classification offers a perspective as well as produces positive 
                                                 
21 Classification foregrounds the relationship between a category and other categories. Also, the system 
situates categories within their respective homogenised context and production, which enables specific 
interpretation. However, classification is ultimately an abstract conception. Because a category is mapped 
out based on conditions that are artificially drawn up by those who subscribe to it, the process of 
classification is neither objective, nor neutral.  
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connections, the process of drawing up demarcations ends up raising substantial 
discontent. Perhaps, then, the problem of thinking about the nature of interpretation 
requires reengineering.  
 Realistically speaking, it is hardly possible to erase knowledge that has been 
accepted as ‘known’. However, to pinpoint the problem(s) concerning perception, a 
suspension of disbelief is required. For instance, in the opening lines of Matter and 
Memory (1988), Bergson rallies the reader to slip into temporary amnesia. He says, “We 
are going to feign for an instant that we know nothing of the theories of matter and of the 
theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions concerning the reality or ideality of the 
external world” (Bergson, Matter 17). The strategy of ‘feigning’ is nothing new 
especially after Descartes had deployed it to raise radical doubts about the existence of 
everything external by conjuring the malicious all-mighty demon. Similarly, the fiction 
called for in this discussion is meant to initiate a cross-examination of widely-accepted 
methods and reasoning. But, what purpose does this course of action serve? 
As a point of departure, feigning ignorance pares down “the habits formed in 
action […] the sphere of speculation, where they create fictitious problems, and that 
[thinking about the nature of perception] must begin by dispersing this artificial 
obscurity” (Bergson, Matter 16). Nevertheless, this process of ‘returning to the basics’, 
which reveals the core(s), is not yet another triumph of methodological reductionism. In 
line with subjects that find affinity with the notion, ‘small is beautiful’ (e.g., physics and 
biology) the objective here is to put forward explanations that are simple and art-less. 
Collectively, these attributes see to the development of a methodology similar to micro-
reductionism. In a strategy that readdresses basics as micro-entities, the primary building 
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blocks of perception are, thereby, laid. Moreover, these fundaments of perception 
contribute to an understanding of how a subject extracts and uses the information which 
the environment ‘extends’. Thus, thinking about the nature of perception must commence 
from and constantly return to these bearers.  
 The liberation of a thesis from layers of “artificial obscurity” urges a return to 
immediacy—the direct22. Because the immediate does not require the invention of any 
intermediary, such as a subject, memory and causality, the taking place of that which is 
‘taking place’ becomes an important event in itself. That is, the very instantaneity of 
intrinsic interactions happening within the dynamics of ‘something taking place’ leads to 
a production of the producing. As a whole, the occurrence is an outcome of confluent 
forces that aggregate to become an event. This ‘occurring’, which is made up of a 
synthesis of events, is an actualisation that demonstrates the affecting as opposed to the 
effecting. 
 An example helps to illustrate the point mentioned above. For instance, water 
solidifying into ice during winter is a momentary occurrence due to the co-incidence of 
metrological conditions, such as passing weather patterns, temperature changes and 
chemical reactions. Therefore, it is inapt to say that during winter ‘water becomes ice’ 
because it will imply that there is a fundamental change in the components that make up 
water. Instead, it may be more appropriate to think of the transition as ‘water is 
solidifying’ because the semantics of the statement encapsulate an actualising of the 
event’s dynamic state (i.e., the process can be recast as an uninflected verb form that is 
being put into action). The phrase, ‘to solidify’, being free from plausible limitations, 
                                                 
22 Ref., Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 137. 
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signals the individuation of water and solid-ness, whilst capturing the dynamism of the 
event’s happening. In spite of the intra- and inter- relationship between ‘water’ and ice’, 
the distinction of element from element, occurrence from occurrence and event from 
event marks a differentiation that maintains the integrity of entities, bodies, or states. 
Nevertheless, if the expressed is not a resemblance of the process that expresses it, how is 
the immediate to be conceived?  
  The directness of immediacy is delivered on two levels. Reminiscent of the sense 
and reference distinction first made by the Stoics, the two equal planes described here 
construct a difference that puts sense and sensibility ‘on par’ in spite of the dichotomy. 
As such, the immediacy of sensibility is both constituted by, as well as, divided from 
sense. Furthermore, the congruency between the two planes can be understood as a 
mingling of the tangible with the intangible. What Deleuze calls the “frolic” (Logic 5) on 
a surface of occurrences, the material and the incorporeal become one in a morphing that 
ultimately composes ‘entirety’. The following example illustrates this event of sense-
ability. ‘The tide is ebbing’ expresses an inherent sense within the observation. That is, 
regardless of how many times the tide ‘has ebbed’, the sense of ‘The tide is ebbing’ 
remains inexhaustible. In other words, the observed can be reduced neither to a specific 
state, nor an infinite series of specific states owing to the occurrence (i.e., the ebbing of 
tide). Thus, while the immediateness of an occurrence possesses the temporality of 
‘present’, the incorporealness guarantees its escape from the presence of a present. This is 
to say, the tide has always ebbed and has yet to ebb. As such, the incorporeal effect of 
‘ebbing’ can never manifest completely.  
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 A recapitulation of the above content directs the argument towards a (re)‘turn’. 
And so, the notion of immediacy will re-examine as well as revise the conventions that 
have been accepted as ‘common sense’. By reinstating and reinventing the problems 
encircling the nature of interpretation, the prospective viewpoints will bear the hallmarks 
of ‘free-play’. That is, a process of creative transformations where the returning passes on 
again and again as it morphs into differing states. To demonstrate what this 
(pseudo)freedom means to the present endeavour, the discussion, hereby, defines the 
problem of perception as one that rests in ‘itself’. This assertion reinforces the 
proposition that the issue at hand is one that relates to itself, and to itself alone.   
Theoretically speaking, the next step should involve outlining an argument that 
would lead to a perspective of perception. However, this will throw the discussion off the 
intended course since it has not put forward a thesis concerning its make-up. Therefore, 
the sub-section following this approximates the constituents of perception. It is an 
approach which may eventually lead to a hypothesis that finds an affinity with 
‘differentiality’. A three-part differentiation that presents a fixation and delimitation of 
the perceivable altogether, it represents a ‘whole’ which continually opens up new 
productions and connections, as opposed to bringing closure and completion. What 
follows then is an attempt to deal with the question, ‘How does perception relate to that 




 What is perception? To a great extent, it is a subject’s interpretation of his/her 
surroundings. S/he churns out an account of ‘what is happening’ by making sense of 
 54
information that is ingested, sieved and transmitted by the five main sensory organs. 
Herein lies the problem of perception. Is perception concerned with a thing, which is 
perceived by a mediator like a subject, or a fact, which deems some thing as ‘true’? 
 If perception is about things, then, generally speaking, the condition is ‘non-
epistemic’. This means that x is deemed ‘x’ without the need of verification. For instance, 
statements such as ‘A cat is resting on the mat’ and ‘An eclipse has the sun hidden’ do 
not require identification. Other ‘better’ instances include ‘Aliens live on Mars’ and 
‘Poltergeists exist’. In these examples, there is no need to ‘know for sure’ if a cat is 
sitting on a mat, an eclipse shadows the sun, there are aliens on the planet Mars, or 
poltergeists really exist. 
But if perception is about facts, then, the condition is ‘epistemic’. Therefore, x 
cannot be determined to be ‘x’ without some sort of verification. So, evidence is needed 
to affirm that cats can rest on mats, the sun can be eclipsed, and Martians and poltergeists 
exist. Nevertheless, perception’s role is not limited to providing its subject with 
knowledge about the environment. Observations suggesting possibilities, such as those 
associated with the mannerisms of a cat, the course taken by an eclipse, the existence of 
aliens and poltergeists, may merely be deductions made based on subject-relevant 
information that is widely accepted, and/or a subjective whim. As such, the discussion 
notes that there must be more to perception apart from ordinary seeing. In other words, 
interpreting meaning spans beyond the given information of what a thing is or is like. 
This assumption draws attention to the possibility that the perception of a perceived may 
just be about perceptual experience (in) itself.  
 55
 To put it simplistically, perception is comprised of two main aspects. They are the 
‘physiological’ and ‘psychological’. While much could be said about what happens 
within the body of a subject once data is being picked up via an array of stimuli, and 
equally much could be written about the mechanisms that participate to compute the 
experience, the aim here is to study perception as an ‘intention’. This is to say, the 
exercise sets out to delineate the various components for thinking about perception and 
see how they piece together—or at least contribute to an understanding of the issues 
presently at stake.  
 The creation of every perception involves a thing/event, a subject and a discourse. 
To gain an understanding of how these constituents all fit in, a detailed study follows. 
Because an interaction is often defined in terms of an exchange between a thing/event 
and a subject, the discussion assumes that a certain sense of ‘extension’ is at work. By 
virtue of this extensionality, which refers to an external some thing, or a set of things, 
objectivity is inferred. Thus, the sustenance of a thing/event is independent of a subject’s 
perception and a discourse’s interpretation of it. And, the ‘object’ functions within an 
arena that is governed by its own set of rules and regulations. All in all, a thing/event just 
exists—it ‘is’. Notwithstanding its independence, the objectification of a thing/event 
weighs heavily as a necessary complement to both subject and discourse. As a matter of 
fact, the initiation of a discourse, via the subject, is dependent on the extension that a 
thing/event yields. Because the relationship between thing/event, subject and discourse is 
legitimised by extensionality and objectivity, the act of perceiving could be read as an 
aftermath of an auto nomos modification (i.e., an engagement with ‘the pure’). Hence, the 
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first hypothesis of perception is that perceptual discourse itself is essentially trans-
temporal, trans-spatial and trans-political. That is, an expression of pure perception23.  
 The notion of pure perception recalls the doctrine of ‘idealism’. This is especially 
so because ‘pure perception’ like ‘ideality’ describes a disposition towards the intangible 
as well as the qualitative. As such, it may be difficult to delineate, or determine what 
‘pure perception’ can come to mean. But, consider this proposition: Pure perception 
stands to a thing/event as a part to a whole. No doubt many counter-arguments crop up, if 
this is to be considered valid. How is it possible for pure perception to be part of a ‘real’ 
thing/event and, at the same time, also be part of a ‘not-real’ that exists only in theory? 
Also, if the discourse that emerges out of interrelating thing/event and subject only differs 
in terms of technicalities, why does it come across as somewhat ‘less real’? What is it 
that links perception to a(p)-perception? How does (pure) perception correlate with what 
it is perceptive of?  
 Maybe an illustration will prove helpful. Imagine an air-tight cylinder filled with 
a mass of tiny white Styrofoam balls moving about in frenzy. Each Styrofoam ball co-
exists indifferently with all others, ceteris paribus. However, due to some unforeseen 
influence, a group of Styrofoam balls begins to behave differently; banding together, 
these ‘deviant’ Styrofoam balls move in random rhythms. Unavoidably, the sudden 
spontaneity that overcomes this group impacts the behavioural patterns of the ‘normal’ 
ones. Perhaps, the other normal Styrofoam balls will react by gathering together, 
initiating their own course, or simply be pushed around by whatever hits them. 
Whichever the case, as a whole, the dynamics that bind the mass of Styrofoam balls 
                                                 
23 Bergson mentions “pure perception” in Matter and Memory (Chap. 4). However, he sees pure perception 
as an experience of matter, whilst the discussion at hand does not. 
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within the cylinder has been altered. That is, whilst the deviant Styrofoam balls gather to 
make up a ‘deviant’ rhythm, the rest gather to make up an alternative (‘normal’) rhythm. 
 Upon transposing the Styrofoam ball anecdote to the subject of pure perception, it 
is at once observed that a thing/event ‘in itself’ lacks differentiality. This non-
differentiality points to the ‘indiscernible’, ‘indifferent’ and ‘out there’. With a subject’s 
intervention, a thing/event ‘comes to life’, or ‘takes on a life’ because s/he sees and reads 
what it could come to mean. And so, this differentiality creates the ‘discernible’, 
‘different’ and ‘within’. Therefore, the dynamical exchange between a thing/event and a 
subject results in a spontaneity that causes the perceivability of a perception (i.e., the 
perceivable). Moreover, because a particular perceivable correlates with all other 
perceivables in a differentiality, it is necessarily biased. Since perceiveables can never be 
engaged with in their entirety, a perceivable, being determined as an ‘is’, is perpetually 
less than itself. This conjecture is supported by two reasons. First, a ‘something’ 
maintains the gap between all possible perceivables; it keeps the perceivable from 
becoming perceived. Second, perceivability hinges upon a subject’s ability to see and 
read; the limitations that accompany this ability translate into an inexhaustibility of that 
which can be perceived (i.e., the perceivability of a thing/event). And so, although the 
subject enables a representation/perception, s/he is not privileged. Rather, the subject, 
being part of a spontaneous flux of perceivables, is in turn inscribed as a ‘subject’. 
 Up till now, obscurity continues to blur the explication of pure perception. 
Though more needs to be said about the subject before making any firm conjecture, a 
reflection of the discussion thus far seem to suggest pro-monistic tendencies. Basically, 
the above paragraphs give the impression that the perceiving of a perception is 
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entrenched in an entity or, colloquially speaking, some kind of ‘stuff’. This is especially 
so when the nature of ‘pure perception’ comes across as neither physical, nor 
metaphysical. Nonetheless, if the discussion seems to inadvertently lean towards the 
monistic, a single principle that binds all perceivables together, it, hereby, takes quick 
steps to remedy further potential misunderstandings. 
 If a thing/event’s ‘nature’ maintains its ‘invisibility’, its state could be deemed as 
objective. When mediated by a subject, a thing/event becomes perceivable. So, is a 
thing/event Janus-faced? Consider this proposition: Whilst the ‘nature’ belonging to a 
thing/event maintains its integrity as ‘the nature’, this very same primary condition takes 
on a secondary variable when a subject, owing to the mechanics of interpretation, 
composes and outlines a ‘perception’ of it. Therefore, the invisible translates as ‘visible’, 
the unperceivable translates as ‘perceivable’ and pure perception translates as 
‘perception’. As such, central to this discussion is a sense of double-ness rather than the 
reduction of everything to a single governing principle (i.e., monism).   
 The above statement concerning the doubleness of a thing/event needs further 
addressing. First and foremost, double-ness does not construe ‘duality’ or ‘double 
aspect’. The spontaneity professed by the perceiving of the perceivables carries with it a 
certain sense of ‘abstraction’. This ‘missing something’ is an attribution of the 
‘undetermined’ or ‘yet-to-be-determined’. As a consequence, the second hypothesis of 
perception draws attention to an endgame that anticipates differential interactions. Simply 
put, pure perception expresses the differentiation, variation and multiplication of 
perceptions (with)in a single-ness. The commitment to the pureness of perception cancels 
out the possibility of any thing being ‘outside’. So, every perception that comes out from 
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‘within’ is really an (re)assertion of ‘itself’. Therefore, the second hypothesis of 
perception conceives that a ‘multiplicity of perception’ proceeds from the primacy of 
pure perception.  
 Before the discussion proceeds to outline the last differentiation, it will be useful 
to revisit the material presented up till here. Generally, the process of thinking about 
perception has manoeuvred this discussion towards the notion of ‘utopianism’24. That is 
to say, the thesis rests on re-connecting and re-distributing the dynamics between 
references and their accepted meanings. Without wanting to repeat too much, overall, the 
(re)arrangement conflates the fundamental with experimental, the one with many, and the 
pure with mixed. To what end does this fusion serve? In order to highlight a reason in 
support of this strategy, the discussion turns to Bergson.  
 In The Creative Mind (1946)25, Bergson makes a case for the metaphysics of 
change and substance by deploying an illustration which involves men, melodies and 
cricket balls. He supposes that regardless of whether ‘men’, ‘cricket balls’ or ‘melodies’ 
admit changes that are perceivable, their progression amounts to an evolution. In each 
event of (ever) realisation, instantaneous becoming is secondary to the primacy of be-
                                                 
24 Deleuze and Guattari deploys the concept of ‘utopia’ in What is Philosophy? (1994). According to them, 
‘utopia’ represents the connection of an absolute plane of immanence with a specific context that also 
functions through immanence (Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy? 98). Thus, “Utopia does not split from 
infinite movement: etymologically it stands for absolute deterritorialisation [. . . it] refers not only to no-
where but also to now-here” (99-100). So, ‘utopia’ points to the perpetual creating of new concepts because 
there is no ‘The Concept’ to speak of. Subsequently, ‘utopianism’ is about engaging with different ways of 
existing and becoming.  
 
25 This dissertation refers to the 1968, Greenwood Press edition. 
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coming. To facilitate the discussion, ‘men’ and ‘melodies’ are deployed in the following 
example26. 
For instance, when Scott Weiland performs an acoustic rendition of Plush on a 
guitar, does the melody exist? Sure, Weiland exists as the person delivering the song. But 
unlike Weiland, the song lacks ‘flesh and blood’ and so is not ‘real’. Certainly, it is easy 
to see the chain of changes that come together to form his delivery of Plush: the 
strumming fingers, the vibrating larynx and the moving lips. However, it is harder to 
pinpoint the constitution of Plush, although it could be thought of as a melody of varying 
sounds. Perhaps, the best way to explain qualitative changes is through the making of 
comparisons. Plush’s melody is comparable to Weiland’s anatomy: basic structures that 
act as determinants—musical notes dictate the melody and physical attributes combine to 
deliver a performance. Plush’s sound is comparable to Weiland’s rendition: the audible is 
varied, indeterminant and ‘contentless’—the sound is an element that does not really 
exist and the rendition is just one of the many possible versions. Overall, sound, like a 
rendition of Plush, cannot exist all-at-once because being somewhat structure-less, it is 
never a ‘complete’ entity. It is crucial to realise that this incompleteness does not merely 
owe itself to the many possible (in fact, infinite) interpretations of the stated noted and 
bars. Rather, this becoming suggests the immanent workings of a continual variation. The 
assertion refers to a chain of sounds/continuants that varies in the ‘pure’ sense.  
 If the discussion of ‘men’ and ‘melodies’ is extended beyond the current context 
of Weiland, performance, melody and sound, a broader inquiry concerning change, the 
                                                 
26 The discussion chooses to put ‘men’ and ‘melodies’ side by side, and to exclude ‘cricket balls’ because it 
is easier to talk about their momentum of change.  
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event of change and the continuant of change is set into motion. Incidentally, this interest 
in change, event and continuant leads the discussion back to the spontaneity of an  
experience, which asserts a repeated differentiality of differences. The concept of a  
 
continuing differencing and deferencing is represented by:  ↕ deference 
             difference. 
 
Saussure posits that a sign is composed of two elements: the signifier and the 
signified. The signifier is the ‘form’ that a sign takes, while the signified is the concept 
which is being represented. Since a sign is the product of a particular signifier referencing 
a particular signified, some thing must point to something. For instance, uttering the word 
‘dog’ will conjure an image of a canine. Therefore, a signified and a signifier are ‘united’, 
and so a sign possesses intrinsic meaning. Although Saussure recognises the arbitrariness 
between a sign and its associated meaning, he continues to assert that, owing to the 
presence of structures and conventions, the link between these two elements is fixed. 
Nevertheless, if there is no natural connection between the signified and the signifier, the 
correlation between the two cannot be ‘already present’. 
Central to the idea of signification is that the interpretable/meaning occurs 
  
through difference. As signification is generated by difference, which co-relates signs  
 
that exist within a signifying system, it is marked by heterogeneity. That is, the over- 
 
determination of a sign. Furthermore, this surplus, which is the result of a repeating  
 
differentiation, points to a creation that deflects, shifts and restructures the  
 
interpretable/meaning: the undetermined. Hence, the intra-changeability of the infinite  
 
differentiality, ↕ deference, and the repeating deferentiality, ↕ difference, is determined by  
       difference                             deference 
 
a singular (non)presence that necessitates the representation of some thing to be  
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something. So, an interpretable/meaning is perpetually a re-placement of another  
 
interpretable/meaning.  This undetermineness is the predicate for an absence that presents  
 
itself as deference/difference║difference/deference.  
 
The concept ↕ difference appears to be an interpretation of Deleuze and Derrida;  
           deference 
 
it seems to resemble notions, including ‘difference’ ‘deference’ and ‘repetition’, which  
 
are often associated with the both of them. Certainly, ↕ difference belongs to the field of  
                           deference 
 
significations which Deleuze and Derrrida (and others, like Nietzsche and Heidegger)  
 
have helped to produced. Nevertheless, should this dissertation be an examination of 
issues similar to those which concerned Deleuze and Derrida, it approaches them 
differently.  
In the case of the discussion at hand, ↕ difference is located within the presence.  
                    deference 
 
of a present absent. That is, the differencing and deferencing inter- and intra- relate  
 
through itself; it is a function that exists within the functioning of function itself. Hence,  
 
‘difference’ and ‘deference’ are represented as the ‘differing’ and ‘deferring’ without the  
 
mediation of some ‘other’ thing (i.e., it just ‘is’). Subsequently, ‘↕ difference’ approaches  
                      deference 
 
the question of ‘What causes the differential and deferential unfolding of things?’ from  
 
the perspective of a thing yielding to the necessitation of its own necessity; ↕ difference  
                            deference 
 
deems the unfolding to be an immanent movement of difference-within-itself. Hence,  
 
every potential, or every thing already exists within the pure materiality of ↕ difference.  
                                 deference 
 
So, creation is constructed and connected in itself; and, ↕ difference is related to the  
                                         deference  
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deferencing/differencing║differencing/deferencing through difference and deference 
 
themselves. Essentially, ↕ difference precludes the be-come-ing. What defines  
                            deference 
↕ difference then is a pure heterogeneity that unfolds within its own —ing.    
  deference 
 
The above perspective highlights that any actualisation (i.e., rendition) of Plush is  
inadequate for representing the whole of Plush. When the presence of a non-presence is 
engaged as a primary value, a quasi-abstraction validates the insubstantiality of that 
which is ‘not-there’. As a result, in spite of the fact that the actual and the notational are 
supposed to be mutually exclusive, the demarcation is blurred because both contribute to 
making the real ‘real’. It is difficult to explain how the real is both an ‘actual’ and a 
‘notational’ at the same time (i.e., the ‘no-thing’ purposely resists explanation because it 
a ‘not-a-thing’). Thus, as far as explicating the immediacy of the real—the experienced—
is concerned, this thesis avows a compromise between that which is broadly deemed as 
‘empirical’ and ‘idealistic’. 
 At this point, it is probably reasonable to assume that isolated studies of the 
abovementioned components, change, event and continuant, ought to be carried out. How 
else can anything be said of their interrelation? But, can they be compartmentalised and 
be examined in succession particularly when this discussion adopts a non-linear schema? 
For instance, the actualisation of an ‘actual’ is not marked by a successive progression of 
one ‘actual’ after another ‘actual’. The thesis posits a three-in-one instantaneity that gives 
the actualised state an all-at-once reality. Therefore, an actualisation is really a collection 
of immediate actualities made actual through a dynamic field of actual/notation 
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tendencies27. And so, perception follows from the singularity of pure perception; the 
repetition of a same: a multiplicity of multiplicities.  
 To come to grips with a proposition that perpetuates the homogeneous return of 
heterogeneity, an argument which is to validate the presupposition of (non)determining 
principles must be convincing. This thesis once again owes much to Deleuze when he 
elaborates the identification between virtuality and Idea in Difference and Repetition. 
According to him, the virtual is neither a resemblance to, nor a transcendence of, the 
actual. Though he agrees that the ‘thing’ which initiates an ‘Idea’ (i.e., thought) does not 
possess empirical existence, Deleuze extends this Kantian precept a step further by 
proposing that the virtualness of the virtual is dependent on the multiplicity of Ideas. And 
the real-ness of this virtual-ness is substantiated by the event of unfolding events. While 
these thoughts radiate a fair degree of vagueness, Deleuze’s theory of sense, where the 
infinitude of verbs is discussed, seems to make them less convoluted. 
 Because of their infinitival nature, verbs best describe the ‘absent’. That which is 
‘virtual’sees to the precipitation of ‘—ing’. After all, verbs, being precursors of both 
passive and active aspects of an actualisation, possess a multiplicative nature. So, 
virtuality is characterised as an event actualised. Nevertheless, if the relationship binding 
the virtual and actual is just about actualisation alone, then, the repeatable will merely be 
reduced to a repetition of the same. Clearly, in context of this discussion, the talked-about 
repeatability does not convey the impression that repeating is a mere matter of the same 
thing recurring over and over again.  The repeatable must be understood as a continual 
                                                 
 
27 Implicitly, suppositions that draw upon ‘actual’ and ‘notional’ relations, such as dichotomies, binary 
opposites and dualities, are erased.  
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movement that is sanctioned by a differencing. The thesis asserts that difference departs 
from sameness because the event of its realisation is appropriated by a variation in and 
through every repeating. Hence, the third hypothesis of perception posits that the purity  
of perception is maintained by a varying ↕ difference. This refers to a repeatable  
       deference 
 
differentiality-in-itself.  
 There is much to say when it comes to drawing up an understanding concerning 
the repetition of difference/s, as the corpus of work developed by philosophers like 
Spinoza, Nietzsche, Bergson, and Deleuze shows. Generally speaking, they explain 
differencing as an ‘unmediated be-coming’. That is, the relations which posit something 
as ‘something’ occur (with)in some thing itself— the ‘un-negated’. For instance, the 
becoming of x is a result of an immanent process, whereby intra-relations are realised 
through a yet-to-be within-ness. Thus, in an attempt to outline the attributes that make up 
differentiality and deferentiality, the ‘Spinozists’ purport a list of concepts, including 
‘eternal return’, ‘duration’ and ‘experimentation’ that will explain an ontology of  
↕ deference. Though an interpretation of these concepts will prove useful here, the  
   difference  
 
discussion seeks to develop the notion of ‘differencing’ from the basic. This intention 
raises a fundamental question. What is repetition?  
 The marker, ‘repetition’, conveys a variety of meanings. On the one hand, ‘repeat’ 
connotes ‘infinity’, ‘automated recurrence’ and ‘same occurrence’. As the classic 
example of absolute determinism, repetition is an ‘infinite automated recurrence of the 
same occurrence’. On the other hand, phenomena-related conditions, including ethical, 
social and political ones, must encourage repeat’s repeatedness. But how can the 
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‘finality’ of an absolute be reconciled with the ‘continuant’ of the phenomena? 
Nietzsche’s musings on the great dice game of existence (Selections 283) demonstrates 
the reconciliation between the determinate and the undeterminate. Like every possible 
combination that will at some time or other be realised when playing dice, the circularity 
that permeates the world repeats itself infinitely. That is,   
[ . . .] since between every ‘combination’ and its next ‘recurrence’ all 
combinations that are in any way possible would have come about, and 
each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations 
in the same series, then a circular course of absolutely identical series 
would thereby be demonstrated: the world as a circular course that has 
already repeated itself infinitely often and that plays its game in infinitum.  
        (Nietzsche, Selections 284) 
Concisely, repetition corresponds with an advancement that is determined by an over-
coming (eternal) returning of the same. And, this leads on to the next question. What is 
that which is being repeated?  
 The non-linearity of the real/actualised has been pointed out earlier on in this sub-
section, ‘The Constituents’28. Subsequently, it is logical to deduce that the repeated does 
not repeat in a consecutive manner. Given that repetition is not unidirectional, some 
assumptions follow. First, because repetition is not about ‘repetition of something’, it 
could be deemed ‘etymological’ in essence; it functions within an expanding web of 
repeatedness-in-itself. Second, repetition is not a process that progresses towards a ‘final 
goal’; it functions affirmatively as repeatability-in-itself. Third, as repetition sees to a 
                                                 
28 With reference to the discussion on ‘men’ and ‘melodies’ (pp. 53-54).   
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repeating that is ‘a-same’, it is directly constructed by a shifting field of mutating 
simultaneity29; it functions purely as repetition-in-itself. As such, the repeated is not a 
repetition of any one thing, or some things. In fact, the repeatable is a virtuosity that 
exhibits the discourse of differentiality in an overabundance. Hence, the repeated is a 
perpetual reconstitution of re-constitution. So, how is repetition produced?  
As the repeatability of repetition is conditioned by difference, its unfolding can be 
described as ‘self-reflexive’. In other words, the condition of differences, as opposed to 
mimesis, is the given state that enables the self-sustainability of perpetual repetition. The 
idea of ‘eternal return’, which Nietzsche, Bergson and Deleuze explicate, illustrates an 
infinite be-coming that differentiates within its own synthesis. This reference to itself 
suggests a returning that produces the recurrence of an unconditional circular course 
which must re-repeat.  
 That is, the effect of repetition as a testament to ‘difference’, which is its 
complementing affect. If the thesis comes across as repeated and recycled, it is because 
the framework expressing the law of repetition-difference conveys nothing beyond its 
self-closing-in. Whilst the constitution belonging to ‘repetition’ and ‘difference’ are 
necessarily unique, it will be quite impossible to see them as independent. In an attempt 
to reconcile the apparent contradiction, an analogy follows.  
 DNA is determined by a twin helix that yields, depending on the combination of 
chemical structures, a selected set of characteristics. Although DNA serves as a template 
                                                 
29 With reference to Derrida. In Dissemination (1981), he says “Now, law is always a law of repetition, and 
repetition is always submission to a law” (123). While the repeatability of repetition is based on the 
repeating of the same, this repeated is never a replication. Also, repetition is temporal in that the repeated is 
always a response to another repeated before it, which is a response to yet another repeated before it, which 
is a response to yet another repeated before it . . .  
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for producing thousands of different ‘characteristics’, the multiplicability of this 
production is left up to the two complementary chains of nucleic acids. In a parallel 
comparison, repetition is likened to DNA and difference is likened to the twin helix; 
repetition is the inherent force that necessitates the repeatedness of the repeated and 
difference is the becoming that materialises the recurrence of this recurrence, that is, 
differentiality. However, it is also possible to reverse the comparison and perceive 
difference to be like DNA and repetition to be like the twin-helix. In this exchange of 
roles, difference becomes the inherent essence that necessitates the recurrence of the 
recurring, while repetition is the be-coming that materialises the repeating of the 
repeated, that is, differentiality-in-itself. As such, there is no ‘real’ way of separating 
differentiality from differentiality-in-itself. The be-ing of repetition/difference is 
composed by the being of a double-ness, which is at once determinating and 
undeterminating. So, what can all this come to mean when thinking about perception?  
 
 
A Theory of Perception 
 
 The premise of this discussion suggests that perceiving is not simply a matter of 
interpreting facts or things. Whilst seeing and believing are integral parts of 
interpretation, the present thesis speculates that an all-encompassing force accompanies 
the subjective experience of perceiving events and objects—more will be said of the 
nature of images in the following chapter. 
 The wish to locate a basis for thinking about ‘how to know’ and ‘what it is’ has 
led the present discussion to consider conditions that are related to transcendence. Whilst, 
in context of this paper, the idea of (pure) transcendence does not impart a ‘practical’ way 
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of dealing with perception, it, nonetheless, relates a ‘gap’. The impregnation of 
perception by something that is essentially abstract, ideal and not-there means that the 
motion, ‘ to perceive’, is bound to a principle and not facts of things: the ‘transcendent’. 
For instance, Bergson explains the transcendent-al as “a [pure] perception which exists in 
principle rather than in fact [. . .] a vision of matter both immediate and instantaneous” 
(Matter 34). In order to outline a theory of perception at the end of this section, the 
present discussion needs to work out several issues which Bergson raises. They include 
the following: Why does the transcendent exist in “principle rather than a fact”? What 
makes the transcendent-al a “matter”? How is transcendent-al-ness “both immediate and 
instantaneous”?  
 At this point, it is probably useful for the discussion to state its understanding and 
employment of the terms ‘transcendent’ and ‘transcendental’. For the sake of pure 
convenience, a general explanation of these concepts is extracted from The Blackwell 
Companion to Philosophy (2003). According to its textbook-like explanation, something 
is ‘transcendent’ if it lies beyond a boundary. And, something is ‘transcendental’ if it lies 
neither within nor without a boundary “but is, rather, a matter of the essential nature of 
those very limits themselves” (Bunnin 731). In short, this explanation establishes an a 
priori, whereby the knowable is not validated by fact or experience.  
 The issues that concern transcendent-al-ness are important to the development of 
a theory of perception because in context of this paper, studying the hermeneutics nexus 
is informed by adjoining fields of investigations, including epistemology, ontology and 
subjectivity. And, the transcendent is a concept that explicitly aligns itself with an 
analysis concerning ‘how to know’, ‘what is there to know’ and ‘what is it’. Therefore, 
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earlier on in this chapter, concepts, like pure perception, singularity of pure perception 
and differentiality-in-itself, convey content that is ‘metaphysical’. So, how can they be 
explained in a sensible, ‘matter-physical’, way?  
 The notion of transcendent-al-ness provokes two questions, which will be 
addressed in turn. The first question is ‘What constitutes the transcendent-al?’. And, the 
second question is ‘What does the transcendent-al justify?’. The ‘answers’ to these two 
questions will shed light on the following concern. How does the transcendent (and its 
transcendent-al-ness) contribute to the process of interpreting things—a theory of 
perception?  
 To a large extent, arguments that are transcendental in nature respond to one 
specific problem, which is ‘how to know the knowable’. According to Robert Stern, 
though the inception of transcendental arguments remains a subject of debate, there is 
clear consensus that, within epistemology, the paradigmatic examples of it begin with 
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and Refutation of Idealism, and his Second Analogy, in 
the Critique of Pure Reason (2). Stern also recognises that P. F. Strawson’s 
reconstruction of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction in The Bounds of Sense (1966), 
Hilary Putnam’s attempt to refute brain-in-a-vat scepticism in Reason, Truth and History 
(1981) and Donald Davidson’s defence of the claim that ‘beliefs are by nature generally 
true’ contribute to the progression of transcendental argument. Nevertheless, other more 
controversial instances of transcendental arguments exist. These include Aristotle’s 
explanation of ‘non-contradiction’ in “Book Gamma” of the Metaphysics, Descartes’s 
defence of the cogito and John Searle’s transcendental argument for external realism.  
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 Although transcendental arguments vary in terms of their perspectives and 
explanations, they converge in one aspect. Generally speaking, they wish to conceive a 
way whereby knowledge can be legitimised. In other words, proponents of transcendental 
arguments seek to map out an ultimate ground for justifying the ‘known’ and ‘to-be-
known’. Therefore, one of the most distinctive features of those arguments put forward 
by the likes of Kant, Strawson, Putnam, and Davidson concerns the a priori. That is, X is 
a necessary condition for x. For instance, existence is a condition for interpretation (and 
just about every other possible occurrence).  
 The other feature concerning transcendental arguments, which the present 
discussion wishes to highlight, pertains to the deduction of conditions that determine X as 
‘X’, as well as x as ‘x’. In both cases, the objective is to delineate the constituents that 
support an appropriate use of reason, which in turn helps to establish (undisputable) 
knowledge. For instance, in spite of the difference in their philosophical trajectories, both 
Descartes and Kant seek to theorise how knowledge can be justified as true. According to 
Descartes, the cogito is a reflection of one’s own consciousness. Because the cogito is 
aware of its own ‘insecurity’ (e.g., it rationalises what is real and what is not), which 
leads to scepticism, it becomes a method for determining ‘what is certain’. As for Kant, 
knowledge is implicitly present in a ‘common consciousness’, which is the 
‘transcendental’. Thus, the transcendental is a necessary condition for every experience. 
It is a ‘starting point’ that underscores all possible experiences. For instance, the ‘innate 
nature’ that gives the mind its ability to formulate perceptions is transcendental in 
essence. As such, the certainty of the known is validated by an autonomous rationality—
an a priori. 
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 Though Descartes and Kant offer different sets of rationalities in terms of how 
knowledge is constructed, both of their theories agree that true knowledge cannot be 
found in how things appear to be. Therefore their theories, which strive to delineate how 
a subject relates to an event, look to conceptualise a way of understanding how things are 
being interpreted. However, there is a distinct difference between transcendental 
arguments that aim to say something about how cognitive faculties function (e.g., 
Descartes) and those that highlight the existence of an ‘outside’ (e.g., Kant). 
Transcendental arguments that deal with cognition are concerned with explicating the 
relationship between a ‘self’ and an event, while the ones that deal with the cannot-be-
known are concerned with identifying ‘how things function’. The intention here is to 
study the nature of how things function, rather than how things are. This is because, more 
often than not, a discussion that hopes to establish ‘how things must be’ leads to an 
uncertainty with regards to whether the very proposition in question is justifiable in terms 
of its coherence and viability.  
 The eventual uncertainty which results from an argument that is transcendental in 
proposition seems to connote a sense of ‘pointlessness’. For instance, to believe x, the 
truth or falsity of ‘x’ must first be established. But, is it possible to determine that x is x 
so as to believe that x is indeed x? Thus, the argument that x is true only if it can be 
confirmed as true comes across as tautological. In view that the intention of the present 
discussion is an attempt to interpret the concept of ‘transcendent-al-ness’, the 
implications which it bears and the kinds of relationships which it establishes are central 
concerns. That is, how does a transcendent-al function? In short, the purpose is to 
elucidate a principle (i.e., a ‘transcendent’) of some kind. And, this principle will 
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coincide with Bergson’s idea of pure perception, where the “immediate” and 
“instantaneous” play important roles.  
 The premise of Bergson’s theory is that some ‘thing’ is a necessary condition of 
perception. Therefore, if not for this condition, which necessitates perception, it will be 
impossible to perceive. However, what is this ‘thing’ that orchestrates a perception? In 
what ‘mode’ does it function? What kind of existence does it imply? With an intention to 
arrive at possible responses that may answer these questions, the discussion turns to 
address the following issue. What is the nature of a thing that bears ‘immediacy’?  As the 
present argument goes on to explore how a ‘reality’ presents itself as itself to itself, a 
perspective concerning the ontology of an immanent difference is construed.  
 What does the ‘real’ consist of? In the fifth century BC, Democritus defines the 
‘real’, or ‘material’, as bits and pieces of indivisible, impenetrable atoms. Though these 
uncountable components are immutable in terms of shape and size, no other determinable 
feature can be said of them. Similar to a huge jigsaw puzzle, where unique irregular 
pieces fit to form an intended picture, Democritus puts forward that the world is made up 
by material components that jostle, repel and, eventually, bond. In order to comment on 
the ‘real-ity’ or ‘material-ity’ that Democritus speaks about, the discussion will now 
highlight a more recent development which involves categorising the real.  
 According to Frege and Popper, there are three categories of real things. The first 
consists of things discernible by the senses, the second consists of all things 
psychological and the third consists of things that are abstract in nature. Indeed, it is 
difficult to accept these categories, especially the second and the third ones, as ‘material’. 
After all, the system upheld by both Frege and Popper could well be a theory of the mind 
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and not of the material. For instance, regardless of the category, the perceived is 
ultimately an interpretation. To put it simplistically, a perception is a mediated 
perspective which the mind produces. As such, the ‘thing’ that constitutes the perceived 
is neither strictly ‘material’ nor ‘non-material’ (i.e., ideal).  
 Nevertheless, the purpose here is not to figure out what is material, and what is 
not. The goal is not to have ready answers for questions like ‘How does material 
substance occur?’, ‘How does the substantive integrate into a whole?’ and ‘How does 
substance correlate with attribute?’. Hence, the focus is not to deal with problems that are 
conceptual in nature (e.g., the relationship between matter and form). Instead, the 
discussion looks to reinterpret the ‘transcendent’, ‘real’ and ‘material’ so as to express a 
perspective involving thing/event, subject and discourse.  
 Before the discussion proceeds to deliver a theory of perception, a summary of the 
arguments that have been presented thus far follows. The opening paragraph of this sub-
section, ‘A Theory of Perception’, states that the act perceiving is not a matter of 
interpreting facts or things. Furthermore, some ‘thing’ prompts the ability to perceive. 
Because this imperative principle is the condition that ascribes possible 
perception/interpretation, something transcendent-al is already in operation. That is to 
say, the transcendent-al-ness of this ‘thing’ articulates a structure that necessarily governs 
all possible possibilities. For instance, the possibility of perceiving something is 
constructed, arranged and assembled in such a way that a particular perception can 
become. 
 Central to the theory of perception is the idea of ‘spontaneity’. Effectively, there 
is an element of surprise that pre-empts the approximation between representations of 
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thing/event, subject and discourse. The non-linearity of this dis-order constructs and 
maintains a freedom that sees to ‘impermanence’. A temporariness that refreshes itself 
again and again, this ‘spontaneous nihilism’ does not and cannot admit certain certainty, 
but certain uncertainty. At this point, the discussion needs to elaborate what ‘spontaneous 
nihilism’ can come to mean. While the word ‘nihilism’ connotes ‘lacking’, in the context 
of the present argument, this ‘not there’ is the precursor of ‘something (being) there’. 
Because the ‘lacking’ is the condition that determines the unfolding of possibilities, it 
affects a spontaneous producing (i.e., the lack being always positive in its lack—ing).  
 Furthermore, the ground-lessness of the yet-to-be-completed is exactly that which 
endorses the thesis of this discussion. The returning of the uncomplete endorses free 
immediacy which constitutes pure discourse—an unfolding of pure perception, 
singularity of pure perception and differentiality-in-itself. That is to say, metaphorically, 
the idea of ‘casting in stone’ is possible only because the stone remains yet-to-be cast. In 
spite of the apparent validation which the ‘lacking’ extends, the aforementioned ‘lacking’ 
continues to inflict uneasiness precisely because something is just lacking. After all, how 
can the ‘lack’ be deployed to explain the ‘present’? As the discussion seeks to develop a 
thesis that does30 perception, it takes special care to deliver a reasoning that is ‘practical’. 
 The attempt is to construct a theory of perception that is ‘open’ and ‘applicable’. 
Because the thesis at hand does not intend to pronounce closure in any sort of way, the 
material it presents will constantly engage with ‘possibilities’. But, offering fresh 
perspectives is only one way of laying bare the elements that may constitute the possible. 
Perhaps, what is more significant is the creativity that is being demonstrated through the 
                                                 
30 Deleuze talks about ‘doing’ metaphysics, thereby arguing for immanence (Pure Immanence: Essays on A 
Life, Trans. Anne Boyman. New York: Zone Books, 2001). 
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re-newing of possibilities. For instance, the creative-ness that sees to the re-generation of 
interpretations repeatedly and repeatingly. In this case, offering a theory of perception is 
about analysing perception through relating perception to itself. That is, the argument has 
to be accountable for both external—the transcendent—as well as internal—the 
immanent—differentiality. As such, the transcendent-al and the immanent are perceived 
as ‘just as important’ (e.g., transcendence is not privileged over immanence—immanent 
to some thing). The bringing together of transcendent-immanent marks the experiencing 
of an event to be an experience within itself. For instance, respectively, plurality, 
virtuality and repeatability occur within the confines of the plural, virtual and repeatable 
itself. The affinity between the two denotes a within-ness of transcendence in immanence 
and immanence in transcendence. This points to the singularising of pure perception.  
 Of pure perception: A single-ness of the immediate extrapolates from the oneness 
of pure perception. A spontaneous return extrapolates from the singularity of a real 
difference. A difference of be-comings extrapolates from the freedom of return. A 
plurality of actualities extrapolates from the temporality of becoming. A plane of 
consistency extrapolates from the actuality of potentiality. The presence of a not-there 
extrapolates from a samenessness: nothingness: the openness of a no-thing that 
necessitates the possible with possibility. 
 The notion of no-thing encapsulates perception-in-itself. The process of forming 
and perceiving a perception is imbued with the infinite, which points to temporary 
determinateness. The dynamism of moment-to-moment representations marks the 
continual birth of perception, and so the perception of any thing/event can never be 
decided. Thus, no-thing denies the becoming of ‘x–thing’, thereby ensuring the 
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heterogeneity of an ever be-come-ing. Subsequently, in no-thingness, the ‘transcendent-
immanent’, is. How can this premise be validated?  
The concept of transcendent-immanent is put to a test when dealing with issues 
such as those concerning ethics and politics. For instance, from the standpoint of 
immanence, transcendence poses a great degree of difficulty for a subject’s acceptance of 
his/her ‘subjectification’. That is, since transcendence yields a sense of haplessness 
because there is always ‘Someone’ out there that ‘Decides the Best Course of Action’, 
what is it that can empower the subject to decide, if anything at all? In other words, how 
could an ‘oppressed’, ‘marginalised’ and ‘subjugated’ subject know that s/he has not 
accepted her/his position unknowingly? Similarly, from the standpoint of transcendence, 
immanence poses problems too. For instance, can the S/subject be unconstructable and 
deconstructing at the same time? In this example, how can the interrelation between the 
transcendent and immanent be reconciled? Questions of this type steer the dissertation 
towards a premature and inadequate end. However, as mentioned earlier on, the thesis 
does not worry itself with apprehending problematics concerning the nature of this or that 
concept. And, for sure, it is impossible to handle the problematics involving immanence 
and transcendence without first laying down parameters that are non-refutable, 
immutable and all-encompassing.  
 In place of assessing and arriving at a conclusion concerning the workings 
underlying the immanent and the transcendent, perhaps it may be more viable to think 
about how “they produce while remaining in themselves” (Deleuze, Expressionism 171). 
An example demonstrates how expressive immanence is sustained by a thoroughgoing 
affirmation of transcendence (178). 
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A piece of paper, 20cm in diametre, can be folded into symmetrical halves again 
and again. Soon, the paper will become too small for any more folding. Though the 
physical division of the paper has reached an end, the possibility of dividing it has not, 
and cannot. One may argue that this division must come to an end because science has 
proven that all matter can be reduced to the indivisibility of some ‘thing’. Nonetheless, 
owing to advancements made in fields related to scientific research, such as technology, 
data management and information sharing, even tinier matters, including the proton and 
quark, have been discovered. Besides, adopting such a stance reduces the divisibility of 
the paper to an entirely observable process: an observation conducted by the eye and 
understood by the mind. 
However, if the exercise is pondered upon based on purely intellectual terms, 
then, for every possible half that is considered, another smaller half must presumably 
exist. Thus, all halving of the paper belong to a process and not a conclusive end. As 
such, the infinite halves are attributes expressing the endless possibilities that a single 
substance, the paper, yields. The paper and its halves are united as one. Notwithstanding 
the oneness of attribute and substance, the paths which these elements map out are 
independent of each other. While each fold of the paper is an attributive part of 
substance’s infinitude, this attribute is but one of the countless unique attributes to come. 
And, whilst substance expresses itself via a collection of possible attributes, it is, 
nonetheless, complete and whole on its own. Hence, the example above highlights a 
rigorous commitment to within-ness and singularity. That is, a ‘one’ manifesting itself in 
the spontaneity of ‘many’31.  
                                                 
31 With regards to the concept of One and Many, Deleuze says, “Expression is on the one hand an 
explication, an unfolding of what expresses itself, the One manifesting itself in the Many [. . .] Its multiple 
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 Before this chapter comes to a close, the discussion will summarise the argument 
which has been presented. The above three sub-sections, namely ‘The Method’, ‘The 
Constituents’ and ‘A Theory of Perception’, argue that the study of perception is not 
limited to interpreting the representation of a thing/event to a subject. As a matter of fact, 
the constitution of a perception results from an undeterminateness that has little, or 
nothing, to do with ‘ordinary’ perceiving. Being in-itself, the pureness of perception 
irrevocably acts upon the acquisition of a meaning, an interpretation. Without relying on 
the experience of experiencing, the returning principle of this within-ness emanates a 
chain of actualising possibilities. Basically, the singular becoming of a plural multiplicity 
invokes a thesis that constructs an outside within an inside and an inside within an 
outside. That is to say, the purity of this spontaneity springs forth from a unitary 
transcendent-immanent. Hence, this constructs the immanently inside/outside through the 
unfolding of the transcendently outside/inside.  
 The co-existence of the transcendent-immanent produces a hybridism, which 
bonds an ‘other’ with a ‘one’. The singularity of a pluralness is constituted within an 
enclosure: a spontaneity which no-thingness perpetrates. This perpetration or ‘happening’ 
connotes the unfolding and refolding of many in one. Further, the constant re-birth-ing to 
a present relates a virtuous circularity that embraces creative expression.  
 Though the current chapter sidelines the issue of ‘what contributes to an 
expression of a perception’, the proceeding one will deal with this issue in depth. As the 
focus of Chapter Two is to examine the nature of mental image, both exterior and interior 
relations play key roles. The purpose is to decipher how any encounter between the 
                                                                                                                                                 
expression, on the other hand involves Unity. The One remains involved in what expresses it, imprinted in 
what unfolds it, immanent in whatever manifests it” (Expressionism 16).  
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‘exterior’ and ‘interior’ actively effects a host of affective tones32. Thus, the next chapter 
is about the in/dependence of the observer, the observed and the observable. Specifically, 
Thinking About the Nature of Mental Images plans to examine the concept of 
‘objectivity’, ‘experiencing’ and ‘experientiality’.  
                                                 
32 With reference to Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Chapter Two, “Repetition for Itself’.  
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Chapter Two: Thinking about the Nature of Mental Images 
 
 
 The previous chapter, Thinking about the Nature of Perception, is about the 
ontology of perceiving. It examines issues concerning the scope, basis and possibility of 
the act of perceiving. The present chapter, Thinking about the Nature of Mental Images, 
studies how interpretation ‘becomes’. In this analysis of how events, things and processes 
become, the discussion seeks to delineate the circumstances that lead to the 
‘experiencing’ of a becoming.  
 The intention to focus on the ‘picture’ that is pieced together by an ‘experience’ 
invariably foregrounds the role played by a subject. As such, the subject is identified as a 
‘being’ embodied with experience and thought. That is, a ‘self’ in possession of the 
capacity for self consciousness and independent deliberation. In view of the fact that the 
subject is perfectly capable of entertaining first-person type of experiences, how does this 
self-reflexivity impact the perceivability of the experienced, assuming that it does at all?  
 There is a need to deal with some subject-centric issues prior to describing a set of 
constitutions that may contribute to an understanding of what mental images are 
composed of.  These issues include ‘What is the function of a subject in the exercise of 
seeing?’ ‘Does s/he serve as evidence for the existence of things/events (i.e., the material 
world)?’ and ‘Is the subject constituted as s/he constitutes?’ An illustration is presented 
for the purpose of identifying possible ‘answers’ to these questions.  
Chad discovers an old photograph album containing pictures of his youth as he is 
clearing out a wardrobe in his bedroom. He flips through the photograph album and 
begins to reminisce about the house which he had stayed at, getting caught for breaking 
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into the school compound, spending every available dime at an arcade, and feeling the 
excitement of giving his first kiss to a girl named Kim33. Although the contents of the 
photograph album are essentially ‘static’, thoughts such as those which Chad experiences 
occur because he already has knowledge of what had happened in the past. Therefore, 
though static, the photographs are able to arouse a chain of dynamic experiences. That is 
to say, the ‘house’, ‘school compound’, ‘arcade’, and ‘Kim’ arouse specific emotions 
within Chad because of his past experiences. Hence, the pictures, as Chad sees them, are 
perceived in a context that he has projected. Whilst he cannot backtrack and relive this 
past, he is able to re-project, regardless of whether faithfully or not, the past in 
conjunction with either this or that picture. 
In Chad’s reminiscence, it does not matter whether the house, school compound, 
arcade, or Kim is ‘real’ (i.e., in a ‘sensible’ sense). The thing of importance is his abstract 
envisaging of these things/events. So, as he (i.e., a subject) goes through the motion of 
seeing (i.e., perceiving) those old pictures, his emotions (i.e., perception) bind each 
snapshot with things/events that are not necessarily present. And so, the emotion and 
significance of those pictures stem largely from an imagination of what they have come 
to represent, albeit momentarily. This abstract force steers the subject towards a certain 
perspective which yields a specific set of meanings. In the above example, the pictures 
cause the rekindling of childhood memory. 
 The ‘intent’ which intention extends permeates all acts of interpretation. Thus, the 
intentionality that guides Chad’s interpretation (i.e., why he interprets the photographs in 
a particular way) of the pictures he finds is not a trait exclusive to him only. In the case of 
                                                 
33 A song by Nickleback, Photograph (2006).  
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the abovementioned example, the visual image of each picture evokes, for the subject, a 
content that intertwines with an abstract process, which sets the mind to motion. 
Similarly, whether a subject is sitting for an examination, travelling on the road, or taking 
part in a 400-metre relay competition, tangible cues serve as intangible/mental markers 
pointing to the physical state of things. Thus, the clock, the landmarks that line the travel 
route and the baton that passes from the first to the last sprinter are visible indicators 
which influence psychological assessments. These things act as ‘yardsticks’ that convey a 
range of possible impressions, including ‘It is nearly time to go home’, ‘Seven kilometres 
more to go’ and ‘The team is ahead of the other five’, respectively. 
 Certainly, the interpretation of any marker is non-exhaustive and so, the same 
clock, landmarks and baton may come to mean something else for another subject. For 
instance, whilst a shopkeeper sees the clock hung on the wall as an indicator of ‘when to 
close the shop and head home’, a casual shopper may take it as a mere decorative item. 
Subsequently, a marker signals different meanings all the time because the inclination 
that a subject has changes from moment to moment (or, in context of the thesis to come, 
‘from moment within moment’). So, although the shopkeeper sees the time on the clock 
as indicative of when to pack up and go, the thought that he has registered zero sales for 
the day, for instance, may also occur congruently at that very moment (in-itself).  
 If a subject is the medium via which perceiving and the interpretation of 
things/events are made possible, then, an understanding of how this perceiving comes 
about is of key importance. Whilst it is pertinent to study how the subject brings 
perspective to phenomena, this assumption implies that interpretation is construed as a 
‘transitive’ activity, where meanings are attached to a thing/event. As such, interpretation 
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entails the exercise of interpreting something ‘as’ some thing: ‘to interpret’. If the 
interpretation of interpretation is to be advanced in this manner, does it not run contrary 
to the hypothesis of pure perception as outlined in Chapter One?34 To analyse the 
birth(ing) and act of interpretation, the discussion will now approach the matter by 
studying the correlation between three aspects of perceiving or ‘seeing’. Therefore the 
following sub-sections will examine issues that concern ‘how to see’, ‘what is there to 
see’ and ‘the ability to see’. 
That is, the question, ‘What makes up the nature of mental images?’ is tackled by 
delivering a constituent that is composed of three elements: the conscious-material-
intentional. The singularisation of these three parts plays an important role in conveying a 
holistic perception(-in-itself). Since the realisation of consciousness-materialness-
intentionality is (with)in perception, the realising of the conscious-material-intentional 
maps the workings of interpretation.   
 
 
How to See? 
 
  In order to approach the subject of ‘seeing’, the discussion hereby makes 
references to the example of Chad and the photograph album once again. The objects that 
Chad sees in the album are collectively known as ‘photographs’. Despite their being mere 
images, what he sees each time is a stimulant of some wonderful memory. The equation x 
=  y (i.e., photograph = memory) expresses this context in a symbolic form. However, ‘x 
                                                 
34 Interpretation is pronounced by an exteriority of relations. Because the exercise of interpreting results 
from the act of ‘making meaning’, the reading of a thing/event refers to a structure that is ‘independent’ in 
essence. In other words, there is a ‘being’ operating within the interpretability of an interpretation. Hence, it 
is justifiable to conclude that ‘the interpreted’ possesses a presence that is (in) itself presentable. (Note: 
while the thing/event exists solitarily, the interpreter, on the other hand, is handicapped without the former).  
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= y’ is variable. For instance, if someone else, like Chad’s girlfriend of three days, was to 
pick up that very same album, she too would see the photographs. But, for her, those 
same photographs may not necessarily be indicators of emotional recall. She may see the 
photographs as faded yellow sheets of paper that serve no purpose other than being dust 
collectors which are to be thrown away: x = z (i.e., photograph = trash). Between Chad 
and his girlfriend, the marker ‘photographs’ bears two meanings: ‘p-h-o-t-o-g-r-a-p-h-s’ 
represents the concept of ‘memory’ for the former, and ‘trash’ for the latter. 
Although the interpretation of ‘photographs’ changes from subject to subject, one 
thing stays constant amidst the fluctuation. Regardless of whether ‘photographs’ is 
equated with ‘memory’, or ‘trash’, the perception of it is structured in terms of ‘as 
something’. That is, ‘photographs as memory’, ‘photographs as trash’: ‘photographs’ as 
some ‘things’. Thus, a marker, in the case of the examples mentioned here, 
‘photographs’, carries with it a host of yet-to-be-determined references/equations. 
Consequently, an interpretation is represented by two interactive modes, one part 
constant and one part variable. The doubleness maintains a constancy, which functions as 
a ‘totality’ dictating possible meanings, and, a variability, which symbolises the 
‘replaceability’ between plausible meanings. 
 The argument above assumes that the graphemes, ‘p-h-o-t-o-g-r-a-p-h-s’, refer to 
a set of specific variables, including ‘memory’ and ‘trash’. The supposition presumes 
‘photographs’ to be the ‘constant’ mode and the meanings that have come to attach 
themselves to it as the ‘variables’. However, is it possible that these two very same 
variables, ‘memory’ and ‘trash’, be referenced by ‘s-o-m-e-t-h-i-n-g e-l-s-e’ instead of ‘p-
h-o-t-o-g-r-a-p-h-s’? In other words, neither the reference, in this case, ‘photographs’ nor 
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the referenced, ‘memory’ and ‘trash’, is in any way constant. Being variables in their own 
right, they bear the potential to refer and be referred to.  
To further discuss the notion of doubleness, the letter s is employed to designate 
‘something else’. Once again, returning to the photograph album illustration, it has been 
established that Chad interprets x as y, and his girlfriend, x as z. Also, it is plausible to 
conclude that Chad had at least interpreted a part of s as y and his girlfriend had 
interpreted a part of s as z. That is, ‘something’ has come to mean some ‘thing’ (i.e., s) 
like ‘memory’ (i.e., y) and ‘trash’ (i.e., z). No doubt this does not discount the possibility 
that both Chad and his girlfriend may just see s as x (i.e., seeing the ‘something’ as 
‘photograph’). Nonetheless, whether Chad sees x as y (i.e., ‘photographs’ as a marker for 
‘emotions’), or s as y (i.e., ‘something’ as a marker for ‘emotions’), the y element is 
determined in the interpretation of what he sees. Similarly, whether Chad’s girlfriend sees 
x as z (i.e., ‘photographs’ as a marker for ‘trash’), or s as z (i.e., ‘something’ as a marker 
for ‘trash’), the z element is determined in the interpretation of what she sees.  
A reversal of roles results, considering that the inferred may just be the ‘constant’, 
and not ‘variable’, mode. That is to say, no matter the point of inference, the 
interpretation of the inferred is fixed. In Chad’s instance, whether he sees ‘photographs’, 
or any ‘something else’, the conceptual content is to be associated with childhood 
memories anyway. Therefore, any ‘something’ will eventually lead to the feelings that 
Chad experiences. Accordingly, while it is reasonable to posit that ‘photographs’ arouses 
a state of emotional recall on Chad’s part, it is hard to justify that he must have seen 
‘photographs’. At best, the case is one whereby he sees ‘something’ that connotes 
‘photographs’, which leads to the reminiscence.  
 87
In short, the blurring of the two modes (c.f., ‘constant’ and ‘variable’) highlights 
that it serves limited purpose to assign determinate and indeterminate modes in the act of 
perception—the undeterminate (i.e., yet-to-be-determinateness) construes anyway. 
Especially so when it is unconclusive35 how and why markers, such as ‘dog’ and ‘cat’, 
yield interchangeable but opposite meanings, including ‘lovable’ and ‘nonchalant’. 
Hence, instead of addressing the topic of ‘how to see’ in a correlative manner, which 
demands a detailed study of function and concept, the discussion at hand examines 
‘relation’ as a fundament of effecting an expression of sense and of meaning. 
Although the notion of ‘function and concept’ will not be further developed here, 
it does not mean that the idea of correspondence is abandoned altogether. As a matter of 
fact, the conjunction, ‘as’, is to be considered following the purpose of wanting to 
articulate how sense and meaning may link up. Besides, the process of ‘seeing’ is denoted 
by situating x as different from y. Thus, the experience of x and y are unique and one 
qualifies the other. The question is, how is x ‘set out’ as x, and y ‘set out’ as y? 
For instance, x and y are being put into their respective context. So, x symbolises 
‘animal’ and y symbolises ‘dog’. Thus, ‘something’ (again, let the marker be symbolised 
by s) is perceived/seen as x (i.e., animal) and x is in turn perceived/seen as y (i.e., dog). 
Briefly, to perceive/see x as y is to interpret ‘x’ as such. Furthermore, to perceive/see s as 
x is to interpret ‘s’ as such (likewise, to perceive/see s as y is to interpret ‘s’ as such). In 
other words, to perceive/see ‘dog’ as representative of ‘animal’ is to interpret it and to 
perceive/see ‘something’ as representative of ‘animal’ is to interpret it as well. The point 
to note is that s represents ‘nonchalant’ and ‘lovable’ notwithstanding the interpreter’s 
                                                 
35 The thesis perceives the ‘inconclusiveness’ to be a necessary condition. A thorough investigation of this 
presumed essentiality is to be found in the next chapter, Thinking about the Nature of Meaning-making.  
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perception of what it stands for (i.e., it is of no matter whether the latter perceives/sees a 
dog).  
 Hence, it is probably justifiable to make two assertions concerning interpretation. 
The first aspect deals with the selectivity of what is perceived that leads to a negated 
outcome eventually. The second aspect deals with the ‘as’ predication that opens up the 
act of perceiving (anything) to various interpretations. Clearly, both aspects conjoin to 
imply that the discourse of experience is not constituted by the mere interpretation of 
empirical material as ‘it is’, but is associated with how the interpreter/perceiver/subject 
‘sees’ the thing/event. On this account, anything that is to be interpreted must first of all 
be located within a context of some sort. That is to say, something preliminary envisages 
the way to see. This ‘pre-text’ shapes the possibility as well as the producibility of a 
‘some thing’ that is to be seen. In essence, this produce, which gives rise to a multitude of 
experiences, is the result of a textualisation that co-relates the non-sense and sense.  
 Though it seems plausible to regard the relationship between non-sense and sense 
as one that is marked by the transformation of a ‘not-there’ to ‘there’, any assignment of 
an actualised state is readily forestalled by the unactualisable—how else can producibility 
do its work? Thus is there any actual (or, ‘real’) relationship between non-sense and 
sense then? Especially, when non-sense can never ‘become’ in terms of sense and sense 
can never be ‘in effect’ to express non-sense. 
 The argument at hand asserts that the dynamic exchange between signs and signs 
is expressed by an arbitrary relation. For instance, x = x and x = y connote different 
meanings. In order to establish how x = x, the designation of x as x has to be determined a 
priori. However, because interpretation keeps the correlation between signs and signs 
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undetermined, the extension of open-ended possibilities professes x as y, or whatever 
symbol. That is, there is no equating of x to anything. The expectation of winter 
transforming into spring illustrates this point. On the assumption that the phenomenon of 
winter transforming into spring is a fact, it should not make any difference whether the 
observation is represented by x = x and x = y. Both of these equations express the 
transition of winter turning to spring unanimously because they do not denote anything 
other than the occurrence itself. Thus, ‘x’ and ‘y’ designate as well as relate to the same 
thing. But, the basis that designates and relates x as x = x as x = y is acceptable only to the 
extent that ‘as’ and ‘=’ refer to the process of winter transforming to spring. And, ‘x’ and 
‘y’ must be connected and mediated by a common ‘something’. Nevertheless, it has 
already been noted earlier on that the “connection” and “mediation”, which leads to a 
“something else”, is necessarily arbitrary. By the token that x as x = x does not convey 
‘something’ a priori, the representation can only be understood via assigned references, 
like x = y, which distinguish between signs and signs.  
 One way of expressing how a sign can take on multiple guises is to look at the 
intersections produced by an equilateral triangle. Imagine that each 60-degree angle 
intersects the opposite polygon at its middle. No matter from which corner the 
intersection starts, these points are designated as x, y and z consecutively. In other words, 
where x and y intersects is also where y and z, and x and z, intersect. In spite of being 
represented by various signs, the reference that cuts x and y, y and z, y and z, and, x and z 
is the same. If this reasoning is applicable to an assertion made earlier on concerning the 
correlation between a ‘one’ and the ‘many’, regardless of the point of reference, the 
meaning assigned to a sign is determined by something outside of the representation. 
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And, since the subject has a part to play in connecting a sign with its possible meanings, 
interpretation owes itself to an ‘outside’ which mediates.   
 Particularly when perception is a consequence of ‘what a subject sees’, central to 
the study of interpretation is the examination of how this external intervention affects a 
perception. If this assertion is considered to be valid—for the time being anyway—what 
is the process that contributes to a subject’s ‘seeing’? Once again, it is crucial to 
remember that the objective of the present discussion is to examine perception in terms of 
it being an activity (i.e., the act of perceiving) and not of objects. In view of this 
intention, the following describes the process in brevity. The act of perceiving involves 
an image. While an image is a projected picture of some ‘thing’, it remains to be part of a 
structure that correlates images through a web of casual relations. Apart from being an 
integral node of a system, which is mapped out for the purpose of differentiating one 
projected thing from another, an image also functions as a marker for particular mental 
state(s). The subjectivity here conveys the feelings, opinions and interpretations of a 
consciousness which refers to a first-person point of view. 
Specifically, making sense of an image hinges upon how the conscious and 
unconscious intend it. A string of problems mapped out by the philosophy of the mind 
would follow if the discussion was to examine the nature of human thought. But central 
to the concern of the proposition at hand is an account of how the subject (i.e., his/her 
consciousness) meaning-makes. The task is to deliver an observation that will advance a 
primary point of reference. In turn, this premise will express the relation between the 
material and immaterial, conscious and unconscious, and physical and mental. 
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 Like the structure that presides over the significance of an image, an 
experience/interpretation is governed by a specific framework as well. For instance, the 
distinction between colours is a result of a corresponding awareness that tells the subject, 
‘red is not blue’. The ability to detect an assortment of colours is, then, a phenomenal 
experience that stems from a complex combination of varying hues, intensities and 
saturations. Furthermore, if this bundle of experiences is indeed encapsulated within a 
phenomenon, it will be credible to think of the occurrence as some thing that is situated 
in space. For instance, information gathered in the area of cognitive research supports this 
conjecture. To elaborate a little bit more, studies on what effects vision shed light on the 
roles played by three axes. Although these axes are independent of each other, they co-
relate to form the geometric structure of the visual field. As a result, they determine ‘what 
is being seen’. The application of these findings to the above example concerning colour 
theory yields the following deduction. The ability to differentiate a spectrum of colours is 
a consequence of the corresponding variation and intersection between the three axes. 
That is to say, the phenomenal space of colour is in direct correlation with the three-
dimensional space of the visual field.  
 Hence, according to the present argument, every thing/event/image is 
interpretable because the conscious ‘scrambles’ a corresponding interpretation within a 
boundary of space (for example, Chad’s interpretation of the photographs is bound to the 
memory he has of his childhood). Thus, it is possible to interpret because interpretation 
can be represented consciously, directly and cognitively. However, not all experiences 
are observable and structurable. For instance, the ‘warmness’ conveyed by colours like 
red, orange and yellow, and the ‘coolness’ conveyed by blue, green, and purple are 
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intrinsic qualities. That is, it is neither possible to observe nor explain why red is ‘warm’ 
and blue is ‘cool’. Perhaps perceiving/‘seeing’ is not reducible to the coherent, 
determinable and corporeal then? 
 
What is there to See? 
  The assumption that there is a correlation between the two concepts, 
consciousness and seeing, prompts a host of challenges. For instance, the task inherits the 
problems that have plagued critical thinking since the inception of dualism36. Amongst 
other dichotomies, including the ‘free’ and ‘determined’ as well as the ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’, it is the demarcation of the ‘mental’ from the ‘physical’ that holds special 
interest here. The mental-physical relationship provokes examination of how a ‘mental’ 
impression that is generated by the ‘conscious’ connects with a ‘physical’ extension that 
is generated by a ‘thing/event/image’. In order to explore the connection between a 
‘thing’ and an ‘interpretation’, the discussion proceeds to read sections of Joseph 
Conrad’s Heart of Darkness.  
In his introduction to the Penguin edition of Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness 
(1989), Paul O’Prey comments that “written in the last year of the nineteenth century [it] 
can be seen as the first twentieth-century novel, with its climate of doubt and vagueness, 
its loss of moral confidence, its need for ‘belief’ in the midst of moral wilderness, its 
exploration of the subconscious, and its affirmation of individual freedom” (Conrad 23-
24)37. Nevertheless, how does the conscious experience of Conrad’s novel come about? 
                                                 
36 Basically, entities are divided into two categories of unique substances. More will be said about 
Cartesian-style dualism shortly. 
 
37 Paul O’Prey’s “Introduction” to the Penguin Books edition of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1989). 
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In this context, how does the written word contribute to the impression that there is need 
to determine a “belief”, explore what goes on in the subconscious and affirm personal 
freedom. In other words, how is it possible that an interpretation (i.e., something 
intangible) emerges from the brain (i.e., something tangible)? The question is this: To 
what extent does a subject’s perceptual experience depend on the mental interpretation of 
external stimulants? 
 What are the relations between the so-called ‘mental’ and ‘physical’? Can there 
be any relationship between two separate metaphysical categories when traditionally the 
mental is accepted as an expression of the mind and the physical an extension of the 
material? The discussion briefly studies Descartes’ theory concerning how things appear 
to a subject so as to gain an insight on ‘what is there to see?’ 
 Descartes purports a notion of dualism that sees to the division of the world into 
two entities: mental and physical38. Accordingly, the mental is intangible and so it must 
be non-spatial, while the physical being tangible is presented in a space. Subsequently, a 
subject is a duality since s/he is made up of a body and a mind. In spite of their apparent 
distinction, the body and the mind interact in order for ‘things to happen’. On the one 
hand, the physical aspect experiences sensations which in turn lead the mind to generate 
an impression, or a thought. On the other hand, the activities that go on in the mind are 
being realised and conveyed through speech and actions. Because that which is physical 
affirms the presence of the mental, and vice versa, this interaction extends a percept that 
is validated by the observable.  That is, Descartes considers the thinking aspect of the 
mind as conscious and the extension of this mentalness into space as physical. The result 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
38 This is also reminiscent of Aristotle’s essence-substance dichotomy. 
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is a perception of the observed. This discussion proceeds to examine those aspects of 
Descartes’s work that are relevant here39. 
 Firstly because Descartes proclaims that the mental is ‘conscious’, he argues that 
a subject’s interpretability is dependent on the state(s) of consciousness. This claim 
implies that a subject must always be in one state of consciousness or another. Regardless 
of whether a subject is aware of it or not, s/he is constantly interpreting his/her 
surroundings. For instance, O’Prey asserts that Conrad is “a much better short-story and 
novella writer than novelist. He was on the whole unable to sustain the tension of a full-
length novel (with the exception of Nostromo)” (Conrad 22). By virtue of this comment, 
O’Prey must already have as a literary critic a preconceived notion of what makes a 
(good) novel or novella. Only then will he be able to appraise a piece of literary work. 
Thus he explains, “Heart of Darkness [. . .] has no slackening of tension, the plot is 
wonderfully compact and the ‘movement’ is a compelling blend of delay and haste [. . .]” 
(22). So, O’Prey’s comment extrapolates an implicit standard (which could have been 
made explicit elsewhere) against which novels and novellas are measured. While the 
intention is to interpret Heart of Darkness, this state of consciousness is neither 
‘straightforward’ nor ‘singular’. This is because the shifts in consciousness result in a 
moment-to-moment actualisation of different interpretations. And so, a reading is 
actualised through a contest of interpretations. Therefore, a subject’s existence is 
validated by a stream of consciousness that is of varying states.  
                                                 
39 Descartes is being mentioned because his work raises a crucial consideration with regard to the mental-
physical problem: Is the subjectiveness of mental/conscious states to be explained in physical-spatial 
terms? Though he proceeds to expound how essence and substance occur in different modes, this part of his 
work will not be dealt with here because it does not make any direct contribution to the present focus.   
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 Secondly because Descartes posits that mental activities bring about causes and 
relations, he argues that how the ‘physical’ (i.e., the ‘sensible’, or ‘material’) 
environment is being interpreted depends on a subject’s intention. Subsequently, the 
‘outside’ is a by-product of a subject’s consciousness. In Heart of Darkness, O’Prey 
notes that “Conrad pays great attention to the effects of light” (Conrad 7). The second 
paragraph of the novella describes the River Thames as follows: 
The sea-reach of the Thames stretched before us like the beginning of an 
interminable waterway. In the offing* the sea and the sky were welded 
together without a joint, and in the luminous space the tanned sails of the 
barges drifting up with the tide seemed to stand still in red clusters [. . .] A 
haze rested on the low shores that ran out to sea in vanishing flatness. The 
air was dark above Gravesend, and farther back still seemed condensed 
into a mournful gloom, brooding motionless over the biggest, and the 
greatest, town on earth.  
 
* the offing: a nautical term meaning the stretch of sea visible from the shore or from the  
anchorage. 
         (Conrad 27)  
Although the above citation can yield various readings, this discussion will present only 
two. The first reading offers a ‘literal’ interpretation of the Thames and Gravesend. In the 
dark night, the river appears to be borderless and endless. Furthermore, a thick layer of 
fog hangs in the still air. In connection to the activities which occur along the Thames, 
Gravesend, a town that is located on the south bank of the river, thrives on the shipping-
related trades. The second reading offers a ‘connotative’ interpretation of the river and 
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the town. The description “sea-reach” gives the impression that the Thames is tiresomely 
long. This tedious endlessness is exacerbated by the fact that “the sea and the sky [are] 
welded together without a joint”. Furthermore, the luminosity and stillness that shroud 
the Thames prompt the ominous. The “[“motionless”] haze [which rests] on the low 
shores that [run] out to the in vanishing flatness” heightens this “brooding” atmosphere. 
As a result of the immense darkness that has the Thames engulfed in a “mournful 
gloom”, the air that presides over the nearby town of Gravesend assumes a state of 
condensed staleness.  
 The two interpretations above demonstrate that the ability to interpret is in a way 
‘immediate’ because the interpreter bears first-person authority. Hence, whilst the 
comprehension of how the “the tanned sails of the barges drifting up with the tide” 
(Conrad 27) is embalmed, or extended, by the spatial content that each word carries, the 
interpretability of the sentence ultimately depends on how a subject plans to read it. This 
is to say, while the mental impression of River Thames and Gravesend stems from how 
the words are being put together, the collective interpretation of these markers is ‘caused’ 
by a subject’s ability to ‘intend’ their meaning(s). Consequently, the physical world is an 
extension of the mental phenomenon. Therefore, the possibility of an experience is not 
limited by empirical cognition. In Conrad’s words, “The mind of man is capable of 
anything — because everything is in it, all the past as well as all the future” (Conrad 69). 
This raises an important consideration with regard to the mental-physical problem: Can 
the subjectivity of the mental/conscious state be explained in physical/spatial terms?  
  Prior to offering an explanation as to how an experience may come about, the 
discussion first needs to outline its understanding and use of the marker, ‘space’. While it 
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will be difficult to detail the representations of space comprehensively, a general 
overview describes spatiality as some-thing that exists some-where. Whether, the notion 
of space is viewed as an integral part of a fundamental universal structure—a set of 
dimensions which locates things independently—or as part of a abstract conceptual 
framework—an ideal quantification of things—it is understood that these perspectives 
arise because of the contemplation, ‘what does it mean for something to be somewhere’.  
 The present discussion conceives ‘s-p-a-c-e’ as a medium through which ‘things’, 
regardless of whether material, or abstract, exist. This is to say, ‘space’ is neither strictly 
an ontological entity in itself nor a conceptual framework designed for the purpose of 
thinking about reality. Hence, ‘space’ contains both the spatiality of the physical and the 
spatialessness of the mental. Hence, the awareness of ‘how things are’ spans beyond the 
perceptibility of the observable. That is to say, the observation of things generates a 
perception, and not a fact. And so, the principle that anchors an experience of the 
observed must be undeterminateness: there is always a resistance against complete 
understanding of any thing.  
 The undetermined yields a probable assumption concerning the mental-physical 
problem. The interaction between the mental (e.g., the conscious) and physical (e.g., an 
experience of some thing) produces an observation (e.g., interpretation) that is neither 
extended nor located within the spatiality of space. After all, the observed is qualified by 
an ‘outsideness’ that cannot be contained by conceivable space. Of course, it must be 
noted that the exteriority mentioned here, nonetheless, is determined by the ‘insideness’ 
of a spatiality as well. So, to what end does such a postulation concerning exteriority and 
interiority serve in the study of interpretation? 
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 A perspective concerning the perception/seeing/interpretation of material things: 
the undeterminateness accorded by exteriority enforces the likelihood that perception 
always exceeds the ability to perceive; and, the determinateness accorded by interiority 
sees that perceiving is always constrained within the ability of perception. Specifically, 
the interpretation of a thing/event/image depends largely on the way a subject represents 
it to him/herself. The subject is, mentally and physically speaking, a ‘spatial being’. The 
framework that forms the basis of thought is built around a conceptual schema which is 
necessarily ‘space-related’. 
 In order to elaborate on the above assertion, the discussion refers to Heart of 
Darkness again. Apart from the fact that the novella was first published at the height of 
Europe’s colonisation of Africa (ca., 1900), the work presents a plot that relates an 
imperialist encounter. While the theme, colonialism, constructs the parameters of the 
work, this apparent coherence does not make Heart of Darkness a ‘straightforward’ text. 
This is because the narrative-in-Heart of Darkness sets up inter-narratives that constantly 
re-represent a widening diametre of meanings (i.e., narrative-in-itself at work). And so, 
“the meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale 
which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze” (Conrad 30). Alternatively, the 
interpretability of the novella can be perceived as not outside, but within an insideness 
that is sustained by a relentless re-un-folding.  
 Therefore, a subject’s experience with Heart of Darkness is determined by the 
spatiality of the work itself—mental-physical space. If perception/seeing/interpretation is 
experienced within a pre-eminently spatial condition, perhaps, the guiding principle 
behind distinguishing ‘this’ and ‘that’ and ‘x’ and ‘y’ lays with the difference of space(s). 
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Hence, all things remaining equal, x and y are regarded as ‘x’ and ‘y’ just in so far as they 
are identified by a spatial difference. That is, a piece of work, for example Heart of 
Darkness, does not bear an interpretation. Rather, the effects of the interpretable are 
traceable from the ‘yet-to-be-said’.  
 For instance, the narrative of Heart of Darkness comes across as deliberately 
ambiguous (i.e., much is to-be-said). Though Marlow is the primary character and 
narrator of the novella, he is actually not the “I” who is relating the story. Taking into 
consideration that “I” only appears three times in the novella, its ‘presence’ is at best 
fleeting and obscure. As “I” directs the unfolding of Heart of Darkness, there exists a 
‘some-where’ that does not belong to the literal context of the work. In the opening of the 
novella, “I” says, “Between us there was, as I have already said somewhere, the bond of 
the sea. Besides holding our hearts together through long periods of separation, it has the 
effect of making us tolerant of each other’s yarns – and even convictions” (Conrad 27). 
So, against the backdrop of the River Thames, “I” reports that Marlow has a story to tell. 
While “I” appears to be the author cum narrator of Heart of Darkness, this assumption is 
undermined by the fact that ‘I’ slips into ‘we’ at certain points. As a matter of fact, the 
‘presence’ that is usually associated with authorship seems to be fleeting here because “I” 
is nearly as undifferentiated as the rest of the characters. By and large, they all speak 
through Marlow. An example of this is when Marlow includes in his speech the 
objections raised by the others as he relates his impression of travelling up river to find 
Kurtz. Marlow says, 
Acquisitions, clothes, pretty rags – rags that would fly off at the first good 
shake. No; you want a deliberate belief. An appeal to me in this fiendish 
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row – is there? Very well; I hear; I admit, but I have a voice, too, and for 
good or evil is the speech that cannot be silenced. Of course, a fool, what 
with sheer fright and fine sentiment, is always safe. Who’s that grunting? 
You wonder I didn’t go ashore for a howl and a dance? Well no – I didn’t. 
Fine sentiments, you say? Fine sentiments, be hanged! I had no time.  
       (Conrad 69) 
Though the narrative is shaped by those who are on board with Marlow as well as the 
presumably, omniscient “I”, each character does not possess an ‘identity’, which will 
justify the employment of the pronoun ‘I’. Thus, collective pronouns, including “us” and 
“our”, which continue to dot the novella, blur the distinction between the singular “I” and 
the plural “we”. Essentially, the example of “I” being undifferentiated from ‘the rest’ 
connotes the lack of ‘a voice’. This, in turn, points to the difficulty of locating a 
‘presence’ within the work.  
 Because the work appears to be ‘slippery’ (i.e., it is not anchored by a ‘centre’), 
the interpretation of Heart of Darkness is marked by more and more possible readings. 
That is to say, an interpretation is constructed out of many other possible interpretations. 
The desire to determine an interpretation as ‘the interpretation’ is forestalled by a 
multiplicity which generates new possibilities and new relations ceaselessly. According 
to Mikhail Bakhtin, the multiple-ness of markers and their interaction is implicitly  
present in an idiom—heteroglossia. And, a marker bears meaning(s) in connection to  
 
other markers; a differentiality that positions it ‘within’ and ‘to’ them. Subsequently, the  
 
interpretation of a work is never present ‘in’ and ‘of’ itself. The interpretable becomes an  
 
interpretation within a plane that is constantly ‘othered’ by means of the deferring and  
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differing (i.e., ↕ deference 
     difference). 
 
Further, a register of differences presupposes locality and distinction. Therefore, 
the fundament of perception is based a structure that is artificially put in place so that 
concepts can interrelate by reference. Means of referencing include a network of markers, 
like symbols, metaphors and analogies. Subsequently, this contrivance foregrounds the 
yet-to-be-determinateness that has come to constitute this as ‘this’, that as ‘that’, x as ‘x’, 
and y as ‘y’. So, an understanding of how the un/determined points to a correlation 
between the mental/abstract and the physical/material. That is, the ‘yet-to-be’ underscores 
a conceptual framework that negotiates itself within the withoutness of ‘is’. Therefore, 
the mental/abstract is not merely reduced to the physical/material—as argued earlier on in 
this dissertation, the method of reduction makes little sense in the project since it seeks to 
interpret all things as unfolding in ‘in-itself’. Instead, the endeavour is to articulate a 
prospect of how the ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’ can systematically co-relate. 
 
The Ability to See? 
 The objective of this sub-section, ‘The Ability to See?’, is to initiate a method of 
representing the relationship between space and perception/seeing/interpretation. 
However, before the discussion embarks on its current task, it will be useful to first 
summarise the contents of the previous sub-section ‘What is there to See?’. Since spatial 
cognition can be derived via sense experience, the notion of ‘space’ is not purely ideal. 
But, because sensibility alone does not determine how space is constituted, the concept 
must be mediated by some ‘thing’ that lies beyond the seemingly comprehensible. That 
is, a subject’s experience and interpretation of a ‘real’ thing/event/image is the result of 
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an interaction between the senses and some ‘thing’. This assertion results in at least two 
contradictions. Firstly, if all possible experiences are invariably tied to the senses in one 
way or another, how can all possible experiences not derive from the senses? Secondly, if 
something is beyond the senses, how can it be ‘known’ to begin with?  
 For the sake of an explanation, the discussion will like to assume momentarily 
that certain first principles must exist before any plausible experience becomes possible. 
As fundamental conditions that exist before any experience can be experienced, these 
presumed principles serve as presuppositions, which justify ‘necessary truths’. In other 
words, a first principle enters into a presence, or become ‘known’, because both the 
rational (i.e., the sensible) and the arational (i.e., the insensible) contribute to how a 
subject experiences. And so, because an ‘experience’ emerges through them, the sensible 
and insensible, rational and arational, inside and outside contribute to the characterisation 
of the experiential.  
 For instance, if first principles are not accepted as ‘just true’, it will be impossible 
to interpret anything, including the relations between a subject and his/her immediate 
environment and concepts like truth and being. The assumption, every physical/material 
experience is foreshadowed by the mental/abstract phenomena, extrapolates that the 
interpretation is a by-product of an exteriority that is located within the interpretable 
itself. That is to say, the acceptance of first principles as ‘undeniable truths’ makes it 
possible to see the conditions of possible (empirical) experience as the very conditions 
for experiencing that particular occurrence. Consequently, the experience of 
perceiving/seeing/interpreting of all things/events/images is subjected to a single 
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doubleness. This duality refers to the spatiality of sensible and the spatialessness of the 
ideal.  
 An anecdote will help illustrate the point to be made here. Imagine it is a Monday 
morning. K is fast asleep until the alarm clock goes off at the stipulated time. Reluctantly, 
he drags himself out of bed. Upon rolling up the blinds, he notices that the sky is grey. 
His dread of the sluggish day ahead is interrupted by a soft ‘meow’. After giving 
Meatball its breakfast and setting the kettle to boil, K goes through the motion of getting 
dressed for another typical workday. The activities that K experiences in his bedroom 
reflects a collective experience concerning facing up to yet another brand new work 
week: it is going to be a tough five days ahead. In alphabetical order, the above sequence 
translates as scenario ‘a’ (i.e., K’s asleep is disrupted by the alarm), followed by scenario 
‘b’ (i.e., K gets out of bed), followed by scenario ‘c’ (i.e., K notices the grey skies), and 
so forth. Although the example illustrates that an experience is made up of a series of 
events, more importantly, it highlights the possibility that a subject is ‘made by’ his/her 
experiences.  
 Consider this proposition: Because a subject is only a mediator between 
thing/event/image-it-self and perception/seeing/interpretation-in-itself, s/he does not 
possess full autonomy when it comes to assigning possibilities to experiences. That is, 
being more of a ‘medium’ via which the observed is ‘digested’ followed by ‘read’, a 
subject is the subject of (possible) experience-in-itself. Although possible experiences 
must somehow be pieced together at one point of time or another—otherwise, a, b, c . . . 
n∞ will not connect to convey a meaning—the question is, how is this task to be 
accomplished? Could the missing link that associates ‘a’ with ‘b’, ‘b’ with ‘c’, ‘c’ with . . 
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. n∞ be undeterminable: a no-thing? After all, a subject owns limited prerogative over 
how an experience is to be interpreted, and any other ‘thing’ cannot preside over the flow 
of experience. Perhaps, then, the ‘missing’ is that which sustains the gap, as well as 
associate ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’ . . .and n∞. This ‘lack’ is that which sees to the assembly of 
perception/seeing/interpretation of things/events/images in itself.  
 The argument asserts that experience and its becoming are not dependent on an 
‘entity’. Therefore there is no ‘centre’ from which a web of relations can emerge. Since, 
perception/seeing/interpretation does not appear perceivable because of a privileged 
‘Something’, the discourse is free from being read as some ‘thing’. Essentially, this 
freedom points to ‘nothing’, or a ‘no-thing’. Thus, when experience is independent of 
either this or that logos-centric principle, the focus is turned to the thing-in-itself. A 
return to the study of experience-in-experience, the representation of the observable is 
situated within the spatiality of its individuated excesses. Then, in place of trying to 
arrive at conditions that seem to favour interpretation, central to this discussion is how 
the interpretable is produced as an effect of the interpretative.  
  In the context of the current argument, the presence that presents experience is 
not reducible to a subject’s seeing and reading of a projected appearance. Although the 
perceivable is, to a certain extent, governed by a set of conditions, the interpretation of it 
remains ‘unregulated’. That is, experience is ascertained by a temporality which is always 
in the process of being re-represented. Alternatively, this repeating representation can be 
thought of as a re-present-ing because there can be no presentation to begin with. So, the 
perceptual interpretation or experience of watching the Stone Temple Pilots play at a 
concert, flipping through an old photograph album, or reading a novel is an intrinsic 
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event-in-itself. The actualising of an experience is constantly negated within a spatiality 
that is characterised by a matrix of successive moments. A determination that is 
renewable again and again, the potentialities generated by the question, ‘how to see’, are 
enabled by the yet-to-be-fixed, an orderly disorder of events and a spatiality of a-unity. 
Hence, from the constitution of this or that perception/seeing/interpretation, there can 
only be a plane of diverging divergences. How this liberation comes about will be the 
topic of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Three: Thinking about the Nature of Meaning-making 
 
 
 The concept of less-ness bears prominence in Chapter One and Two. This 
‘lessness-ness’ charts a diversity of possibilities that is manifested through a host of 
functions, including the ‘trans-temporal’, ‘pure’, ‘differential’, ‘repeatable’, ‘divergent’ 
and ‘no-thing’. While less-ness presupposes the always-lacking, which encourages 
momentary passing of compositions that are neither localised nor determined, it cannot 
be deemed ‘arbitrary’. This is because the no-thing yields a framework, a some-thing, 
that facilitates the (trans)passing of the interpretable (i.e., meaning-making that is 
orientated by conditions relating to ‘how to see’, ‘what is there to see’ and ‘the ability to 
see’). As such, less-ness extends a ‘liberty’ which points towards ‘openness’, where 
every possible interpretation is equally possible given the appropriate circumstance. 
Ultimately, this freedom (or a ‘lack’) legitimises interpretation and its self-regulation. 
Before the discussion proceeds to explicate this hypothesis, it will be useful to first 
consider the bases that are associated with the development of it. Only then, will it make 
sense to propose a link between the concept of less-ness and that of meaning-making in 
the present context.   
 The task at hand prompts a question. What role does the ‘lacking’ play in a 
discussion concerning knowledge, existence and interpretation? For a start, the non-
presence of the ‘lack’ interrogates the possibility of presenting a present. The presence-
ness of the present is thought of as the fundamental trait that gives the observable its 
(re)presentablity (e.g., identity). For instance, geometrical shapes bounded by three 
straight lines, which contain angles that add up to 180-degrees, are collectively defined as 
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‘triangles’. Thus, the mention of ‘equilateral’ or ‘isosceles’ refers to ‘triangle’ while 
‘hexagon’ and ‘heptagon’ do not. As such, things are grouped with accordance to how 
they resemble each other and the common features they share. 
 According to arguments that are logos-centric in essence, the presence of a 
present x presents x as ‘x’. But, this discussion puts forward that it is the presence of a 
non-present—the lacking—which produces attributes of x. Of the latter, because x is 
undeterminable, it will be fair to state that x is ‘x’ only when x is indeed ‘x’. The 
perpetual making of x points to a potential for varying, creating and producing xs beyond 
all possible knowable xs. That is, x cannot be reduced to the present-ness of an ‘is’ 
because it is always yet-to-be-articulated, which leads to an overabundance. For instance, 
it is not the law of vectors that defines a plane as a ‘triangle’, or ‘polygon’. Rather, it is 
the application of the law of vectors that creates a ‘triangle’, which has three intersecting 
lines, or ‘polygon’, which has four intersecting lines. Therefore, it is the process of 
applying ‘x’ to x that momentarily morphs x into ‘x’. Also, the dynamism involved in the 
recourse of accounting for x points to a making that is exclusively inherent, within and 
immanent to x. 
 Since x cannot be determined by characteristics that are dogmatically imposed 
(e.g., through categorisation), what is the justification for construing that x becomes x via 
its own unfolding? Moreover, the idea that ‘process’ makes some thing a ‘thing’ seems to 
steer the argument right back to a position that is reminiscent of logos-centricism. The 
order of a process is still an ‘order’ in spite of its dynamism.  
 For the purpose of studying how x can be interpreted as x, the discussion will now 
develop the notion of ‘diverging divergences’. Furthermore, the divergency spoken about 
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here bears intimate correlation with another concept that is central to the thesis of this 
paper: that of multiplicity. In context of the premises being put up here, a brief but 
appropriate explanation of what ‘multiplicity’ may reference highlights concepts, 
including ‘decentredness’, ‘displacement’ and ‘differentiality’. The heterogeneity that 
marks the workings of these functions connotes a spontaneity, a many-ness, that 
privileges the indeterminate, incomplete and infinite. And, structures of fresh possibilities 
refold into a space that is opened up by the many, which unfold within a multiplicity of 
multiplicities.  
 The multiple-ness of multiplicity appears to display two distinct characteristics: 
‘varying possibilities’ and ‘absent presence’. However, prior to examining these features 
in detail, what can the multiple-ness of multiplicity come to mean? Especially, when the 
concept can neither be reduced to a specific sense of coherence, nor be explained via 
conventional wisdom instituted by markers, such as ‘many’, ‘variety’ and ‘assortment’. 
While it may be difficult to pinpoint what multiplicity ‘is’, a study of how it functions 
will help to establish its relevance to the task of making meaning. In order to demonstrate 
how multiplicity relates (within) itself, a case study involving material objects and 
physical processes follows. 
 For instance, the movements of a hobby horse are limited to two motions: that of 
forward and backward. And, the momentum of these movements is dependent on the 
force which its rider applies to the object. Accordingly, the dynamical behaviour of a 
hobby horse could be summarised as, ‘two-dimensional’. The movements of a model 
aeroplane, on the other hand, far exceed that of a hobby horse. Considering all the mobile 
parts, including propellers, wheels and engine, a model aeroplane is capable of displaying 
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at least six different combinations of movement and momentum (i.e., forward and 
backward, fast and slow). Therefore, two dimensions are required to see the possible 
potential which a hobby horse can yield, and six-dimensions40 are required to see the 
possible potential which a model aeroplane can yield. 
 Be it the movement and momentum of the hobby horse or model aeroplane, 
spatial dimensionality, which facilitates ‘what could happen to an object’, underscores a 
range of free play—there is freedom to ‘be’ within a designated scope. So, spatiality 
captures all possibilities of a single possibility. And of this very singularity-in-itself, 
belies a multiplicity of multiplicities. That is to say, the process of something taking place 
achieves instantaneity regardless of how simple or complex is the transition. In the case 
of a model aeroplane, it has the potential to exhibit six dimensions in spite of it being 
endowed three-dimensional capabilities (i.e., given the appropriate circumstance, six 
different occurrences can recur within a spatiality of three dimensions). Obviously, the 
potentiality/possibilities/spatiality that a model aeroplane possesses is far greater than its 
observable material/physical attributes. But what compresses a multiplicity of possibles 
into a concurrent occurrence?  
 The multiple-ness of the singular, as described by this discussion, is marked as 
infinite. Moreover, the lineage of this single infinity encompasses the ‘structure’ that 
yields a multitude of possibilities to come. This deliberately simplistic assertion puts 
across a salient point that states ‘singularity opens up multiplicity’. Nevertheless, in spite 
of being borne out a singularity, the many-ness of multiplicity cannot be reduced to a 
specificity, or singleness. To make sense of this premise, an interpretation must be 
                                                 
40 A six-way combination comprising of 1) forward-backward; 2) forward-fast;  3) forward-slow; 4) 
backward-fast; 5) backward-slow; and 6) fast-slow.  
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thought of as a ‘fold’ that just ‘happens’ to ‘be’ in between the successions of 
interpretable thing/event/image. As such, an interpretation is not the product of a 
thing/event/image determined as that exact thing/event/image. Because the realisation of 
an interpretable is ‘actualised’ within an unfolding (as oppose to ‘exacting’), connectives 
and syntheses set the divergence of a converging multiplicity into perpetual motion.  
 Further, the impact of every other point of interpretable thing/event onto every 
other point of interpretable thing/event leads to a multiple-ness of new connections that 
resist affirmation. The steady resistance against being determined presupposes the 
perpetual need for an all-new way of interpreting any thing. It is a peculiar construction 
whereby the building blocks of interpretation stay necessarily unconstructed. Thus, the 
interpretability of a thing/event/image depends on how independent points of reference 
mitigate, negotiate and inter-relate under a condition that must remain condition-less. As 
a result, the description of an occurrence (i.e., ‘what has happened’) cannot be completed, 
attributed and distinguished. Thus, a thing/event is always in a state of being described 
(i.e., ‘to be’). And, the ‘lacking’ that secures the undeterminateness of any occurrence 
gathers in a momentum which forms a continuous (immanent) space. In this void of the 
‘unsaid’, which is essentially uncompletable, unattributable and undistinguisable, be-
coming becomes in a state of ever be-come-ing (i.e., —ing).  
 The process of making meaning, when implicated by multiple-less-ness, is, then, 
not an end of itself. Rather, the multifariousness of multiplicity charters facetious means 
for thinking about how things/events piece together. When considering the congruency of 
all occurrences, the meeting of many-fold within a fold articulates a continuum that 
brings together differencing and repeating. While the chapter, Thinking about the Nature 
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of Perception, outlines an interpretation of ‘difference’ and ‘repetition’ that concurs with 
the premises of this discussion, it is currently necessary to speak more about these 
concepts.  
 The dynamical process which occurs in an unfolding multiplicity is characterised 
by simultaneous relations that are differential and repetitive. An illustration will help to 
elucidate this proposition. From the time of implantation, an embryo alters to take the 
human shape over the course of approximately nine months. During this period, the once 
formless oocyte gestates to develop life supporting organs, functions and tissues. Despite 
the pretext that a fertilised oocyte carries with it pre-coded genetic data, its proliferation, 
nonetheless, depends on how the bundle of nuclei morph. In other words, what becomes 
of an embryo depends on how its germ layers repeatedly differentiate. So, even though 
the occyte is a template inscribed with certain biochemical strains, the information it 
contains does not yield a straightforward end result. In a way, the distinctive inherent 
state, which an oocyte is thought to possess, represents the potential to refract a host of 
possible states. Hence, within the single-ness of the homogeneous, the multiple-ness of 
heterogeneity negotiates itself.  
  Subsequently, the exchange between the singular and the plural accords a space 
that unfolds within a refolding folding41. More specifically, the (reun)fold(ing) is defined 
by a plane that is comprised of two kinds of ‘spatialities’, namely, the ‘intangible’, or 
‘tangible’. Given the excess that they produce, space can be interpreted as structures of 
                                                 
41 The idea owes itself to Deleuze notion of “the fold”. He comments that “differentiation does not refer to 
a pregiven undifferentiated, but to a Difference that endlessly unfolds and folds from each of its two sides, 
and that unfolds the one only one while refolding the other [. . .] a severing by which each term casts the 
other forwards, a tension by which each fold is pulled into the other” (Deleuze, The Fold 30).  
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possibilities then. Being a collective structure-in-itself, the in/tangible space is a 
multiplicity (i.e., many-fold), a centrefold, of all possible becoming possibilities.  
 Hence, all reproducible occurrences that take place within an intangible space can 
be accounted for. Since ‘how a thing/event happens’ is explainable and determinable, 
conditions that lead to a ‘happening’ can be ‘laid out’. Therefore, the intangibility that 
exerts an influence over both material and mental substances can be ‘known’. This 
comprehensibility indicates that every thing exists immanently (i.e., there is neither an 
‘outside’ nor a ‘beyond’). Thus, the intangible is actualised within a state of tangibility, 
which denotes a third ‘version’ of space. The present discussion calls this immanent 
space the ‘in/tangible’.  
 An assumption stands firm when explaining what in/tangibility may come to 
constitute. That is, one and all intangible and tangible are already present within the 
in/tangible itself. For instance, though the tangibility of an intangible space is thought to 
be ‘not real’, the space that subsumes it is considered ‘real’ (i.e., the tangible aspect of 
in/tangibility). Subsequently, the realness of the unreal unfolds within a (re)production of 
the multiplicable, whereby a spontaneous unfolding of difference gains momentum 
through a folding repetition. A force that inhabits a phenomena—(difference-
repetition)/(in/tangibility)—the (re)unfolding composes a rupture of occurrences, or 
actualities, that points to a be-come-ing of no particular end. In short, the dynamism of 
the in/tangible is in perpetual negotiation with itself: the possibility to become is 
predicated of a be-come-ing that is repeatedly the same (c.f., the gestation of an occyte). 
 As becoming is always waiting to become, the absent must play a primary role in 
the actualisation of (difference-repetition)/(in/tangibility). An unfolding that finds 
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affirmation within an entire oeuvre of spontaneity, temporary ‘actuals’ coalesce to 
produce a seamless and ceaseless metamorphosis. Nevertheless, can the ‘actual’ and the 
‘spontaneous’ relate when they each bring to mind polemic concepts? That is, an actual is 
already a possible prior to its actualisation, while the spontaneous is predisposed to the 
possibility of a possibility. The thesis at hand posits an actualising that renews itself 
consistently since the spontaneous can never be fully present(ed). Indirectly, this 
hypothesis disregards the artificial dichotomy between the ‘actual’ and ‘spontaneous’.  
 To make sense of the tangibility of (difference-repetition)/(in/tangibility), the 
actual and the spontaneous must be regarded as two mutually distinctive, and yet 
enjoined, entities of that which ‘becomes’. In turn, this assumption helps to characterise, 
as well as co-relate three elements associated with the ‘possible’, namely, multiplicity, 
becoming and the absent. 
 Explicitly, the actual/becomes refers to the ‘real’ occurrence of an event. For 
instance, white appears to be the fundamental colour of light. However, passing white 
light through a prism refracts seven colours. And, directing these other colours through 
individual prisms refract yet another respective set of seven colours42. Therefore, via a 
medium, in this case, a prism, white light ‘reveals’ the spectrum of colours that composes 
it. If white light is produced by combining the visible colours of light in equal amounts, 
then, a mixture of imbalance proportions will result in various hues. So, when the 
brightness of a particular colour, say, green, increases in intensity, the end-product will 
immediately change to become more ‘greenish’ (e.g., more ‘cyan’ than ‘gold’). As such, 
                                                 
42 An experiment carried out by Isaac Newton.  
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the increase and/or decrease in hue, saturation and/or brightness produce a differentiated 
colour effect. 
Although the above example does not describe the ‘becoming’ of a colour in a 
material sense, like water solidifying into ice, or evaporating into steam, it shows that a 
singular event (i.e., a ‘fold’) occurs in between a multiple (i.e., many-fold) of possible 
events. Thus, the singularities that constitute the multiple-ness of a multiplicity exhibit 
the potential of carrying on as an infinite series. The differencing of this repeatable 
in/tangibility points to an uninhabited aspect of the (un)realisable. That is, a spontaneous 
be-come-ing. 
 Implicitly, the spontaneity of the be-come-ing refers to the ‘incorporeal’ 
occurrence of an event. A present that is neither ‘here’ nor ‘there’, the ‘absent’ brings 
about an actualising which stops short of identifying with its own actualisation. For 
instance, the colour blue is apparent only because it is a ‘passing’ that underscores its 
constitution. Characteristic of a metamorphosis (i.e., the production of events), be-come-
ing is a spontaneous differencing that is constantly in the process of being further 
differentiated and (re)affirmed. Subsequently, in context of the current discussion, the 
force, which mediates between thing/event/image-it-self and 
perception/seeing/interpretation-in-itself, is best understood as an ability ‘to create’. An 
experimentation that leads to a continuous unfolding, the becoming of this creativity may 
be expressed as follows: actual/becomes ∞ spontaneous/be-come-ing ∞ actual/becomes ∞ 
spontaneous/be-come-ing . . . —ing. So, the actualising of a thing/event/image-in-itself 
does not pass from actualisation to actualisation. Instead of one actual/becomes 
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succeeding another, the actualising of the spontaneous/be-come-ing expands within a 
returning field of dynamic trans-formation.  
 The transverse-ness43 of be-come-ing situates the manifestation of (difference-
repetition)/(in/tangibility) within an —ing that persistently re/un/folds. Nevertheless, this 
event of becoming does not purposely work towards the realising of be-come-ing and its 
diverse multiple-ness. Capitalising on the shifting presence of that is ‘to come’, the 
spontaneity of an actual becoming privileges the active and generative. Therefore, this 
spontaneous be-coming is regarded as an immediacy that lacks immediateness. After all, 
if becoming is understood either as difference over a discourse of repeatable 
in/tangibility, or difference of repeatable in/tangibility, be-come-ing will be reduced to no 
more than an unvarying variation between point to point (e.g., the gap between x2 and x3 
is the same as the gap between x3 and x4; on both accounts the repeating difference is the 
same).  
 For instance, there must be a basis if Deleuze is to be compared to Derrida. 
Otherwise, it will not be possible to observe, contrast and/or deduce the differences 
and/or similarities that emerge from their trajectories. However, commentaries, such as 
Deleuze being a philosopher of “duality”, “positivity” and “self -interrogation” and 
Derrida being a philosopher of “unity”, “negativity” and “interrogation by another” 
(Lawlor 67), merely approximate how both of them are different and/or the same. These 
distinctions, including ‘how Deleuze is like Derrida’ and ‘how Deleuze is unlike 
                                                 
43 Guattari deploys the concept of ‘transversality’ in a conference paper (1964). But, in terms of this 
discussion, Deleuze’s application of the marker seems more relevant. Briefly, the latter perceives 
transversality as an antithesis to logos. Departing from the Platonic Ideal of wanting to arrive at an Origin, 
the transverse promoted the assembling and unification of heterogeneity. Deleuze says, “But the whole 
problem is to know on what [. . .] formal structure rests, and how it gives the parts and the style a unity 
which they would not have without it [. . .] the importance of a transversal dimension [. . .]: transversality” 
(Deleuze, Proust 149). 
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Derrida’, eventually result in templates of rigid categories, which are used for drawing 
conclusions. If be-come-ing was to be framed by such a structure, it would be represented 
by a cohesive present that presents its presence. But, the arguments that the discussion 
puts forward clearly run contrary to the notion of ‘wholesomeness’. Conceived of in 
terms of ‘becoming-in-itself’, the occurrence of a particular event is all at once singular, 
momentary and end-less. In short, an occurrence is a heterogeneous passing between 
events.  
 The transitoriness of be-come-ing frees the becoming of some ‘thing’ from 
becoming ‘something’. In other words, becoming-in-itself sidelines the concept of 
representation in favour of describing the circumstances that lead to its liberal production. 
The focus of be-come-ing being the ever differing and deferring of some ‘thing’ as a 
‘thing’, it engages with a (quasi)specificity that defies generalisation. A ‘here’ and a 
‘now’ that pass on again and again to yet another, and another, ‘here’ and ‘now’, the 
experience of a thing-in-itself is a composition of be-coming(s) re-presented by the 
re/un/fold—ing.   
 However, the be-coming of —ing is not a perpetuation that merely culminates 
into a heterogeneous surplus. A re-presentation that could be described as representations 
that are always deferrentiated, its multiple-ness is affirmed by the vigour of a 
differentiated heterosis. That is to say, be-com-ing is not just the re-presentation of —ing. 
The be-coming is the re-presentation of a hybridity that expresses be-come-ing itself. 
That is, —ing-in-itself. Therefore, within the plane of multiplicative —ing, becoming 
passes on and becomes. Nonetheless, this argument, just like any other, is contestable, 
especially when the discussion seems to be drawing a synonymy between becoming and 
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endless-ness. To put it simply, how can the becoming, become? While becoming 
connotes the ephemeralness of be-ing, the verb ‘be’ points to an ‘actuality’ that is 
reminiscent of being (i.e., ‘fundament’, ‘unchanging’ and ‘fixed’).  
 That is, the be(-)ing of becoming is the very manifestation of be-com-ing. For 
instance, the passing of an event, ‘x’, does not take place ‘outside’ of its occurrence. 
Because x happens within x-itself, the point-to-point metamorphosis, like from x2 to x3 to 
x4 . . ., is the re/un/folding of an actualise-ing actualisation; a continuum that must be 
accentuated by the unactualised. In other words, actualisation requires that actualising not 
only actualises itself in a representation, but is also of the very re-presentation which is 
always yet-to-be-actualised. Hence, the present thesis postulates that the being of 
becoming is be-come-ing (within) itself. This refolding and unfolding of a folding (i.e., 
—ing) culminate as an actualisation of a fold. In light of an ever be-coming, how is 
meaning making characterised?  
 Central to making meaning is a representability (i.e., of every thing/event/image 
that is interpretable) that resists all appropriations of representation. However, because 
meaning making is representable (i.e., the interpretability of every thing/event/image) 
that which can be represented is re-presentable. Further, this representability is grounded 
within an immanent assembling, effecting and unfolding of the presentable. This 
assumption is based on the present-ness of a ‘present’ that perpetuates a space for all 
other ‘presents’ to come. However, the presentation of the present hinges upon an un-
present(able) that supplements the present(able). Hence, meaning-making enters into a 
plane of present relations that are constituted by the to-be-present. To affirm a nature of 
meaning-making is to affirm lessness-ness, then. That is, the intention to make meaning 
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trespasses beyond a present representation/interpretation. Whatever interpretable 
thing/event/image, there is undoubtedly more and more possible 
representations/interpretations yet to come.  
 Subsequently, the mutability of lessness-ness subverts the dogmatism of 
representation44. Although, ‘representation’ has been intermittently discussed throughout 
the three chapters, it is necessary to restudy the concept once more. Representation 
appears to be a blueprint for experiencing the phenomena. If representation is governed 
by the principle, logos, its framework must be marked by ‘stability’, ‘presentness’ and 
‘fixity’. And, if the wholeness of a logos-centric representation is to be interpreted, the 
means for conceiving ‘what is out there’ must be in place. As such, meaning-making is 
an activity that consists of (artificially) establishing what different symbols/markers can 
represent. For instance, the represented is a representation of what a subject perceives, 
thinks and interprets how the phenomenon ‘is’. Thus, a template, like a social, political or 
economic infrastructure, accords the interpretation of how things must be.  
 As an alternative to a representation that is logos centric, the concept of lessness 
posits a ‘lacking’ that persists in presenting temporary representings; the re-present-ings 
of meanings upon all interpretable thing/event/image. If it is possible to note down the 
intention of lessness-ness, it must be thought of as an instrument for diagnosing the 
symptoms of meaning-making.  
Obviously, lessness is not yet another concept designed to apprehend the nature, 
or essence, of interpretation. After all, the marker ‘less(ness)’ is employed to signify the 
‘no-thing’ which ensures the return of an overabundant re-presentation. Whilst the 
                                                 
44 Deleuze talks about the ‘dogmatic image of thought’ in Difference and Repetition and A Thousand 
Plateaus (with Guattari).    
 
 119
actualisation of the repeatable difference is marked as the perceivable ‘thing’, the virtual-
ness of this repeating return is marked as the yet-to-be-perceived ‘no-thing’. So, lessness 
is the single plurality that encompasses the renewing possibility of every repeatable 
differentiality-in-itself within an immanence. Hence, the interpretable produces an 
excess. And, this ‘more than’ is beyond what ‘representation’ can designate.   
 How an occyte behaves illustrates the actualisation of virtual lessness-ness. 
Typically, each nucleus found in an occyte contains 23 pairs of chromosomes. Although 
the respective pairings possess unique genetic qualities, they are by no means 
independent of one another. Collectively, the chromosomes unify to realise their 
virtuality by exhibiting concrete characteristics. However, because they interact 
perpetually and momentarily, a field of variables is generated. As such, what becomes of 
a nucleus is not predetermined. That is to say, the genetic becoming of an occyte is not 
‘fixed’. Thus, the be-come-ing of the occyte is a re/un/folding that actualises the genetic 
permutations of an open virtuality.  
Similarly, there is always a surplus when it comes to conceiving and perceiving 
how meaning makes. This is because the interpretative is indebted to an absence that is 
constituted by lessness-ness. And so, the act of interpreting must be deemed as a making 
that lies outside of a particular present presence. In short, the interpretable recurs as an 
inexhaustible becoming that possesses the freedom to create within a plane of creativity. 
Since the creative gravitates towards the experimental, its being—or, be-ing—liberates 
itself from determined as an ‘itself’. In other words, the realisation of an actual does not 
curb the virtualness of the possible multiplicity of multiplicities. That is, the actual is an 
actualising deference and difference that presents itself as actualise/d within the one 
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moment. So, the expression of a meaning remains ‘open-ended’ even though it is 
expressed within a specificity. Presented by a no-thing, meaning-making embraces a 
‘more than’ that points to an evolutionary be-come-ing. A continual passing that becomes 
after be-coming, the negation that be-ing produces a one-ness that can only be 






 As a whole, Section Two seeks to demonstrate textual openness. By reading  
 
specific texts, the present endeavour is an attempt to map out the relationship between the 
‘yet-to-be-determined’ and hermeneutics. That is, interpretation is not located ‘in’ a text 
because the process is driven forth by a multiplicity of instabilities and potentialities, 
which are inherent of meaning-making. Hence, this discussion adopts a poststructuralist 
viewpoint, which purports that all interpretations are textual and inter-textual as there can 
be no outside of a text (Derrida, Of Grammatology, 1982). Moreover, since interpretation 
is marked by a surplus of interpretations, the result of this polysemy is an inter-play of 
differentiations, deferentiations and displacements. The present thesis posits the inter-
play (and, perhaps, intra-play) of texts as ‘hyper-textual’. That is, a text is inter-connected 
(as well as intra-connected) to other texts that exist within itself.  
 The following salient points accompany the concept of hyper-textuality. First, the 
hyper-textual resists logos-centrism. Second, the hyperactive nature of texts highlights 
the undeterminateness that accompanies meaning-making. If such a strategy is to be 
sustained, then, it has to steadily refute structured analysis. Otherwise, interpretation will 
be subjected to the ‘determinable’. In this case, the “validity” that E. D. Hirsch Jr. hopes 
to achieve with the interpretative will not apply. He purports that “the activity of 
interpretation can lay claim to intellectual respectability only if its results can lay claim to 
validity” (Hirsch 164). To achieve this validation, “the interpreter’s primary task is to 
reproduce in himself the author’s ‘logic’, his attitudes, his cultural givens, in short, his 
world. Even though the process of verification is highly complex and difficult, the 
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ultimate verificative principle is very simple—the imaginative reconstruction of the 
speaking subject” (242). So Hirsch thinks that the validity of an interpretation is 
dependent on whether the reading concurs with the author’s intention (or, how accurately 
a reading reproduces the specific meaning(s) as intended by the author).  
 However, as an interpretation emerges from a network of possible interpretations, 
the organising rationale behind this continuous shifting points to an infinite 
‘decentreableness’. In other words, the hyper-ness of a text, which gives rise to 
interpretation(s), is not facilitated by a primary axis of reference—an interpretation takes 
shape in spite of an absent centre.  To a large extent, interpretation is a ‘linear’ process. 
For instance, three markers, ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ cannot be read all at once. Regardless of the 
order in which a subject decides to read, for example, A-B-C, A-C-B, B-C-A, C-A-B, or 
C-B-A, an interpretation of what these combinations of markers can come to mean still 
requires a singular focus. Therefore, while a subject perceives/sees ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ all at 
once, the interpretation of these markers is dependent on the sequence which s/he chooses 
to read them in.   
 Consequently, there are two different interpretations altogether. First, there is the 
interpretation of markers, such as ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’. Second, there is the interpretation of 
texts, like A-B-C, A-C-B and B-C-A. As such, there are two levels of interpretables: that 
of a marker and that of a text. Furthermore, this interpretability is enabled by a system of 
differences. For instance, Ferdinand de Saussure conveys how this system functions in 
Course in General Linguistics, a compilation by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye that 
is based on notes taken from lectures which the former had given at the University of 
Geneva. Saussure argues that the meaning that a marker/sign bears is in direct relation to 
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the other makers/signs which exist within the same system. As such, A is ‘A’ for two 
reasons. Firstly, because it is not B and secondly, it is othered by B. Therefore, ‘A’ is not 
‘B’ because ‘A’ is neither written nor read as ‘B’. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
‘A’ cannot take on the interpretation that has been artificially assigned to ‘B’45. 
Subsequently, the undeterminateness of an interpretation is heightened by the 
arbitrariness that helps correlate a particular marker/sign with a particular signification.  
 Thus, hyper-textuality is not a methodology that explains ‘how interpretation 
functions’. Rather, it is a metainterpretation that studies the passings which are closely 
tied to the re-representability and re-reinterpretability of texts. This assertion is based on 
the assumption that an interpretation is subjected to an infinite reciprocity between 
repetition and difference. And since the reading of any one text is undeterminable, there 
can never be a conclusive interpretation of it. In context of this thesis, an interpretable is 
subjected to an infinite differing and deferring of folds.  
 Specifically, the concept of ‘folding’46 encourages the production of possibilities. 
This unfolding of folds/possibilities points to the effect of folds/possibilities within 
folds/possibilities themselves. In light of the present discussion, this translates into the 
relation of interpretations to interpretations-in-themselves. Hence, the fold is really an 
inward unfolding of that which remains undeterminable (i.e., the ‘outside’). The hyper-
ness of the text is produced by the decentrability of the text-in-itself. Generally, a 
                                                 
45 It is sustainable to argue that an interpretation is determined by a context (e.g., an idiom authorship and 
socio-politics). The problem is, if interpretation is indeed context-bound, context is, however, ‘boundless’ 
That is, there is no way of determining what context ‘is’ since it shifts from contexts to contexts (c.f., 
moment-to-moment momentariness).  
 
46 The notion of the ‘fold’ is central to Deleuze’s work. He applies it especially to his reading of Leibniz 
and Foucault.   
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refolding is a possible that unfolds within a space which continuously folds into and onto 
another and another . . . possibility.  
 As every possibility is perpetuated and propelled by the ‘ever to come’, the 
constitution of inter-interpretations is produced by a force that diversifies (i.e., 
differentiation through repetition). A passing on of some ‘thing’ happening again and 
again, this eternal re-constitution of interpretation, through its own repeatability, suggests 
a becoming that will always be-coming. In sum, the relationalness that becoming creates 
provides hyper-textuality with its evolutionary form, where possibilities multiply and 
proliferate. With neither a beginning nor an end point, the sets of in-between differences 
and repetitions entail a continuum that is unified in the very be-coming of the becoming.  
 Against this backdrop of multiplicity, interpretation is continually driven by the 
affectiveness of a hyperality. A hyper-ness that produces more and more potential 
readings, these ‘layers’ of possibilities provoke a host of challenges which exacerbate the 
fundamental difficulties raised by the interpretative. These include the problematics 
involving perception, the concept of the image and the function of the sense47. According 
to Bergson, hyperality’s “artificial obscurity” serves no purpose other than to create 
“fictitious problems” when attempting to penetrate the “inner meaning” of a text (Matter 
15-16).   
 The following three chapters seek to demonstrate the abovementioned ‘artifice’, 
which hyper-textuality introduces into a text. It will be useful to note that instead of 
explicating theses which specific theorists purport, the following chapters will focus on 
the investigation of specific themes. The reason for this strategy is two-fold. Firstly, the 
                                                 
47 Section one of this dissertation identifies as well as explicates some of these basic problems.       
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discussion wishes to outline some of the fundamental concepts that are associated with 
the topic of meaning making. Secondly, it is always contestable as to why the perspective 
offered by one theorist is privileged over another. Therefore, the discussion employs 
explicit references, like referring to a specific piece of work, or theorist, solely for the 
purpose of describing the problematics that are associated with interpretation. This 
strategy aims to describe the ‘being’ of interpretation so that an exposition of its 
‘becoming’ can be delivered.  
 In Chapter Four, the discussion studies Deleuze’s interpretation of Marcel 
Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past (1981). The chapter makes specific references to 
Proust and Signs, whereby Deleuze performs an in-depth, albeit, selective, analysis of 
Remembrance of Things Past. The intention to interpret Deleuze’s reading of 
Remembrance of Things Past is in effect an example of how interpretation produces 
layers of (hyper)texts via the unfolding of repeatable differences. Of course, apart from 
providing an instance of what interpretation does, making the choice to close-read 
Deleuze and his concepts serves other objectives as well. For one, the theses that Deleuze 
purports have clear relevance to the present endeavour. Particularly significant to this 
study of hypertextuality is his explication of how a text is a difference that unfolds within 
its own repeatable difference. Moreover, apart from ‘difference’, ‘repetition’, ‘unfolding’ 
and ‘inter-interpretations’, Deleuze’s choice to examine Remembrance of Things Past 
affords an understanding of the complex interrelations between ‘time’ and ‘space’, which 
are the focuses of the following two respective chapters.   
 In Chapter Five, An Interpretation of Interpretations of Time, the discussion 
concerning ‘time’ offers a perspective on the production of multiple interpretations under 
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the condition of a singular past-present-future: the temporalisation of texts. This 
interpretation of time explores the meaning of time in the context of ontological thought. 
That is, under the mediation of infinite time, the interpretable is represented by a 
continuum, where (re)interpretation(s) itself acquires a force of becoming: the hyperality 
of inter-textualness. As such, within the variability of a single time, inter-textuality and 
its many-folds unify in a single multiplicity. Because this chapter is about the ways in 
which the notion of time can be interpreted, its choice of theoretical propositions offered 
by various philosophers and theorists is necessarily selective. Furthermore, the respective 
interpretation that each of them posit will be dealt with in brief. That is, arguments 
targeted for inclusion elaborate on the correlation between the concept of ‘time’ and ‘a-
thing-in-itself. The question is, is it possible for x to become different and yet remain as 
‘x’? 
 Subsequently, the temporality that produces inter-interpretations presents an 
extension that constitutes the realisation of ‘space’. Therefore, Chapter Six, An 
Interpretation of Interpretations of Space, offers a perspective on how interpretations are 
‘constructions’ that occur within time. This conjecture, in turn, contributes to a 
conception of ‘space’. The inter-textuality of this structure (i.e., layers upon layers of 
interpretations) is created by the moment-within-moment encounters between hyper-
foldings. Hence, the incessant passing from interpretations to interpretations opens up a 
terrain that is tantamount to ‘infinity’: the boundless refolding within the boundary of a 
fold. Similar to Chapter Five, which examines the concept of ‘time’, the discussion on the 
idea of ‘space’ includes a selection of works that will contribute to an explication of how 
interpretation can take place. That is, x becomes ‘x’, which refers to a becoming of itself.  
 127
 In this light, the act of interpretation is dynamic and non-eventual not only on the 
level of the interpretable, but also on that of interpretability. This is why, in the present 
discussion, the decentredness of ‘becoming’, ‘difference’ and ‘repetition’ is deployed to 
describe the hypertextual nature of hermeneutics. At the same time, this implies that 
interpretation is made possible by the ‘absent’: a nothing. That is, the relations of an 
interpretation to other interpretations exist within a presentness that is naturally evasive: a 
no-thing. According to Deleuze (and Guattari), the hyperality of ‘no-thingness’ is self-
referential; it materialises through its own heterogeneous homogeneity. Of this immanent 
plane, he says,  
Every movement passes through the whole of the plane by immediately 
turning back on and folding itself and also by folding other movements or 
allowing itself to be folded by them, giving rise to retroactions, 
connections, and proliferations in the fractualisation of this infinitely 
folded up infinity (variable curvature of the plane) [. . .] the plane of 
immanence is always single, being itself [a] pure variation [. . .] upon 
which infinite movements are retained and selected, succeed and contest 
each other [. . .] 
      (Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy? 38-39) 
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Chapter Four: An Interpretation of Deleuze Reading Proust 
 
 The present endeavour explores and describes the development of Deleuze’s 
interpretation of Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past48. By making specific references 
to Proust and Signs, the current endeavour seeks to explicate a reasoning which supports 
Deleuze’s claim that “interpretation is the converse of a production of signs themselves” 
(Proust 1)49. In brief, this chapter will take three things into consideration: the 
assumptions that Deleuze makes when reading Proust; how they contribute to the 
development of his literary trajectory; and, the significance and impact of his theories on 
meaning-making. Therefore, the intention is to study how “determinable procedures” 
produce interpretable signs in a work of art, in this case Remembrance (Deleuze, Proust 
1). Although the current chapter wishes to determine the constituents of ‘Deleuzian’ 
theory, it is essentially an interpretation (i.e., an interpretation of what ‘Deluezianism’ 
might be). Also, the inspection and conclusion that follow are predisposed towards a 
limitation that is set forth by the very nature of hermeneutics itself.  
 There is much to speak about concerning the exchange between an interpretation 
and a sign/marker. More often than not, the act of recollection is thought to be the key 
when considering methods involving ‘how to interpret’. For instance, the character, 
Socrates, in Plato’s Meno, proposes that knowledge is dependent on a memory that has 
been accumulated through time. Thus, in several dialogues, Socrates suggests that 
                                                 
48 Proust, Marcel. Remembrance of Things Past. Trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin. 3 
Vols. New York: Vintage, 1981. The discussion abbreviates the work as, Remembrance.  
 
49 The abbreviation of Deleuze’s work, Proust and Signs, is, Proust.  
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knowledge, such as that concerning virtue, wisdom and justice, is ‘pre-programmed’—
the idea of ‘anamnesis’.   
 An episode involving Socrates, a slave boy and the subject of geometry, 
demonstrates the correlation between the a priori and knowledge. Socrates argues that 
owing to the boy’s latent potential, the latter is able to provide correct answers to 
geometry related questions in spite of not having studied the subject. Socrates postulates 
that because the boy possesses the potential to ‘recollect’ as well as ‘deliver’ knowledge 
that has been ‘built-in’ into his system, appropriate questioning and prompting naturally 
lead to the ‘right’ answers. This episode foregrounds a paradox even though it contributes 
to Plato’s development of the Theory of Forms.  
 Socrates and the premise that he advocates suggest that all knowledge must be 
acknowledged as ‘learnt’, regardless of whether there is any actual recollection of having 
learnt it or not. However, can the presentness of that ‘present’ knowledge be 
accumulated/preserved when it does not, in the first place, ‘exist’ within the scope of a 
memory?  The paradox of learning suggests that certain things are beyond learning 
because the premise for learning must be discovered before any learning can take place.  
 The study of how an interpretation and a sign/marker correlate has resulted in a 
wide variety of contemporary critical theories. For the purpose of understanding ‘how to 
interpret’, rigorous interpretative methodologies, involving the subject, object and event 
have been constructed. Analyses consisting of these three constitutions include assessing 
the subject in relation to his/her social context, understanding the connections that the 
object projects and being aware of the possibilities that an event gives rise to. These 
theories of interpretation, for example, speculate that the attempt to understand how 
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signs/markers function is likely to end up inconclusive. Due to the interpretative 
ambiguity that emerges from presuppositions, differing authorial intentions, and/or the 
evolution of words, the interpretation of any event will irrevocably lead to infinite 
reinterpretations and reinterpretations. In order to facilitate a discussion on this 
hermeneutical condition, Deleuze’s intellectual trajectory is being used as a case study. 
The ‘multiple-ness’ that composes his arguments serves as a promising platform for 
exploring a pluralistic approach to interpretation.  
 However, an interpretation of Deleuze’s work is a reading carried out from a 
particular perspective. There are two reasons for this assertion: any interpretation is but 
an interpretation; and, according to John Rajchman, Deleuze does not map out meanings 
“in a predetermined plane with fixed coordinates” (4-5). The opacity that Deleuze 
exhibits in his work has been commented upon by many others, including Paul Patton, 
John Protevi and Leonard Lawlor. As a matter of fact, the density of Deleuze’s writing 
can be extrapolated from the observation that despite being a slender volume consisting 
of less than a hundred pages, Kant’s Critical Philosophy (1963) manages to crystallise all 
three volumes of Kant’s Critiques. Of course, just like any other rereading, Deleuze’s 
reinterpretation of the Critiques is necessarily selective. That is, Deleuze’s reading of the 
Critiques bears arbitrariness in relation to ‘what Kant is trying to convey’. As such, the 
intention, ‘to interpret’, carries a fundamental dilemma, whereby all variations of 
interpretations are necessarily incomplete50.  
                                                 
50 The problem of ‘arbitrariness’ confronts any approach to interpretation. That is, since not one 
interpretation can be deemed, ‘correct’, all interpretations are equally ‘correct’ then. Although there is 
much to be said about interpretation and relativism, the focus here is to examine how Deleuze’s work 
succeeds in contributing to an understanding of how the interpretative functions.   
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 The object of analysis in Proust, Remembrance, must first be dealt with in some 
detail prior to delivering an outline of Deleuze reading Proust. Briefly, Remembrance 
relates the story of a narrator who observes ‘nothing’. That is to say, Remembrance gives 
the impression of making a conscientious effort to recount a single story in as many ways 
as possible. This duplicity, which conveys a sense of repeatedness, culminates in a 
tapestry embroiled in profound complexities. Further, the repetitive searching after and 
encapsulating of ‘lostness’, which involve memory, experience and time, invariably 
suggest an unfolding of differences. Of Remembrance’s repeatable differences, Deleuze 
concludes that Proust must have conceived the work as “an apparatus or a machine 
capable of functioning effectively, producing signs of different orders, which will have 
an effect on the reader” ultimately (Proust 1). 
 As a point of departure, the following excerpt condenses Deleuze’s concerns with 
Remembrance. He says, 
The problem is raised by Proust on several levels: What constitutes the 
unity of a work? What makes us “communicate” with a work? What 
constitutes the unity of art, if there is such a thing? We have given up 
seeking a unity which would unify the parts, a whole which would totalise 
the fragments. For it is the character and nature of the parts or fragments 
to exclude the Logos both as logical unity and as organic totality. But 
there is, there must be a unity which is the unity of this very multiplicity, a 
whole which is the whole of just these fragments: a One and a Whole 
which would not be the principle but, on the contrary, “the effect” of the 
multiplicity and of its disconnected parts. One and Whole which would 
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function as effect, effect of machines, instead of as principles. A 
communication which would not be posited in principle, but which would 
result from the operation of the machines and their detached parts, their 
noncommunicating fragments. 
(Deleuze, Proust 144-145) 
The following interpretation is an elementary interpretation of the above citation. A sign 
that marks the repeatability of difference (i.e., the ‘search’ of Remembrance) points to a 
continuum that is yet to be transformed51. Therefore, the ongoing discovery of a ‘centre’ 
that can facilitate the active production of a difference and deference refers to a unity that 
eludes unification— transverseness. Moreover, this transversality constitutes the singular 
unity and totality of the sign; the ‘transverse’ places precedence on the emission and 
multiplication of signs as it encourages differencing and deferencing (Deleuze, Proust 
149). The effect is: the oneness of a multiplicity and the disconnectness of a whole. That 
is, the “whole parts” cannot “totalised” and the “unifying” parts does not “unite” (150).  
  In short, Deleuze is not too concerned with the conceptual themes that make up 
the implicit and evolving meanings of Remembrance. Rather, he seems to be engaged by 
how these themes collectively lay bare as signs. For instance, Marcel’s madeline is not 
just a motif to denote the encounters experienced by his senses and memory. The cake 
acts as a sign pointing to an involuntary emotion that forces thought (i.e., the 
unconscious) into thinking (i.e., conscious)—suddenly, the essence of 
Combray/Balbec/Venice infiltrates and overwhelms Marcel’s consciousness. Together 
with other types of markers, including ‘landscapes’, ‘art’ and ‘love’, “signs form both the 
                                                 
51 A remark that Deleuze makes on Balzac’s style. He says, “In Balzac there coexist, not digested, not yet 
transformed, all the elements of a style-to-come which does not exist”. (Deleuze, Proust 146).  
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unity and plurality of the Search” in Remembrance (Deleuze, Proust 5). So, the search for 
‘lost’ time is presented as a system of signs that induces meanings, but evades permanent 
decipherability. Hence, “meaning itself is identified with this development of the sign, as 
the sign was identified with the involution of meaning . . . [held] in [a] complication, it 
puts the one in the other” (Deleuze, Proust 89). 
 As “one” is “put into the other”, the unity that effects the “multiple” and 
“disconnected” fragments of Remembrance must be a system that resists complete 
comprehension. Deleuze endorses this ambivalency when upon contemplating the 
question “What constitutes the unity of In Search of Lost Time?” he concludes that “We 
know, at least, what does not” (Deleuze, Proust 3). After all, the possibility of an 
interpretation is presented only when involuntary signs betray profound meanings which 
are to envelop and implicate the unity of external signs (16). Subsequently, even the most 
basic of all signs provoke a sense of uncertainty. For instance, the worldly signs of social 
decorum, convention and etiquette ask to be interpreted, deciphered and explicated (17). 
What then, gives rise to an unexpected blush? Why is there a need to glance in secrecy? 
Is there ‘hidden’ meaning behind a seemingly oblique remark? While the worldly sign is 
stereotypical as it “stands for action and for thought”, the “vacuity” that confers ritual 
perfect/formalistic meaning upon a marker is ultimately irreducible (Deleuze, Proust 6-
7). This is because the worldly sign, like all other signs, is “empty” (7). On the nature of 
meaning and a sign’s relation to its meaning, Deleuze postulates that “the work of art [. . 
.] produces within itself and upon itself its own effects, and is filled with them, and 
nourished by them” (Proust 84; 136).  
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 Since there is nothing outside of the sign, its signification is the result of an intra-
folding. In other words, the constitution of the “whole which would totalise the 
fragments” (144) is an intra-differentiation that expresses a recurring freedom to create 
and to become. For instance, Marcel’s madeline contextualises Combray in two different 
ways: the experience of eating the cake in the past is internalised as present; Combray as 
experienced in the past is recalled in the present: the past is present. Though it is possible 
to interpret what ‘Combray’ may come to mean, the signification(s) that accompanies it 
bears a degree of ‘inadequacy’ (i.e., a ‘lack’) since its presence is perpetually fragmented 
and fragmenting (Deleuze, Proust 149). Being an “effect of machines, instead of 
principles”, the reading of any sign does not communicate a single interpretation. 
Deleuze explains that signs “do not have the same way of appearing, do not allow 
themselves to be deciphered in the same manner, do not have identical relation with their 
meaning” (Proust 5). That is, while signs are assigned to designate specific objects, they 
signify something different each and every time (26).  
 Hence, Deleuze posits that the essence of interpreting signs is “a difference, the 
absolute and ultimate Difference” (Proust 41) that conveys “non-communicating 
fragments”. For instance, every subject observes the world from a different perspective 
and a “point of view is difference itself, internal absolute difference” (42). However, this 
does not amount to ‘subjectivism’ because “it is not the subject which explains essence 
[i.e., internal absolute difference], rather it is essence which implicates, envelops, wraps 
itself up in the subject” (43). Thus, “essence” and “subject” merge and emerge through an 
unfolding of differentiation. Similarly, Marcel remarks that style is a question not of 
technique but of vision: it is a “revelation” that cannot be understood via direct and 
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conscious methods (Proust III 931). That is, difference-in-itself highlights the qualitative 
difference between differences.  
 As a consequence, interpreting the sign (or, interpretation itself) “has become 
crumbs and chaos” because “order has collapsed, as much in the states of the 
[interpretative] which were supposed to reproduce it as in the essences or Ideas which 
were supposed to inspire it” (Deleuze, Proust 98). Accordingly, a reading of 
Remembrance is independent of pre-determined essence. In place of an essence, an 
‘individualised’ being, Deleuze puts forward a principle of individuation. He says, “This 
is precisely the originality of Proustian reminiscence: it proceeds from a mood, from a 
state of soul, and from its associative chains, to a creative or transcendent viewpoint—
and no longer, in Plato’s fashion, from a state of the world to seen objectivities” 
(Deleuze, Proust 98). This proposition implies that the act of reading engages the 
“disparity”, “incommensurability” and “disintegration of the parts”, which, in turn, render 
an investigation of tale-telling “breaks”, “lacunae” and “intermittences” (103).  
 For the purpose of studying how signs produce “the effect of [a] multiplicity” 
(144) that is symptomatic of a reading of Remembrance, Deleuze studies the relationship 
between ‘containers’ and ‘contents’. The chain of ‘containers’ that he chooses to 
‘unpack’ includes an ‘object’, a ‘character’ and a ‘name’. They represent ‘madeline’, 
‘Albertine’ and ‘Balbec’, respectively. A brief survey of these markers yields the 
following interpretation. ‘Container madeline’ holds the memory of a Combray that is 
reconstructed based on imagination: it represents a life-at-Combray that Marcel never 
had. ‘Container Albertine’ holds the impersonal perspective that arises from “a force” 
that “breaks” a chain of associations, which links Albertine, Balbec and Marcel (Deleuze, 
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Proust 107). ‘Container Balbec’ holds the association between the landscape and its 
impregnable meanings: the meaning waits—and remains waiting—for Marcel’s 
comprehension. 
 In the abovementioned examples, making meaning out of the relationship 
between ‘container’ and ‘content’ lies beyond the empirical container/content. An 
‘outsideness’, which points to the presence of an ‘absent’, and a ‘silence’, which speaks, 
demonstrate that interpretation is made possible because some ‘thing’ is ‘not there’. 
Deleuze says, “In all the aspects of [a gap between content and container], then, the 
inadequation, the incommensurability of the content is manifested: either it is a lost 
content, which brings the self to its death, or a separated content, which casts [. . .] 
inevitable disappointment” (Proust 108). As a result, meaning-making “can never be 
organised hierarchically and objectively” (108).  
 Because the unity of a work is constituted by a ‘gap’, outsideness articulates the 
essence of an effective “whole”. In order to emphasise that “whole” is not “absolute” 
(i.e., ‘being’), Deleuze asserts that ‘essence’ is “a kind of superior viewpoint, an 
irreducible viewpoint which signifies at once the birth [. . . that] always constitutes [. . .]” 
(Proust 98). He lists the five viewpoints that contribute to the interpretation of signs: 
[1.] The configuration of the parts as they are outlined in the world; [2.] 
the nature of the law they reveal; [3] the use of the faculties they solicit; 
[4.] the type of unity they create; and [5.] the structure of the language 
which translates and interprets them. It is from all these viewpoints—
parts, law, use, unity, style—that the sign [makes meaning]. 
(Deleuze, Proust 96) 
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Thus, it is ‘plurality’, and not ‘logos’ that holds together the chain of dynamic attributions 
which makes up a sign. The signification that binds the contents of Remembrance is a 
repeating difference, where an individuating viewpoint refracts multiple viewpoints. 
Specifically, concerning the status of an ‘essence’/unity, Deleuze says that it is “an 
individuating viewpoint superior to the individuals themselves, breaking with their chains 
of associations; essence appears alongside these chains, incarnated in a closed fragment, 
adjacent to what it overwhelms, contiguous to what it reveals” (Proust 143). In sum, 
“without anything lacking” (143), the ‘associative’ and ‘creative’ maintain the ‘essence’ 
of a single plurality. So, what ensures the continuity and connectivity of a One and a 
Whole that function as an effect?  
 Deleuze advances “a radical, absolute beginning” (Proust 44) in an attempt to 
delineate how a “One and a Whole” is “effect[ed]”. He suggests that the “productiv[ity] 
of certain truths” (129) depends on the efficacy of an “antilogos”. He elaborates how this 
‘mechanism’ functions: 
To the logos, organ and organon whose meaning must be discovered in the 
whole to which it belongs, is opposed the antilogos, machine and 
machinery whose meaning (anything you like) depends solely on its 
functioning, which, in turn, depends on its separate parts [. . . the 
interpretative] has no problem of meaning, it has only a problem of use”  
(Deleuze, Proust 29)  
In sum, the “antilogos” effects a “functioning” because it is an “involuntary machine of 
interpretation” (131). 
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 Hence, the Search in Remembrance is a machine producing orders of truths; the 
production of truths occurs as signs open themselves up for interpreting, deciphering and 
translating (Deleuze, Proust 130-131). For instance, a sign, like ‘time’ (or, ‘truth’), 
conveys the effect of an “explicative style” (148). Deleuze identifies three orders of time, 
which correlate with three orders of truths. The first order, ‘lost time’, is defined by 
“reminiscences and essences” that equate to ‘worldly signs’. The second order, ‘time 
regained’, is concerned with “unfulfilled” and “unperceived” pleasures and pains that 
correspond to involuntary memory and emotion. And, the third order, ‘eternal time’, is 
about the ceaselessness of an “alteration” that will see to an eternally repeating repetition 
and difference (Deleuze, Proust 131-132).  
 Each of these three orders of time acts as a ‘machine’ that produces a degree of 
truth. The first machine produces truths that are related to the ‘lost-ness’ of time. These, 
include material signs (i.e., ‘objects’), such as containers, girls, and Venice. No more than 
crude resemblances, signs produced by the first machine are “partial objects [. . .] 
fragments without totality, vessels without communication, partitioned scenes” (Deleuze, 
Proust 133). The second machine produces truths that are related to ‘regaining’ time. For 
instance, involuntary memory “affects” two moments of experience: the present and a 
prior one (133). Therefore, the violin and the piano resonate with one another within the 
‘rendition’ of the Vinteuil sonata. The third machine produces truths that are related to 
the ‘eternity’ of time. This ‘eternal-ness’ points to an ‘immutable’ force, which exerts 
‘eventualities’, including death, degeneration and transversality. For instance, towards the 
end of Remembrance Marcel realises the signification of experiencing time and death. 
That is, regardless of the uncertainty of those who still live, or the surety of those who 
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have already passed on (e.g., Marcel’s past love interests), nothing escapes the perennial 
progress of dying and the eventuality of death. As a result, the third machine does not 
simply produce an interpretation of ‘what the Search is’52; it effects a unity that makes 
the plurality (i.e., multiplicity) of multiplicities “One” and “Whole”.  
 Subsequently, “a very special mode of unity irreducible to any ‘unification’” 
(Deleuze, Proust 149) underscores the interconnection between a ‘one’ and the ‘whole’. 
In other words, the interpretation of what a sign can come to mean is aligned with an 
‘unlacking’ lack: an uncomplete that completes, an unspoken that speaks and an absent 
that presents. Deleuze clarifies how the ‘unintended’ functions when he comments that 
“this text certainly invokes a continuity and a totality; but the essential point is to know 
where these are elaborated—neither in the viewpoint nor in the thing seen, but in the 
transversal [. . .]” (Deleuze, Proust 153). He cites the incident of Marcel catching sight of 
the pink sky whilst on a train ride as an example. The connection between “continuity”, 
“totality” and “transversality” is depicted as Marcel makes a mental edit of the sequence 
as well as significance of the images that pass by the window at his seat. Essentially, 
Marcel’s train ride and the scenery that passes him by evoke an interpretation that seeks 
“not to unify the viewpoints of a landscape, but to bring them into communication 
according to their own dimension. It is transversality which constitutes the singular unity 
and totality of [possible meaning]” (Deleuze, Proust 149).  
 Hence, according to Deleuze, “transversality” facilitates the “communication” 
that makes sense of “detached” and “noncommunicating fragments”. He considers 
transverse-ness to be “the new linguistic convention” that establishes, unites and totalises 
                                                 
52 Deleuze interprets this as “the search for causes” (Proust 136).  
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“without unifying or totalising objects and subjects” (Deleuze, Proust 150). While a sign 
accords its peculiar discourse, this unfolding is, nonetheless, dependent on an external 
medium: the subject. Thus, signs, including objects, places and people, function within a 
system that is effect-producing; stimulated by the possibilities that signs possess, a 
subject constructs ‘meanings/significations’ which otherwise will not enter into 
presence53. As such, the nature of meaning and a sign’s correlation to its meanings is 
represented by “an associative, incongruous chain [that] is unified only by a creative 
viewpoint which itself takes the role of an incongruous part within a whole” (102). The 
unfolding pluralism within a system of refolding signs is perpetuated by the antilogos 
(i.e., transversality), which works towards endorsing an organic unity a radical 
“complication” that envelops the many in the One and affirms the unity of the multiple 
(44). 
 For instance, the creative54 complication that affords the emission of interpretable 
signs is reflected in the encounter between Marcel and ‘time’. The passages of ‘lost’, 
‘regained’ and ‘eternal’ time exemplify the passing of significations that are passive, 
active and empty, respectively. And, because their relations are inseparable from one 
another, this internalisation, or virtuality, becomes immanent (Deleuze, Proust 59-60).  
 ‘Lost time’ represents ‘time past’. And the ‘pastness’ and ‘decayedness’ of time 
are exhibited in a chain of ‘cause and effect’. Marcel being reminded of his 
grandmother’s death when removing his boots is an example that attests to the stimulus-
                                                 
53 The affinity between subject, object and interpretation is studied in the field of reception theory.  
 
54 Deleuze asserts that “[. . .] to remember is to create, is to reach that point where the associative chain 




response type of association. ‘Time regained’ represents ‘present time’. And, this 
‘presentness’ of time helps to reveal a mature Marcel. He realises that, in the past, too 
much time has been wasted on seeking superficial pleasures. ‘Eternal time’ represents 
‘universal time’. A “perpetual recreation of the primordial elements of nature” (Deleuze, 
Proust 44), ‘eternal time’ transgresses the very ‘structure’ that yields it. The multiple-
ness of a singularity, the universality of eternal time is all at once ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of 
an ‘itself’ that escapes itself.  
 So, the passiveness accrued by lost time, the activeness mobilised by time 
regained and the emptiness affirmed by eternal time culminate in a pure state. That is, the 
very be-coming of the past, present and future within itself (Deleuze, Proust 59). For 
instance, Remembrance concludes with Marcel being enlightened to the condition that 
experiences are meaningful only when they are ‘meaningless’, or ‘void of meaning’ to 
begin with—the hypothesis of the floating signifier. As he becomes one who affirms life 
by evolving in tandem with an unpresentable time, Marcel ‘becomes’ in his own ‘be-
coming’. Deleuze encapsulates the incorporeality of Marcel’s ‘becoming’ as follows: 
It is obvious that something essential escapes voluntary memory: the 
past’s being as past. Voluntary memory proceeds as if the past were 
constituted as such after it has been present. It would therefore have to 
wait for a new present so that the preceding one could pass by, or become 
past. But in this way the essence of time escapes us. For if the present was 
not past at the same time as present, if the same moment did not coexist 
with itself as present and past, it would never pass, a new present would 
never come to replace this one. The past as it is in itself coexists with, and 
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does not succeed, the present it has been. It is true that we do not 
apprehend something as past at the very moment when we experience it as 
present [. . .] But this is because joint memory establish a real succession 
where, more profoundly, there is a virtual coexistence. 
(Proust 56-57) 
  Before turning to examine how Deleuze’s assertions correlate with the 
problematics of interpretation, a summary of this chapter thus far. Deleuze’s Proust is 
about the differencing and deferring of both the production and interpretation of signs. 
The work elaborates how a sign, owing to an ongoing repetition of its differentiality in 
relation to other signs, is in itself a difference that refolds and unfolds. This re/unfolding 
of differencing and repeatability points to two crucial aspects of the sign: the purity of a 
sign (e.g., ‘truth’) is based on difference and deference (i.e., “transversality”, “antilogos” 
and “a principle of individuation”) and some ‘thing’ automates the production of 
repeatable differences. As such,  
“There is no Logos, there are only hieroglyphs. To think is therefore to 
interpret, is therefore to translate. The essences are at once the thing to be 
translated and the translation itself, the sign and the meaning [. . .] 
Everywhere is the hieroglyph, whose double symbol is the accident of the 
encounter and the necessity of thought: “fortuitous and inevitable”. 
(Deleuze, Proust 167) 
 Clearly, the focus of Deleuze’s critical examination of signification and  
 
interpretation is ‘deference and difference’ (i.e., ↕ deference) and not essence (i.e., logos).  
                           difference 
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Since a ‘lacking’ predisposes the mechanics of repeatable difference, its functioning 
departs from hierarchal demarcations, such as ‘essence’ versus ‘Essence’, ‘truths’ versus 
‘Truth’ and ‘thoughts’ versus ‘Thought’. Thus, ‘representation’ is marked by the re-
presentation of the non-presentable. For instance, Claude Lévi-Strauss proposes that the 
‘floating signifier’—the re-presentable—embodies a default lacking as well as signifies 
excess signification. The co-presence of the non/sense suggest an immediacy that brings 
differentiation, re-presentation and interpretation together. Furthermore, a reconstitution 
of ‘time’ and ‘space’ is construed within an infinite production of producing possibilities.  
  Hence, Deleuze’s concept of time presents a series of fractured perspectives. This 
in turn foregrounds the making of an unpresentable space. That is to say, the time-space 
a-chronology destabilises a logos-centric congruity which presumes a successive 
transition of past to present to future. Deleuze’s argument highlights that neither the past, 
present nor future is captured within isolated points on the time-space continuum. The 
presentness within the passing of a present moment and the moments immediate to it 
must be simultaneous and ongoing. As every moment of the present co-exists with the 
past, all ‘pasts’ are part of a single continuous to-be-presented present. While the past-
present-future is featured as a collective passing, the actualisations of the ‘past’, ‘present’ 
and ‘future’ archives “individuation”. For instance, the past possesses a ‘virtual’ presence 
whilst the present possesses an ‘actual’ presence. Though both past and present are just as 
‘real’, the ‘virtual’ can never be defined as ‘actual’55.  
                                                 
55 C.f., “But let a noise or a scent, once heard or once smelt, be heard or smelt again in the present and at 
the same time in the past, real without being actual, ideal without being abstract [my italics] and 
immediately the permanent and habitually concealed essence of things is liberated” (Proust III 905-06).  
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 As Deleuze considers the experience and interpretation of signs (Proust 1), 
concepts including ‘difference’, ‘repetition’ and ‘transversality’ are set forth. The 
manifestation of these ideas acts as alternatives to conventional understanding (e.g., 
logos-centric theories) of ‘how to see’. For instance, the multiplicity of a singular effects 
the refolding of an unfolding becoming (i.e., logos versus plurality). Concisely, Deleuze’s 
authorship interrogates the issue ‘how might one interpret’, thereby forging a response 
that orientates towards an absent— the ‘to come’. For instance, throughout Proust, he 
speaks about how signs are reproducible because they do not represent any 
signification—as ‘functions’, signs operate solely to proliferate effects.  
  Deleuze’s trajectory unfolds a methodology for thinking about ‘how to think’. In 
short, his work constitutes an “unattributable” assemblage that “exists only through the 
outside and on the outside” (Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand 4). That is to say, the 
(in)conspicuousness of the Deleuzian principle aims at uncovering and developing fresh 
ways of making meaning and signification. This openness, which advocates 
‘interpretation in itself, for itself’, connotes a perpetual alteration that constructs by 
unconstructing56. By embracing the pluralness of a singularity, which “produces effects of 
resonance and forced movements” (Proust 148), Deleuze purports that the unity of “One 
and Whole” is a continuous passing of “difference, the absolute and ultimate Difference” 
(41).  
                                                 
56 C.f., the idea of remembering by forgetting in Alain Resnais’ Hiroshima Mon Amour.  
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Chapter Five: An Interpretation of Interpretations of Time 
  
This chapter will offer a perspective on the correlation between two concepts: 
time and multiplicity. Although the intention here is to deliver an understanding of ‘what 
time might be’, the discussion will neither be a chronology documenting the development 
of time nor a concise summary of the traditions that seek to describe what time is. Instead 
of trying to determine the problems and solutions which are associated to the concept of 
time, this discussion will be about how time orientates a ‘temporal unity’ that directs 
itself towards itself. That is, how time exists as an unfolding of itself from its own 
possibilities and be-come-ing.  
 J.M.E. McTaggart’s claim that “time is unreal” (23) is one of the responses to St. 
Augustine’s question “What, then, is time?”57. The former defends his proposition in an 
essay entitled “The Unreality of Time” (1908). He explains that  
Positions in time, as time appears to us prima facie, are distinguished in 
two ways. Each position is Earlier than some and Later than some of the 
other positions. To constitute such a series there is required a transitive 
asymmetrical relation, and a collection of terms such that, of any two of 
them, either the first is in this relation to the second, or the second is in 
this relation to the first [. . .] 
In the second place, each position is either Past, Present, or Future. The 
distinctions of the former class are permanent, while those of the latter are 
                                                 
57 In Book 11 of Confessions, Augustine asks, “What, then, is time?” (263). After deliberating over the 
question, he concludes that “I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked 
what it is and try to explain, I am baffled” (264). The dilemma that has Augustine “baffled” exemplifies a 
fundamental issue: What does it mean to experience and/or perceive time?  
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not. If M is ever earlier than N, it is always earlier. But an event, which is 
now present, was future, and will be past.  
Since distinctions of the first class are permanent, it might be thought that 
they were more objective, and more essential to the nature of time, than 
those of the second class. I believe, however, that this would be a mistake, 
and that the distinction of past, present, and future is as essential to time as 
the distinction of earlier and later, while in a certain sense it may . . . be 
regarded as more fundamental than the distinction of earlier and later. And 
it is because the distinctions of past, present, and future seem to me to be 
essential for time that I regard time as unreal.  
       (McTaggart 24)  
In short, the appearance of a temporal order is illusionary. McTaggart maintains that 
while it “seems highly paradoxical to assert that Time is unreal, and that all statements 
which involve its reality are erroneous [. . .] the belief in the unreality of time has shown 
itself to be singularly persistent” (23). He elaborates on how time is indeed unreal by 
studying the ways in which it can be ordered.  
 Though McTaggart thinks that there are three ways to distinguish the passing of 
time (i.e., Series A, B and C), the present discussion will only examine two58. According 
to him, the position of a point in time can refer to something specific, like ‘yesterday’ 
                                                 
58 McTaggart’s article does not make an explicit reference to the C-series of time. However, the C-series 
can be inferred from the fact that he says, “Whether we place the object of our belief or of our 
contemplation in the present, the past, or the future will depend upon the characteristics of that object. But 
somewhere in the A series it will be place (my italics)” (29). Thus, a time-within-time exists in the A-series. 
As such, the first and third series of time appear to be repetitions. Basically, “just as far as a thing is in 
time, it is in the A series” (29). That is, the conditions that make up the A- and C-series are “essential to 
time” (30). In other words, “Time only belongs to the existent. [. . .] It may be questioned whether all of 
what exists is in time, or even whether anything really existent is in time, but it would not be denied that, if 
anything is in time, it must exist” (29).  
 
 147
(i.e., ‘one day has past’), ‘today’ (i.e., ‘the present’) and ‘tomorrow’ (i.e., ‘one day into 
the future’). He names this category of time the ‘A-series’. Since the A-series involves 
constant change, it is considered to be ‘essential time’.  Further, between various points 
of time, relationships are formed. For instance, time x is related to time y even though 
they occur at a different point. So, Saturday comes before Sunday and Tuesday comes 
after Monday. McTaggart calls this category of time the ‘B-series’. Because the B-series 
relates one position of time to another (i.e., the distinction of an ‘earlier’ and ‘later’), it 
points to a variety of fixed time. So both A- and B-series will have to complement each 
other if time is indeed real. Essentially, 
[. . .] if there is any change, it must be looked for in the A series, and in the 
A series alone. If there is no real A series, there is no real change. The B 
series, therefore, is not by itself sufficient to constitute time, since time 
involves change.  
The B series, however, cannot exist except as temporal, since earlier and 
later, which are the relations which connect its terms are clearly time-
relations. So it follows that there can be B series when there is no A series, 
since without an A series there is no time.  
      (McTaggart 26-27) 
 Herein lies the paradox that McTaggart attempts to present in his theory 
concerning the unreality of time. Can a point in time, say, x, be both past and future? 
After all, x must be the future at some point of past time and will be the past at some 
point of future time. But, can a point in time be, for example, both past and future? He 
explains that every event must be one or the other and no event can be more than one 
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event in itself. Therefore, ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ are incompatible determinations. 
This is to say, time involves a ‘transition’; a change that occurs between future and 
present, present and past (and past and future). And so, “this exclusiveness is essential to 
change, and therefore to time” (McTaggart 32). Consequently, within the A-series, no 
point of time is compatible with another. In this case, can A-series still complement B-
series when these two positions of time do not correlate? This is especially when B-series 
constitutes the relationships between different times. Since a contradiction leads from the 
premise which A-series is being built upon, and A-series is as essential as B-series in the 
composition of time, McTaggart concludes that the distinctions of past, present and future 
are never true of reality. He attempts to validate this assertion by pointing out that 
The attribution of the characteristics past, present, and future to the terms 
of any series leads to a contradiction, unless it is specified that they have 
them successively. This means [. . .] that they have them in relation to 
terms specified as past, present, and future. These again, to avoid a like 
contradiction, must in turn be specified as past, present, and future. And, 
since this continues infinitely, the first set of terms never escapes from 
contradiction at all. 
         (McTaggart 33) 
But, the ability to perceive x as ‘x’ and not ‘y’ means that there is something within a 
series of somethings—the changes which take place within a changing. Hence, something 
is really ‘present’, ‘past’, or ‘future’ and something is really earlier or later than anything 
else or temporally simultaneous with it. As such, some thing really changes and 
something really exists in ‘time’. While the unreality of time remains debatable, 
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McTaggart’s argument highlights one salient point: different points of time are ‘related’ 
to one another. In order to examine how frames of time related to one another, a case 
study on television commercials follows.  
 Many television commercials promote fantastic laundry attributes, which are 
delivered by this or that brand of detergent. Typically, the viewer is shown a ‘before’ 
image of soiled clothes, followed by an ‘after’ image of clean looking ones. The purpose 
for showing the two successive images is to put across the message, ‘product ‘x’ is an 
excellent laundry product’. Duplication in format and structure of these detergent 
commercials possess a consistent formula: a ‘before’ that turns into an ‘after’ with some 
other things happening in between. Frame one: soiled clothes. Frame two: application of 
product ‘x’ onto soiled clothes. Frame three: wait for ‘y’ minutes. Frame four: soiled 
clothes and more of product ‘x’ are placed into a washing machine. Frame five: clothes 
appear immaculately clean. In the case of the detergent television commercial, ‘time’ is 
encapsulated in an apparent transition between different states. That is, the alterations 
embodied in the respective frame one, two, three, and so forth demonstrate the passing of 
time. And so, the commercial shows that a qualitative change has occurred between time 
‘before’ and ‘after’: soiled clothes have become clean within a ‘y’ period of time.  
 The abovementioned television commercial demonstrates the ‘effect’ of time. As 
Aristotle claims, time is equivalent to the motions taken to connect a ‘before’ with an 
‘after’. Although several ancient Greek philosophers, including Heraclitus, Parmenides 
and Plato have written on the subject of time, its analysis is refined by Aristotle. For 
instance, the latter applies formal logical techniques (i.e., modal logic) to probe the nature 
of time. Aristotle observes that change(s) that take place during a moment, and another 
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moment, and another moment . . . ∞ add up to compose some ‘thing’ called ‘time’. As he 
takes into consideration Heraclitus’ theory concerning ‘flux’ and ‘rationality’, as well as 
Plato’s theory on ‘the natural world of changing things’, Aristotle posits a theory that 
relates a correlation between time, change and motion. 
Aristotle advocates that the transition of time does not progress in tandem with 
motion. This is because motion is related to the movement of objects, whereas, time, 
being pervasive, is ‘everywhere’. Moreover, if time is the measure of motion, for 
example object ‘x’ is moving faster than object ‘y’, can it be identified with the very 
thing it measures? Technically speaking, ‘motion’ is the process of moving, or ‘changing 
position’, through space: motion is equated to change. So, due to a change which 
involves motion, it becomes possible to tell that ‘time has passed’. As such, time is not 
the yardstick for measuring change/motion; rather, being oblivious to change/motion 
results in the inability to ‘tell time’.  
 Though Aristotle’s theory of time is an attempt at clarifying the question, ‘What is 
time?’ the focus of his argument appears to explicate duration instead. In Chapter 11 of 
Physics, he asserts that time is the “number of movements in respect of the before and 
after, and is continuous [. . .]”. In this way, time is defined as a successions of ‘nows’ 
counted on the basis of a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ motion. Further, since there is always a 
‘now’ after any given ‘now’ time is always beginning and continuing. 
 At this point, it is necessary to return to the example of the television commercial 
once again. The commercial shows that it takes five ‘frames’ (i.e., a period of time 
constituting five frames) to clean a load of clothes. Since change is deduced by counting 
frames of time, their succession is equated to ‘before’ and ‘after’. However, Aristotle 
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contends that a ‘frame of time’ (i.e., ‘now’) neither makes up nor is part of time59. This is 
because the succession of a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ indicate a single transition: the present. 
For instance, a ‘presence’ is ‘present’ throughout the duration of the laundry commercial. 
And, the various frames/stages that constitute time are instants of presents that make up 
the presentness of the commercial. This assertion highlights that there are two folds to a 
‘now’. On the one hand, ‘now’ promotes the continuum of time by connecting the past 
with the future and on the other, it divides time because it has the potential to interrupt 
the interval of time.  
 Aristotle concludes that every change is a result of time passed because the 
potentiality of each now is realised within the presentness of a present. A single now that 
‘starts’ and ‘ends’ must be conceived of as an abstraction within the structure of a ‘time’. 
Whilst ‘now’ and ‘time’ are co-dependent in terms of their existence, unlike ‘time’, 
‘now’ is not in transition. That is, a ‘now’ marks a point within a transition which is made 
up of many ‘nows’. For instance, in frame three of the television commercial, the 
transformation from ‘soiled’ to ‘clean’ within ‘y’ minutes denotes a change that has taken 
place within a single continuance. This continuance, or ‘duration’, demonstrates the 
elapses between frames one, two, three, four and five. The consequence of the ‘event’ 
that has occurred in between any two of these elapses is the qualitative changes which the 
clothing appears to have undergone (of course, a 30-second block of air time has also 
                                                 
59 Aristotle speaks about the paradox of the dot, which compares ‘nows’ and ‘dots’. Owing to the theory of 
infinite divisibility, he reasons that putting nows in a succession do not add up to a ‘line’ of time because 
putting dots in succession cannot form a line. The theory claims that for every dot that is considered, there 
is always a smaller one halving its diametre. Therefore, it is impossible for two dots to follow one another 
as an infinite number of dots exist in between them. This argument is problematic because it does not take 
into account the infinite indivisibility of ‘now’.  
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passed). While the transitional nature of time is recognised, the question, ‘what time is’, 
still warrants some study.  
 Augustine suggests that time is ‘real’ because it is created by God. He says,  
You are the Maker of all time [. . .] although you are before time, it is not 
in time that you precede it. If this were so, you would not be before all 
time. It is in eternity, which is supreme over time because it is a never-
ending present, that you are at once before all time and after all future 
time. For what is now the future, once it comes, will become the past, 
whereas you are unchanging, your years can never fail. Your years neither 
go nor come, but our years pass and others come after them, so that they 
all may come in their turn. [. . .] You made all time; you are before all 
time; and the ‘time’, if we may call it, when there was no time was not 
time at all. 
(Augustine 263) 
Augustine thinks that when God was creating the world, time emerged as a by-product. 
Because the occurrences that take place in the world are ‘transient’ and its inhabitants are 
affected by ‘change’, the phenomenon of this ‘finitude’ can only be understood via a 
sense of temporality (e.g., memory and interpretation). Consequently, time is a condition 
of knowledge. He claims that “if nothing passed, there would be no past time; if nothing 
were going to happen, there would be no future time; and if nothing were, there would be 
no present time” (Augustine 264).  
 In other words, time is comparable to a ‘passing’. Also, past and future must exist 
in a present because the transitoriness of time is an extension of a singular past-present-
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future. Augustine posits the oneness of this singularity as an “instant” (266). That is to 
say, though past and future do not exist, the pastness and futureness present in the 
presentness of an “instant” endorse a presence. For instance, the past is present in 
memory, the present is present in interpretation and the future is present in the perception 
of the to-come. Moreover, because ‘memory’, ‘interpretation’ and ‘perception’ are 
intermittent reflections of the mind, Augustine maintains that “time emerges from some 
secret refuge when it passes from the future to the present, and goes back into hiding 
when it moves from the present to the past” (267). While both past and future are 
inflected within a present, the instantaneity of this presence can only be described as a 
state of “not being” (264).  
 One of the responses to Augustine’s ‘lack of being’ is Nietzsche’s notion of 
‘rhythmic tension’, which synthesises with momentary becoming. In the case of ‘time’, it 
is bound together by a force that generates a congruent moment, which consists of many 
moments of instants. Being both active and reactive at the same time, Nietzsche 
expounds a theory that sees to the perpetual repetition of a differentiation. On the one 
hand, the circularity of possibilities maintains a reaffirmation of repeated possibilities. 
This culminates as an active repetition of difference. On the other hand, the negation 
within this very circularity of possibilities acts upon itself and so possibilities are 
reassigned repeatedly: the reactive difference of repetition. Of this steadfast differencing 
and deferring, Nietzsche calls it “a monster of force, without beginning, without end, a 
fixed, iron quantity of force which grows neither larger nor smaller, which doesn’t 
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exhaust but only transforms itself, as a whole unchanging [. . .] enclosed by ‘nothingness’ 
[. . .]”60 (Writings 38).  
 A same that radically departs from sameness, Nietzsche formulates a “quantum of 
power, a becoming” (Writings 212) that is to unfold through the differentiation of the 
force. This implies that the return of returning time is neither a series of recurring events, 
nor a state of straightforward repetition. The “Dionysian world of eternal self-creating, of 
eternal self-destroying” (Writings 38) is an affirmation of a returning recurrence that 
approximates the rhythm of a pure progression. Thus, 
If the world had a goal, it could not fail to have been reached by now. If it 
had an unintended final state, this too could not fail to have been reached. 
If it were capable at all of standing still and remaining frozen, of ‘being’, 
then in turn all becoming would long since be over and done with, and so 
would all thinking, all ‘mind’. The fact of ‘mind’ as a becoming proves 
that the world has no goal and no final state and is incapable of being.  
(Nietzsche, Writings 23) 
 Therefore, the return of time is a renewing of ‘time’ within each moment and 
instant: it is an occurrence of time-in-itself: the be-ing of time. Therefore, the presence of 
time is not presented ‘outside’ of its existence. As such, the becoming of time is a 
                                                 
60 The discussion does not refer to the correlation between “eternal return” and “will to power” directly. 
The attempt to explain how these two concepts function will require a separate paper. Issues that need 
addressing include their conception, meaning and apparent incompatibility. For instance, the apparent 
incompatibility between ‘eternal return’ and ‘will of power’ is summarised by Karl Löwith’s “two modes 
of representation”. He sets the objective-oriented ‘will to power’ as an antithesis of the self-contained 
‘eternal recurrence’ (ref. Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same). In order to 
explicate the seeming incompatibility, it will be necessary to reinterpret the concept of ‘will to power’. 
Nietzsche explains the ‘one source” which all drives can be traced back to: “The triumphant concept of 
‘force’, with which our physicists have created God and the world, needs supplementing: it must be 
ascribed an inner world which I call ‘will to power’, i.e., an insatiable craving to manifest power; or to 
employ, exercise power, as a creative drive etc.” and so “the will to power can only express itself against 
resistances; it seeks what will resist it” (Writings 26; 165) 
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difference that repeatedly actualises itself in a constant becoming of itself. If there is only 
the eternal becoming of time to speak of, what is it about time that ‘returns’? What is it 
that always ‘comes back’? Consider this proposition: The present will not be if the past 
does not exist. As such, a present moment can never pass if it is not already a past and a 
future. Hence, the past actualises itself within a present that is to come. That is, the 
actualising of unactualisable difference(s). Subsequently, the instantaneity of the past-
present-future “does not have to preserve in itself anything but itself [. . .] The being of 
the past in itself is what Bergson called the virtual” (Deleuze, Proust 57). 
 According to Bergson, the becoming of a time that is ‘to come’ is the connection 
between the past and present. He puts forward a philosophy of time, or durée, which 
reengineers Aristotle’s concept of duration. Bergson purports that it is a mistake to 
perceive duration as ‘homogeneous’ because it leads to the metaphysical dogmatism 
(Matter 211). That is to say, the elements that make up duration are “dissociated and 
juxtaposed” (186). Bergson explains his case by deploying the image of an inverted cone 
as an example. He illustrates: 
If I represent by a cone SAB, the totality of the recollections accumulated 
in my memory, the base AB, situated in the past, remains motionless, 
while the summit S, which indicates at all times my present, moves 
forward unceasingly, and unceasingly also touches the moving plane P of 
my actual representation of the universe.  
       (Bergson, Matter 152) 
The imagery of the cone expresses the entirety (i.e., the actual and the virtual) of the past-
present-future itself. In this case, no present exists if it has not been already actualised in 
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the past—the past has become at every present moment. Furthermore, no future exists if 
it has not been already actualised in a present past—the future past exists in an 
actualising. Hence, Bergson’s durée (and, imagery of the cone) represents the realisation 
of instants, where the becoming of actuals emerges from a field of moments that are 
already present either as ‘have past’, or ‘are to come’: the virtual.  
 The result of durée and its heterogeneity is “enormous multiplicity” (Bergson, 
Matter 70). Bergson elaborates that pure duration is a plurality that pluralises the same 
within the singularity of difference: qualitative multiplicity is a continuous difference 
contained within the durée of an indivisible whole. He argues for the 
heterogeneous/singularised, continuous/interpenetrating and progressive/temporal in 
Introduction to Metaphysics (1955). The ‘continuity’ that composes durée is comparable 
to two spools of thread, where one is on the unwinding end, whilst the other is on the 
receiving end. The future is likened to the spool of thread that gets smaller and the past is 
likened to the spool of thread that gets bigger. This analogy foregrounds a self-
perpetuating continuity of repeatable heterogeneity and differential folding (i.e., the 
uncomplete). Bergson sums up this ‘uncompletion’ by pointing out that “every 
comparison will be insufficient, because the unrolling of [. . .] duration resembles in some 
of its aspects the unity of an advancing movement and in others the multiplicity of 
expanding states [. . .] no metaphor can express one of these two aspects without 
sacrificing the other” (Introduction 27).  
 Subsequently, two elements compose durée: unity (i.e., the actual) and 
multiplicity (i.e., the virtual). Deleuze comments on this “pure condition” when he says, 
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The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two 
elements which coexist: One is the present, which does not cease to pass, 
and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all 
presents pass. It is in this sense that there is a pure past, a kind of ‘past in 
general’: The past does not follow the present, but on the contrary, is 
presupposed by it as the pure condition without which it would not pass. 
(Bergsonism 59) 
The absence of a permanent present is interpretable as an affirmation of all possible 
possibilities. Under this context, the possible is actually ‘real’, though it lacks existence 
in the ‘actual’ sense. For instance, the past is present except that it is not being presented 
in presence. Similarly, the possibility of the virtually possible helps to realise an 
unfolding folding which constitutes the actualisation of multiplicity61. Thus, the 
presentness of past-present-future time is not a unified actualisation that is limited to the 
actual; it is not a ‘present’ per se. The virtuality that exists in an unfolding presentness is 
the return of a multiplicity of instantaneous positions, which ensure the coherence of the 
past with the present (Bergson, Matter 187). In this case as Deleuze again says, time is 
“the ultimate existence of parts, of different sizes and shapes, which cannot be adapted, 
which do not develop at the same rhythm, and which the stream of style does not sweep 
along at the same speed. The order of [past-present-future] has collapsed, crumbled into [. 
. .] non[/]communicative viewpoints” (Proust 101). 
 The Bergsonian concept of actualising the virtual transpires the presentness of an 
‘event’. That is, the event of a perpetual production. Deleuze introduces the notion, 
                                                 
61 C.f., Bergson’s chapter, “The Possible and the Real”, in The Creative Mind.  
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‘event’, in The Logic of Sense (1990)62. According to Deleuze, ‘event’ describes the state-
to-state transformation of some ‘happening’. He says, “The event is not what occurs (an 
accident), it is rather inside what occurs, the purely expressed” (Deleuze, Logic 149). 
And, the “expressed” is a pure becoming that “divides itself infinitely in past and future 
and always eludes the present” (Logic 5). Deleuze elaborates on the singularising of 
becoming’s pluralness by describing three syntheses of time in Difference and Repetition.  
 Deleuze’s first synthesis of time is associated with the notion of ‘habit’. Because 
the first synthesis follows the stimulus-response model, the notion of time is based upon a 
‘before’ and an ‘after’. Thus, time is produced as a present in present. By connecting the 
past and future within an instant, independent occurrences are braided into a singular 
timeline. Therefore, within this constitution, instances of actual pasts are retained while 
possible futures are being opened up. This amalgamation produces an immediate present. 
That is, the synthesis of past-present-future through the repeatability of differencing. 
Deleuze calls this ‘variation’ a ‘disguise’ that expresses the “differential mechanism 
which belong to the essence and origin of that which is repeated” (Difference 19-20). 
Though the past is independent of the present and future, these three variations are 
singularised within an ever presenting. Nevertheless, if past-present-future exists within 
the present, how does the past pass? 
 In the passing of a past, its presentness re-produces and re-represents all other 
presents, thereby channelling all possibilities into a unity: the past. Thus, the first 
synthesis of time occurs in time. That is to say, there are two aspects to the activeness of 
                                                 
62 In the chapter, “Twenty-First Series of the Event”, Deleuze asks, “What does it mean then to will the 
event?”. He puts forward that “It wills now not exactly what occurs, but something in that which occurs, 
something yet to come which would be consistent with what occurs, something yet to come which would 
be consistent with what occurs, in accordance with the laws of an obscure, humorous conformity: the 
Event’ (Deleuze, Logic 149).  
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this ‘present’ synthesis: the present of the present and a prior past. While the first aspect, 
the present of the present, is a straightforward presentation of presentness, the second 
aspect, prior past, requires clarification. The prior past is not an accumulation of presents 
that have passed. Instead, it is a present-past that constitutes the present and prior presents 
(i.e., the prior past archives the ‘presenting presents’). 
 Consequently, Deleuze’s second synthesis of time suggests a presence that is a 
pure past. Because it is based upon a past that is not actualised, the second synthesis is 
related to ‘remembering’. So in order for a present to become a past, it has to be in the 
present, but be determined as something that has past. Thus, if everything past is already 
constituted in the present, then, every present must pass and every present is already a 
past when it is being presented.  
 The theory of the pure past points to the ‘nature’ of a becoming present. As the 
past exists for itself, it passes every ‘prior’ present, as well as substantiates the possibility 
of each ‘new’ present to come. Inevitably, Deleuze’s conception of pure past brings to 
mind Bergson’s idea of the virtual (i.e., being real without being actual). If the notion of 
‘virtualness’ is to be taken into account, the following assumption applies. Although the 
past presupposes the present, the virtualness of virtuality initiates a ‘reality’ in which both 
virtual past and present co-exist. The pure past, and only the pure past, belongs to this 
ideality. 
 The discussion summaries its interpretation of Deleuze’s first and second 
syntheses of time before going on to present a third. The first synthesis posits the 
continuity of a present: the actualisation of presents connotes the presentness of the 
present. The second synthesis posits a past that engages with a present: the actualisation 
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of a virtual present that is past. While the first synthesis refers to a difference that 
emerges from moments that pass on simultaneously, the second synthesis foregrounds a 
difference that differs from itself. As such, the presentness of the ‘present’ is being 
presented on two levels. In the first synthesis, present is being expanded in a singular 
forward-looking continuum. And, in the second synthesis, the present is being condensed 
into the multiple-ness of past possibilities (i.e., virtual). Unlike the synthesis of habit, 
which constitutes the past and future as asymmetrical elements of the present, the 
synthesis of remembering constitutes the present in a pure past (Deleuze, Difference 103). 
In sum, the present is at once actual and virtual and present and past.  
 If the first and second syntheses are means to explicate ‘what time is’, the third 
synthesis is an attempt to ascertain ‘what time does’. Deleuze’s third synthesis of time 
puts forward that present time is constituted by past and future time. A trinity that is 
singularised as one, the future coexists with the past as it passes on to become the 
present-past: the eternal production of something new: the becoming of time. As such, 
central to the three syntheses is the concept of repetition. After all, “time is constituted 
only in the originary synthesis which operated on the repetition of instants” (Deleuze, 
Difference 91). The following paragraph demonstrates the affinity between time and 
repetition. 
 In the first synthesis, time is comparable to a circle. Time passes on cyclically 
since its repetition is borne out of ‘habit’ (Deleuze, Difference 90-96; 101-102). This 
passive synthesis of moments accumulates “time as a living present, and the past and the 
future as dimensions of this present” (Difference 97). In the second synthesis, time is 
comparable to a straight line. Time is relieved of its circularity because “memory” entails 
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the possibility of having experienced something. A repetitive remembering that recollects 
the past, this “synthesis of memory may be regarded as the principle of representation 
under [a] double aspect: reproduction of the former present and reflection of the present 
present” (Difference 102). In the third synthesis, time is comparable to an “empty form” 
(Difference 111). Because of the absence of a ‘present’, this ‘not-there’ becomes a ‘there’ 
for the repeated precipitation of itself.  
 Hence, under the pretext of being the same (be it of difference, or repetition), the 
virtual unites with the actual. That is to say, an instant is realised within the dynamism of 
the virtual past, actual present and virtual-actual future. As mentioned before, in spite of 
their conceptual independence the virtual and actual enjoin to make the present, real.  
Concisely, the becoming of a be-coming instant is expressed as: 
 
 virtual/real(actualisation) – virtual/real (actualisation) 
actual/real(actualisation)       actual/real (actualisation) 
 
This schema suggests that becoming is neither circular nor linear. The result of this 
proposition is the actualisation of an actualising multiplicity of multiplicities. According 
to Deleuze, this heterogeneity sums up what time is. Of time’s pure state, he says, “This 
is how the story of time ends: by undoing its too well centred natural or physical circle 
and forming a straight line which then, led by its own length, reconstitutes an eternally 
decentred circle” (Deleuze, Difference 141).  
 Hence, time is characterised by the passing instant of past-present-future 
synthesis: the momentariness of event. In this conception, the effect of time returns to the 
present as a yet-to-be experienced experience. For instance, the equivalent of time is the 
aftermath of having suffered a ‘shock’, or ‘trauma’. Some experiences that have already 
been pre-registered in the psyche will become apparent only at a later stage. Similarly, all 
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that present time encompasses (i.e., the past and future) already exists within its very 
trace of presentness. And so the manifestation of ‘all that must already exist’ depends on 
the event of becoming. As such, there is only a single time. A one time that includes the 
presentable past and present within the presentness of itself.  
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Chapter Six: An Interpretation of Interpretations of Space 
 
 Chapter Six of this dissertation seeks to delineate how space might be an effect, as 
well as a (pre)condition of existence. Similar to Chapter Five, which discusses the 
concept of time, the intention of this current discussion is not to describe ‘what space is’. 
Instead, central to the discussion will be how space creates and is created (with)in the re-
un-folding of an event. This premise assumes that space becomes ‘space’ because it 
‘becomes’ through an immanent unfolding of actual/virtual relations. In short, space is 
construed to be an (pure) affect that produces an (pure) effect—a dynamic and creative 
production in itself.  
Subsequently, there is no reason to try and determine a specific measure or 
parametre of space. For instance, Henri Lefebvre comments that the marker, ‘space’, 
carries with it a “geometrical meaning” (1). He says the idea that ‘space’ evokes is 
“simply that of an empty area. In scholarly use it was generally accompanied by some 
such epithet as ‘Euclidean’, ‘isotropic’, or ‘infinite’, and the general feeling was that the 
concept of space was ultimately a mathematical one” (Lefebvre 1). Lefebvre’s comments 
seem justifiable if Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity, which concerns space and time, 
is taken into consideration. Although the intricacies behind Einstein’s equations and 
interpretations of relativity are important to an understanding of ‘what space is’, the 
object of the discussion at hand is not about how space and time crystalise to produce the 
‘fourth dimension’. Instead, the focus of this discussion seeks to examine ‘space’ as 
something that exists in its own right—space-in-itself.  
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 The strategy of approaching space as an independent substance is not new. Prior 
to contributions put forward by the likes of Hendrick Lorentz, Einstein and Hermann 
Minkowski, which have helped develop a singular space-time concept, ‘space’ and ‘time’ 
are studied as separate, though interdependent substances. In fact, Kant holds that it is 
through categories like those of ‘space’ and ‘time’ that the senses are able to make an 
interpretation of the surroundings.  
 Questions concerning the concept of space have posed significant challenges to 
Greek philosophers, such as Heraclitus, Parmenides and Aristotle. They include ‘Can 
space be measured, or is it part of the measurement system?’, ‘Is it an ontological entity 
itself?’ and ‘Is it is a framework conceptualised for the purpose of understanding this 
world?’. As it stands, ‘space’, like ‘time’ and ‘matter’, is assumed to be a basic substance 
that makes up the comprehensible (i.e., empirical) part of the world. They are conceived 
to be both infinitely wide and divisible. But in view that space, like time, remains 
imperceptible via any known mode of perception it cannot be thought of as ‘real’.  
 According to Descartes, the mind dictates comprehension, and, hence, 
interpretation. Moreover, since the conception of space (and time) reflects the primacy of 
the mind, he asserts that space must be unlimited (while time is the means by which the 
mind accounts for a specified duration). Thus, Descartes rationalises that space is 
‘absolute’. That is, space encompasses every matter (i.e., object and subject): it contains 
all extended things (i.e., res extensa) and thinking things (i.e., res cogitans) as well as the 
body and mind. In other words, Descartes purports that every ‘thing’ is spatially 
extended. This proposition extrapolates that all matter are compounds made up of basic 
particles. Thus, in principle, regardless of how small some ‘thing’ is, it can still be 
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divided into even smaller parts. So, space is some ‘thing’ that totalises all that exists? 
Although Descartes thinks that space is an absolute entity because every thing else is 
encompassed within its independency, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz argues otherwise.  
 The following is an outline of Leibniz’s argument. Assuming that space is 
absolute, then every ‘space’ is indiscernible from every other ‘space’. In this case, how is 
it possible to distinguish between two extrinsic spaces, which must exist in two different 
locations? Also, if two spaces are alike in all aspects, they are actually the same and not 
two entities. As such, Leibniz concludes that no one space is ever a replica of another. He 
proposes that because all compounds are constructed out of a combination of basic 
particles, the constituents of all things must ultimately be ‘simple’ and ‘non-extended’. 
As he believes that ‘space’ is not a fundamental feature of the comprehensible (i.e., the 
‘material’ world), it must be understood as an immaterial substance (or what Leibniz 
calls, ‘monad’63). That is, space is some ‘thing’ that is located within a thing itself and 
also of all other things that are relative to it. Thus, being not-real, space is but an intrinsic 
reference for keeping track of all that occur in the empirical phenomenon.  
 Leibniz’s theory of space foregrounds two salient features. First, because space is 
situated in a thing, or is relative to other things, there is no absolute space. Second, 
because space is not in itself ‘real’, it must be an ‘ideal’. Subsequently, the correlations 
that space initiate stands as irreducible relations ‘outside’ to substances (i.e., space 
exhibits itself as a thing that is relative in itself). These two features suggest that ‘space’ 
                                                 
63 In Monadology (1714), Leibniz theorises that the universe consists of infinite substances called 
‘monads’. He defines a monad as an elementary substance that cannot be further divided. This theory is 
applied to his discussions concerning perception and consciousness, which are supposed to govern reason 
and truth.  
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is, by and large, a concept for perceiving certain ‘virtual’ relation(s) between one 
substance and another. That is, space is some ‘thing’ that helps place the co-existence of 
substances in a comprehensible order. In other words, though space is not ‘sensible’, it is 
a presence that presents the virtuality of actual differences between substances. 
Furthermore, this also means that without things/substances, ‘space’ will cease to ‘exist’ 
(or, be presented as present). Hence, central to Leibniz’s theory is the denial of space and 
its substantiveness.  
 Leibniz and his ‘relational’ concept of space find continuity in the work of Kant. 
In fact, Kant’s initial proposition on the notion of space is formulated with such close 
reference to his predecessor’s that it may be considered as a strict regurgitation of 
Leibnizian theory. Nevertheless, in spite of his clear admiration for Leibniz, a study into 
the theories concerning absolute space (e.g., Descartes and Isaac Newton) convinces him 
that space is not merely some ‘thing’ which determines the relations between substances.  
 Kant explicates the constitution of space (and time) in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. He examines whether space is a “real” existence, or is it only a “pure intuition” 
(Kant 158). A point to note: the accelerated proliferation of mathematical and 
philosophical theories during Kant’s time must have contributed to the difficulty of 
explicating what space is. To a large extent, a discussion on the issue of ‘what is space’ 
generates two conflicting schools of thoughts. On the one hand, Newtonian Euclidean 
geometry perpetrates an absolute and real sense of space. That is, space is a substantive 
thing that contains all things; everything takes place within the realm of space. On the 
other hand, Leibnizian rationality argues for a relational theory of space. As observed 
earlier on in this chapter, relational theory considers the conception of space as ‘ideal’.  
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 The attempt to reconcile the respective theories which the Newtonians and the 
Leibnizians hold leads Kant to develop what he calls a ‘Copernican revolution’ when 
thinking about space. Of this new perspective, Kant says, 
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the 
objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through 
concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this pre-supposition, 
come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with 
the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to 
our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of 
an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about 
objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first 
thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the 
explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial 
host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater 
success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest. 
(110) 
Due to the fact that ‘objects must conform to cognition’ (because “cognition must 
conform to the objects” in return), Kant perceives space to be a substance that is 
dependent on the subjective condition of “sensibility” (160). Thus, ‘space’ is that which 
helps a subject organise, analyse and interpret information concerning his/her immediate 
surroundings. But, because space is not an empirical concept derived from “the relations 
of outer appearance through experiences” (158), it is neither objective, nor self-
subsisting. In short, “space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of 
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outer intuitions. [This is to say], one can never represent that there is no space, although 
one can very think that there are no objects to be encountered in it” (158). 
 Hence, Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ succeeds in arbitrating the disagreement 
between ‘absolute’ and ‘relational’ theories of space. He concurs with Newton that space 
is absolute for objects that exist within a subjective experience (e.g., phenomenal 
experiences that scientific inquiry attests to). He also agrees with Leibniz that space is 
nothing for objects that exist apart from the subject (i.e., ‘things- in-themselves’). Thus, 
Kant situates space as an a priori “For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be 
intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they pertain” (159). Moreover, it is 
impossible to represent an ‘absent space’ to a subject because this ‘absence’ will have to 
owe itself to the emptiness of objects themselves (160-161)64. However, if a subject is 
unable to represent to him/herself the absence of space, how can ‘space’ be conceived 
then? What prompts the unfolding of space? 
 The idea of a ‘subject’ is interpretable on two levels: a subject that possesses 
individualised thoughts and passion, and an incorporeal entity that facilitates in the 
actualisation of events. Nevertheless, on both levels, a subject is constituted via the 
process of subjectification65. For the sake of simplicity as well as clarity, markers ‘s’ and 
‘S’ are employed to denote ‘subject as an individual’ and ‘subject as an incorporeal 
                                                 
64 Kant puts forward that “The transcendental concept of appearances in space [. . .] is a critical reminder 
that absolutely nothing that is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form that is proper 
to anything in itself, but rather that objects in themselves are not know to us at all, and that what we call 
outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but who 
true correlate, i.e., thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognised through them, but is also never asked after 
in experience” (161-162). Nevertheless, how is x to be recognised as ‘x’ then? A variant of x must already 
be within the possibilities of xs so that x can become ‘x’ in its own unfolding.  
 
65 The subject produces and is, in turn, produced by a sphere of social constructs (e.g., ideology).  
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entity’ respectively. So, is the realisation of s/S situated ‘to’ or ‘in’ the production of 
spatial relations? 
 In the first case, where s/S is construed as in relation ‘to’ something (e.g., a 
‘product’ of a social practice), transcendentalness directs the investigation. Thus, 
intelligible experience is garnered through a host of (a priori) faculties, including reason, 
consciousness and perception. For instance, Kant considers these universal attributes as 
senses that assist in the interpretation of possible sensibilities, which are being offered by 
the phenomena. This perspective implies the two following assumptions. First, 
transcendentalness produces ‘empiricalness’ as it is impossible to differentiate between a 
priori and a posteriori knowledge. Second, s/S is instituted by a synthesis of experiences 
for the interpretation of the perceivable depends on the intelligible.  
 In the second case, where s/S is construed as ‘in’ relation to something (e.g., 
‘producing’ a social practice) immanence underpins the investigation. While immanence 
points to a presence that permeates material existence, the deployment of the marker here 
appeals to an alternative understanding. That is, immanence is associated with a synthesis 
which is both singular and plural66. So, whilst the singularity of s/S is always related to 
shifting contexts, such as socio-politics, interpretation and subjectivity, its singularness 
perpetuates a constant. For instance, S/s returns to transform s/S, and vice versa (c.f., 
Nietzsche and the eternal return). Nevertheless, again, this returning is not the infinite 
return of a same. Rather, this re-turning is the repetition of a difference, of an 
undeterminable s/S: the multiplicity of ‘s’, ‘S’ and ‘s/S’.  
                                                 
66 Here, the concept of ‘singularness’ is understood as the singularities that belong to the singularities of 
others (Deleuze, The Fold 86). This concept correlates with Deleuze’s ‘difference’ and ‘repetition’.  
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 Hence, central to the immanent ‘in’ are differential and deferential relations. 
Further, this immanence describes a synthesis that encompasses all potential 
actualisations. This refers to the becoming of events, or the eternal return of some ‘thing’. 
Therefore, the ‘in-ness’ of immanence foregrounds the oneness between relations and 
relations. For instance, s is ‘s’ because it is not z. Furthermore, s is ‘s’ because s is not-
yet-present. As such, the continual alteration between s2, s3, s4 . . . sx is made possible by 
the fact that there is no ‘s’ to begin with. In addition, the passings between say ‘s2 and s3’, 
and ‘s3 and s4’ are not interpreted as a ‘transition’ between two somethings. Otherwise 
these markers will cease to signify a ‘becoming’ and just ‘be’. For instance, s2 is 
consistently in a dynamic process of transformation and actualisation without ever 
entering into the state of ‘s2’ (i.e., s2 can be represented as s2). In short, becoming ensures 
the repeatability of difference in a field of dynamic immanence. This dynamism is made 
possible only because something is always missing (c.f., the not-present).  
 The heterogeneity that becoming professes denotes neither a point of departure 
nor a point of arrival. And, what defines the singularity of immanence’s becoming is a 
matrix of multipleness, which establishes a non-exhaustive space; a continuum that is 
defined by a constant relating, unfolding and becoming: virtual space. According to 
Deleuze, “the reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and relations along 
with the singular points which correspond to them. The reality of the virtual is a [‘real’] 
structure” (Difference 260). That is to say, the future-past of all potential actualities are 
contained within the virtualness of space. As a sum of every possible relation, unfolding 
and becoming, the virtual is essentially “a centre which would unify other centres” 
(Deleuze, Difference 260).  
 171
 In a Deleuzian sense, the study of space is an explication of several interrelated 
problems then. These include how the becoming of multiplicities differ and defer within 
virtual space, how phenomena comprising the ‘virtual’ must be characterised as a ‘not-
present’ and how the virtual is a plane which refracts singularities that extend a network 
of pluralness. Manuel DeLanda explicates this understanding of the virtual in the 
following remarks: 
The virtual continuum would be, as it were, a space of spaces, with each 
its component spaces having the capacity of progressive differentiation. 
Beside this multiplication of spaces, we need a way of meshing these 
together into a heterogeneous whole. Deleuze, in fact, refers to the virtual 
continuum as a plane of consistency [. . .] consistency is defined as the 
synthesis of heterogeneities as such.  
(78) 
DeLanda observes that the virtual denotes ‘corporeal’ causes because its becoming 
depends on the actualisation of material processes. Furthermore, he notes that the virtual 
is autonomous; it is therefore ‘incorporeal’. That is, within the virtuality of space, the 
relationships between the multiplicity of multiplicities are ‘quasi-causal’. For instance, an 
event exists within the virtual; but, the potentiality of this event does not represent the 
virtual in turn. Hence, the virtual “does not result from any limitation of a pre-existing 
possibility” (Deleuze, Difference 264). As such, “for a potential or virtual object, to be 
actualised is to create divergent lines which correspond to—without resembling—a 
virtual multiplicity”. (264) 
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 To conclude, the virtual is actualised within the becoming of differenciation. 
Deleuze proposes that “each differenciation is a local integration or a local solution 
which then connects with others in the overall solution or the global integration” 
(Difference 262). He elaborates on this “integration” by pointing out that “The 
actualisation of the virtual [. . .] always takes place by difference, divergence or 
differenciation. [. . .] For a potential or virtual object, to be actualised is to create 
divergent line which correspond to—without resembling—a virtual multiplicity” (264). 
For instance, interpretations emerge as part of past and/or future interpretations that 
have/or will occur. And, because the actualisation the virtual is not pre-determined by 
fixity, its dynamic unfolding is sustained by a constructing unconstruct.  
 As such, the conventional notion of perceiving space as a homogeneous whole, 
within which events unfold, requires reassessing. While ‘space’ is presented as unified, 
its ‘wholesomeness’ is composed of heterogeneous passings (i.e., the unfolding of infinite 
becomings). In this immanent spatiality, becoming’s ‘multilinearity’ “[. . .] can fold back 
on itself with intersections and inflections that interconnect [. . .] As though these are so 
many twists in the path of something moving through space like a whirlwind that can 
materialise at any point” (Deleuze, Negotiations 161). As such, the internal difference of 
becoming-in-itself develops within a chain of diverging refractions and through this 
dislocation, the virtualness of a potential is actualised.  
 A product of interactions between the ‘was present’, ‘present’ and ‘to be present’, 
the event of some ‘thing’ happening points to a particular a priority. Hence, the concept 
of space must be understood as empirically transcendental. This is because the 
occurrence of an event takes place within the conditions of a real event occurring. Unlike 
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Kant’s transcendental space, which omits logical and empirical bases, the sensibilities of 
an empirical transcendentalness of space preclude conditions that constitute ‘real’ events. 
Thus, the extension of space bears an unfolding that opens up new potentialities, relations 
and planes.  
 In short, the ‘spatiality’ of space lies outside of the fields that determine it. As 
space becomes itself, it affectively embraces the differentiating and deferentiating. The 
manifestation of this event creates the plane of space which folds upon itself in order to 
articulate itself. In light of the current discussion, ‘space’ neither determines the moments 
when s2, s3, s4 . . . sx take place nor asserts the movements that produce the passings 
between ‘s2 and s3’, and ‘s3 and s4’. Instead, from the constitutions of space-to-space, its 
spatialness is interpretable as a boundless refraction. That is, an infinitude which is 




 Sections One and Two of this dissertation are attempts to examine the constituents 
that occupy the subject of hermeneutics. Specifically, Section One offers a perspective of 
the conditions that the interpretative casts. And, Section Two exemplifies the production 
and manifestation of interpretation(s). Altogether, sections one and two assert two salient 
points: everything is subjugated to the interpretability of the interpretable (i.e., there is 
nothing ‘outside’ of interpretation) and the interpretative proliferates a multiplicity of 
interpretations (i.e., the plurality of a singular interpretation).  
 Since the plurality of interpretation creates what there is and what can be, every 
‘thing’ unfolds from a fundamental force: the principle of deference and difference. That 
is, the potentiality of any given thing is interpreted in terms of what is created and what is 
to be created. The dissertation at hand tries to demonstrate this concept of interpretation 
by applying it to a variety of activities, as well as examples that are ‘perceivable’ (i.e., the 
observable) in nature. These include: Chad and his interpretation of the photographs; 
optometric phenomena like the ebbing of tide and the refraction of light; interpretations 
of concepts like time and space; and readings of authors, such as Deleuze and  
Bergson, and excerpts from Heart of Darkness and ‘The Flea’. Basically, these  
 
discussions try to demonstrate how ↕ deference is a ‘creative’ and ‘positive’ process. In  
difference 
 
each instance, some new ‘thing’ is created because the act of interpretation is essentially 
a dynamic activity. 
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 To a large extent, this dissertation has been about the correlation between 
deference, difference and the being of interpretation. Generally speaking, it implies the 
following: every possibility is created through an infinite force that is expressed within a 
pure medium. Although the concept of ‘withinness’, or ‘immanence’, appears to be 
Deleuzian in essence, the present dissertation offers an extended understanding of these 
markers. In short, I have equated be-ing (of interpretation) with a material virtualness: the 
no-thing. According to Peter Hallward, “Deleuze’s philosophy is best described as an 
exercise in creative indiscernment” and the latter pays careful attention to the mechanics 
of material or actual creations only because he seeks to invent suitable means of escaping 
them (3). However, I argue that the “mechanics of material” or “actual creations” are 
materialised or actualised within the presentness of a not-present. In other words, there 
can be no escape from the no-thing. That is, interpretation becomes when it is actualised 
in its own virtuality; only by becoming interpretable can interpretation fully realise the  
potential of ↕ deference which its very being attests. Hence, the being of interpretation  
          difference 
unfolds within a virtual-reality that relates, constitutes and expresses it through itself in 
itself.  
 In view that different aspects of interpretation are dealt with in sections one and 
two of this dissertation, the present discussion, which endeavours to conclude the entire 
work, will address the issues that have been raised separately. Therefore, there will be 
two parts to this dissertation’s Conclusion. 
 Part One of the conclusion will probe how and why interpretation is, in itself, a 
dynamic process. That is, how and why does an interpretation function the way it does 
(i.e., a study of how interpretation functions as a function—its functionality). Basically, 
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the discussion will foreground the notion that interpretations are themselves aspects of a 
limitless creative force. Thus if the interpretative is indeed ‘creative’ in essence, it can 
only become through an actualisation of the virtual. Furthermore, the evolution of 
interpretation’s restless creativity is expressed through an infinite differing and deferring 
creation: a creativity that is presented by the unpresentability of a no-thing.  
 Part Two of the conclusion will probe into how and why interpretation is a 
dynamic process (with)in-itself. That is, what makes the event of interpretation a 
confluence of instantaneous productions (i.e., a study of how interpretation functions as 
an entity—its being). The discussion intends to highlight how the interpretable is a 
product of a synthesis of inter- and intra- acting forces; a producing which points to an 
internal intra-action. And, because interpretation is some thing that becomes in the state 
of something ‘happening’, it is constituted by the yet-to-be-determined (or, the 
‘undeterminate’). Hence, the interpretative is (re)affirmed through some ‘thing’ that 
(re)differentiates, (re)deferentiates and (re)creates; an eternal returning re-turning. In 
context of this dissertation, the nature of interpretation is ascribed within a single 
multiplicity which re-un-folds into itself: —ing.  
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Part One 
 The general argument of this dissertation proposes that the act of interpretation 
yields a gyre of unlimitedness. In other words, all virtualities as well as actualities are 
composed by a single productive force: the infinite be-coming of becoming. The 
implication of this singularity is that every thing is the ‘same’ in one way or another. 
Deleuze call this the “single voice” (Difference 44) that encompasses possibilities in a 
multiplicity of multiplicities—univocity. Thus, the singularity of the interpretable, for 
example, refers to the fact that there is essentially no difference between interpretations. 
All interpretations being equal, every interpretation is exactly ‘the’ interpretation. 
Consequently, if interpretations exist in a singularity, then, there can only be one source 
of creation. That is, the unfolding of the actual/virtual within an immanent. For instance, 
the production and co-existence of interpretations are re-presented by a consistent plane 
which is characterised by an inclusive singular pluralness. 
 Nevertheless, the constancy of ‘the singular’ does not imply a straightforward 
uniformity. In fact, the infinite becoming of the ‘unlimited’ points to a creation that is 
effected by a repeated differencing. So, the ‘actualisations’ of virtualities are really re-
reconstitutions of potentialities that underlie the passing of transformations upon 
transformations. The dynamism of reconstitution’s irreducible state signals the syntheses 
of becomings that are affirmed within their becoming. For instance, distinct strands of 
creative trajectories compose the act of interpretation, which is essentially the exercise of 
interpreting the interpretable. The basis of creating or producing interpretations is 
constituted by self-reference then. This reliance on interpretation-in-itself is precisely the 
condition that enables self-creativity. That is, interpretation itself manifests every othered 
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interpretation in a continuum of ↕ deference  (i.e., a repeated differentiality of  
              difference 
 
of differences). Thus affirming the interpretative is not merely an affirmation of its  
 
interpretability. Instead, the interpretative itself is its own presentness and this very  
 
presence creates and entails interpretabilities.  
 
 In view of the above perspective, the immanent nature of the creative engages an 
immediacy that exhibits entire unfoldings all-at-once. Self-generating and self-sustaining, 
the instantaneity of the immediate advances the seamless unfolding of a creativity which 
singularises binary distinctions, such as difference and identity and becoming and being. 
So, for example, an x3 is not a differentiation from an x2 that, presumably, comes before 
it. Rather, x3 and x2 pass on within a same moment in a single plane of differences. When 
the interpretative is conceived of in this manner, an interpretation is not set against an  
‘Original Interpretation’. The one-ness of interpretations presupposes that the  
 
interpretative is the primary creative force which constitutes itself in ↕ deference. And,  
             difference 
 
this homogeneous immediacy sanctions a timeless production that proliferates diverse  
 
passings in and through repeatable differencing/repetitive difference. 
 
 By connecting creation to a fundamental oneness, it foregrounds a self-
perpetuating  creativity that is immanently singular. This assertion also implies that the 
creative gathers a boundless unfolding within its fold. That is, nothing mediates creativity 
since its be-ing/be-coming is a ‘unity’, whereby the ‘inside’ is no more than a folding of 
the ‘outside’. Thus, to create is to re/un/fold that which is outside inside. As such, 
creativity does not create any thing other than itself and creation does not create any thing 
that is the same. Consequently, every re-recreation is a recreation of and in itself. 
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Therefore, each re-recreation is an event, a distinct aspect, of a limitless whole. For 
instance, an interpretation is unique as well as an interpretation-in-itself. Nevertheless, 
the many divergent interpretations are facets that realise the wholesomeness of the 
interpretative. Hence, interpretability and its creativeness construct a relationship of the 
interpretable in (and ‘to’) its ‘self’. 
 The assumption of an inward-looking creativity articulates an immediateness that 
expresses the multiplicity of many-ness in a singular one. However, ‘one’ does not 
displace ‘many’ because the creative plane is a consistent plane upon which all creations 
assemble. Because the ability ‘to create’ is defined by moment-to-moment precipitation, 
this force is perceived as ‘intra’- rather than ‘inter’-related (i.e., moments that intra-
relate). Since multiple-ness is a symptom of the singular, the many-folds of creativity 
cannot be separated from the unified re-un-folding of itself. This unity of the plural and 
singular denotes two things. First, the plural is a manifestation that constitutes the 
singular. Second, the plural is itself singular. For instance, the interpretability of the 
interpretable must be deciphered as an indivisible continuity of interpretations within 
interpretations. Only when the interpretative is conceived of as an undividable, 
uninterrupted and continuing whole can its evolution be immediate, single and becoming. 
In other words, the ‘totality’ of interpretation divides into itself upon its ‘self’. However, 
the infinite division of this ‘self’ is in itself indivisible.  
 Hence, the creatable is expressed within a unified totality. Furthermore, the 
wholesomeness of this unity is entrenched within the unequal co-existences of equal 
unities and unities67. The present thesis is supported by three assumptions. First, the 
                                                 
67 Deleuze says, “In effect, the essential in univocity is not that Being is said in a single and same sense, but 
that it is said, in a single and same sense, of all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. Being is 
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presence of the pre-existent is not justified by an a priori (in the Kantian sense). For 
instance, the interpretative itself does not denote a whole. Instead, interpretations 
themselves pass on to deliver a perspective of the interpretable interpretative. Thus, it is 
through multiplicable relations that existences, including the creative and interpretative, 
become creatable. Second, the unity between unities and unities is but a transcendent 
totality. That is, the notion of ‘totalness’ is illusory. Therefore, for example, interpretation 
is an act that problematises the interpretative. As the interpretative changes through the 
interpretable, ultimately, it is the disjunctive that orientates the relations between 
interpretations and interpretations68. Third, because unities are produced by particular 
constructs, they vary from moment to moment within a moment-in-moment. So, a unity 
is essentially produced within the disunited. The unity of the interpretative, for example, 
results from the kinds of interpretations there can/could be. Thus, the wholesomeness of 
unity is produced by the variations of the interpretable. While the homogeneity of the 
united is not a given (i.e., there is no a priority), its wholesomeness is maintained by a 
consistent becoming.  
 The proposition, creativity is not a ‘whole’ in any traditional sense of the marker, 
suggests that it must be construed as yet-to-be-completed, notwithstanding, being 
already-completed. That is, the creative is a continual intensification of an immanent be-
coming, becoming itself. Because creativity is always in the state of being presented, this 
work-in-progress points to a notion of the unpresentable.  
                                                                                                                                                 
the same for all these modalities, but these modalities are not the same. It is ‘equal’ for all, but they 
themselves are not equal. It is said of all in a single sense, but they themselves do not have the same sense” 
(Difference 45).  
 
68 I.e., the producibility of the disjunctive is dependent on repeatable differences. Deleuze speaks about the 
concept of disjunctive synthesis in Difference and Repetition as well as Anti-Oedipus.  
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 In other words, the wholeness of creativity is to be thought of as non-presentable 
and non-actual: the virtual. A present that can never be fully present, the virtuality of the 
creative brings about an actualisation that it does not identify with. That is, the virtual 
cannot become the actualised. Hence, the creation that produces differentiality and 
deferrentiality stems from the non-presence of the virtual. And, what the virtual 
proliferates creates the past-present-future all at once. As such, the actual creative present 
passes on because all possible creative presents are already presented within the past and 
future. Also, in all past actual creative presents, including the past creative that has never 
been presented (i.e., the past virtual creative), the entire past creative is conserved in 
itself. While the virtuality of the creative is an actualisation of a repeatable difference, 
this creating is, nonetheless, a creation of the yet-to-come. Thus, in its perpetual 
unfolding, creation resists against full presentability. This resistance results in the 
departure from that which is conclusive. Even when the creative present presents itself as 
an actual, it is because the actuality of this presentness passes itself on as presentable 
instant.  
 For instance, although both the interpreted and interpretable are part of the 
interpretative, they bear different intensions of the constitution. The interpreted is an 
‘actual’ that represents the ‘definite’ aspect of an interpretable. And, the continuity of this 
interpretability is affirmed by an actuality that bears the possibility for actualising an 
actualisation. Therefore, the interpreted is an actuality that unfolds (or, is an effect of) 
from its own potentiality. In other words, the interpretable is the ‘virtual’ that produces 
the eternal returning of that which is to become ‘the interpretative’. So, a becoming that 
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returns to synthesise, become and affect the potentiality of virtualness. That is, the 
interpretable is not merely some repeatable ‘return’. Rather, it is in itself a returning  
affirmed by multiplicity. Hence, the interpretative is in essence a self-↕ deference that  
               difference 
 
refracts through a virtuality which actualises an ‘itself’ by be-coming. 
                
 In short, the actualness of creativity is the constituted, whilst its virtualness is its 
constituent. That is, creation’s ‘created-ness’ and ‘creating-ness’ result from three 
independent, but interrelated premises. First, the returning immediacy that composes the 
‘to-be-created’ is a catalyst for restless re/un/foldings. A source that re-reproduces 
unlimited possibilities, the immediacy of each possibility (i.e., fold) synthesises within it 
all conceivable potentials and generates all plausible creations. Thus, the immediate is an 
immanent force that multiplies via self-determining. And, the spontaneity of this 
immediateness points to a presentness that cancels out any mediation by a transcendent.  
As such, the second premise is an account of the dynamic (non)presentability of 
the immediate. That is, creativity is presented as, in-itself, not presentable. After all, if the 
creative is presented as some ‘thing’, then it will become ‘something’ eventually. But, in 
tandem with the current argument, the act of creating expresses a quality that is ‘verb-
like’. Similar to the ‘infinitive’, while charting its course of actualisation, creation 
functions as a substantive that is independent of any particular actualising. So, creativity 
is both the creation that articulates the creatable, as well as the creatable that gives rise to 
the creation. 
 Consequently, the final premise of creativity is associated with the notion of 
circularity. The concept of relentless returning is crucial to the intension of immediacy 
and non-presentability. Because each creating is a creation that differs and defers, 
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creativity cannot be grounded as ‘c-r-e-a-t-i-v-i-t-y’. Nevertheless, since creation is 
affirmed by a differencing(/deferencing) deference(/difference), its abandonment of being 
‘c-r-e-a-t-i-o-n’ anticipates the arrival at an ever-returning return. This eternal re-turning 
produces every ‘thing’ that differs, especially the synthesis of being/becoming that is 
affirmed in be-coming/multiplicity.  
 Thus, the actualisation of an interpretation is an actuality insofar as it is indeed an 
actual. And, the interpretative is a production that expands upon the generative dynamism 
of the interpretable. That is, upon a plane of immanence, ‘to interpret’ fortifies 
spontaneity, openness and experimentation. A force that articulates the unpresentable, the 
interpretable is construed as some ‘thing’ that passes through a repeatability, whereby its 
creativity is constituted by differencing. As such, that which is inherent of the 
interpretative is a constant evolvement passing through achronological displacements. 
Thus, the becoming of interpretations maintains the interpretable in an event of 
undeterminacy.  
 Since creativity, in this case, of interpretation, is understood as a ceaseless 
unfolding within a multiplicity, then, the ‘created’ is some ‘thing’ that proceeds from an 
in-between to yet another in-between (i.e., it is not a linear progression from a start to an 
end). As creativeness opens itself to, effect, affects, it is affected upon, in effect. Clearly, 
this re/un/foldability of the creative precludes a ‘lacking’; it is this ‘absence’ that prompts 
the layering of creatables upon creatables within the creation of a creativity. 
Subsequently, the creative is only creating on the condition that it refers to the ‘absent’. It 
is an absence that the creatable defers to as well as differs from. Because every creation 
bears an ‘absence’ that defines it, this ‘not-there’ must encompass all possible foldings.  
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Hence, the absent is a virtuality that creates the creatable because the to-be-
created remains yet-to-be-created. The unrepresentability of the absent points to a 
departure from, firstly, Plato and his notion of an Ideal form, and, secondly, Aristotle and 
his notion of difference. An abandonment which sets it apart from the whole Platonic and 
Aristotelian legacy,  the ‘absent’ proposed here points to a ‘no-thing’ that is free from any 
‘outside’, ‘difference from another’ and ‘subjugation’ (i.e., subjected to, for example, 
identity, dualism and resemblance). The absent which this discussion perpetrates 
proceeds from itself, within itself. Subsequently, the virtualness of the absent is 
conceivable only through the insideness of its own infinite unfolding. Ultimately, this 
autonomy refracts a host of diverse permutations which reflect a spontaneity that is 
inherent of creativity.  
  Thus, it is possible to re-recreate interpretations because the interpretative is in 
essence polysemic. That is, being always overdetermined, the interpretable is in 
possession of excessive meanings. And, the possibilities that an interpretation yields stem 
from a ‘lack’.  As a matter of fact, the momentary passings of in-betweenness between 
interpretations and interpretation demonstrate the presence of an absent, which in turn 
affirms the no-thing. As the interpretative ‘lacks’ an objective (and so there is no ‘the 
interpretation’ to speak of), its actualisation must rely upon the production of a refolding 
and unfolding folding. In view of this constitution, interpretation is not some ‘thing’ that 
is already itself, then. An interpretation is some ‘thing’ that comes into being through 
becoming. Therefore, the interpretative is not bound by a determined locus of meanings. 
Because of its ‘slippery’ nature, the making of an interpretation transcends the limitation 
of a specific signification. Therefore, the interpretative is described as a shifting field of 
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interrelations, where interpretations are intertextually expressed within an interweaving 
multiplicity of intra-pretations.  
 Although the creator of ‘things’, including the creative and interpretative, can 
neither be presented nor be determined, its virtuality accounts for the in-between 
actualisations of ‘things’. In context of this dissertation, the virtual creator may be 
thought of as a difference of repeatable ‘nothing’. In other words, the repeatability of the 
not-present is a repetition of the ‘different’. For instance, two interpretations that repeat 
must be different; but being repetitions, they must be considered conceptually identical. 
Therefore, whilst the interpretative is representable, the difference between one 
interpretation and another is non-representable. Nevertheless, is the repeatable ‘real’? 
Also, can there be non-representable difference? 
 So, for example, if the marker, ‘cat’, can be fully characterised by a concept 
denoted by ‘c-a-t’, then, ‘cat’ will refer to one specific thing. In this case, because a 
marker is affirmed as some ‘thing’ (i.e., instead of being ‘free’, difference bears a 
denomination), there would be no difference or repetition. Thus, the interpretability of 
‘cat’ depends on the uncompleteness of the concepts that the marker can be made to 
bear—a repeatable conceptless difference. As such, the repetition of ‘cat’ does not 
presuppose a determinable concept. Instead, the repeatability of ‘cat’ is dependent on the 
fact that there are differential yet-to-be-completed concepts, yet-to-come-possibilities and 
yet-to-come-becomings: an expression of pure no-thingness.  
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 Though the interpretative does not acquire a new sense here69, this dissertation is 
an attempt to work on the concept of interpreting from a ‘yet-to-be-ness’ (i.e., the 
unpresentable). And so, the logic of no-thingness is the result of a wish to distant the 
thesis from modes that are ‘representational’ and ‘determinable’. For instance, the 
arguments do not assert one version of truth over another, or try to deduce categories of 
the a priori kind, or reduce the undetermined to a fundamental whole. The logic of ‘no-
thing’ abandons the particular and the general in exchange for a difference that is 
reproducible within a plane that unfolds to become. In other words, it is a logic of an 
interpretation and experience that is yet-to-be-formed. Thus, being neither inductive nor 
deductive, interpretation and its irreducibility foreground a yet-to-come that will always 
be creating the creatable: —ing. In seeking to exemplify the complexities involving the 
interpretable, the thesis demonstrates the primacy of a ‘thing’ that perpetrates the 
continuity of a singular plural.  
 Specifically the following three characteristics describe the logic of no-thingness. 
First, the idea of no-thingness presents a yet-to-be-present. Although the absent is a 
condition that epitomises the ‘no-thing’, this ‘not-there’ does not point to absence per se. 
As a matter of fact, the absent opens up an event to a multiplicity of events (e.g., the 
overdetermination of the interpretable). By connecting events and events, the in-
betweenness of the varying syntheses make-present possibilities that are immanent, 
excessive and shifting. Therefore, the unfolding of the no-thing is a ‘present’ that folds 
within a refolding that is uncentred and divergent.  
                                                 
69 The interpretability of the interpretative must already exist in the act of interpreting itself. Thus, the 




 Second, the ‘presentness’ that arises from the interrelations which connect a 
presentation to other presentations suggest a yet-to-come. That is, events occur as 
happenings rather than outcomes. The relationship between ‘this’ and ‘that’ which takes 
place in a continuous flow within ‘here’ and ‘there’ points to a departure from 
determinability. Characterised by the unattributable, the present is a presenting of parts 
that evolve to become. Thus, no-thingness supposes the unspoken, undetermined and 
uncomplete which necessitate the ‘speakability’, ‘determinablity’ and ‘completability’ of 
a ‘thing’ (e.g., it is possible to interpret the marker ‘cat’ because the signification of ‘c-a-
t’ is not already determined).  
 Third, no-thingness is not an end in itself. The no-thing refracts a singular 
multiplicity of relations that involve the plural multiplicities of a repeatable difference. In 
other words, the no-thing does not function as a condition that facilitates the piecing 
together of differences in a whole. Rather, the no-thingness of the no-thing precludes a 
wholeness that encompasses the multiplicities of a multiplicity. Hence, the no-thing is a 
singularity composed by a series of pluralities, which, in turn, is composed within a 
singularity.  
 So, the logic of no-thingness is about the actualisation, understanding and 
interpretation of any ‘something’. Be it the creatable, or interpretable, its becoming is an 
event that immediately differs from and defers within itself. That is, the withinness of the 
no-thing automates a self -differentiality and -deferentiality which makes it what it is. A 
differing and deferring that returns to defer and differ itself within itself, the differed and 
deferred are immediately the actual, virtual, immanent, and single. Consequently, every 
‘something’ connotes the passing of a pure difference and repetition. In this sense, no-
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thingness affirms a logic that finds accordance with the restlessness of the positive. And 
so, the becoming will always be coming: —ing. Hence, central to the logic of 
nothingness is the birth to a differencing and repeating presence. This process of 
‘birthing’ can be summed up by Deleuze’s observation on the concepts of difference and 
repetition. On the subject of the “essence” of the differentiable and repeatable, he says: 
Essence is not only particular, individual, but individualising. [. . .] This is 
because essence is in itself difference. But it does not have the power to 
diversify, and to diversify itself, without also having the power to repeat 
itself, identical to itself. What can one do with essence, which is ultimate 
difference, except to repeat it, since it is irreplaceable and since nothing 
can be substituted for it? [. . .] Difference and repetition are only 
apparently in opposition. [. . .] This is because difference as the quality of 
a world, is affirmed only through a kind of autorepetition which traverses 
the various media and reunited different objects; repetition constitutes the 
degrees of an original difference, but also diversity constitutes the levels 
of a repetition no less fundamental. [. . .] Actually, difference and 
repetition are two inseparable and correlative powers of essence [. . .] for 
repetition is the power of difference, no less than difference the power of 
repetition. [They] become the centre of a system which leaves nothing 
outside itself [.] 




The subject of this dissertation concerns interpretation. Its purpose is to 
understand how to read idiomatic and non-idiomatic markers: a study of hermeneutics. 
Therefore, the paper discusses a set of issues that is particularly pertinent to its focus of 
examining ‘what is interpretation’. For the purpose of explicating the interpretative, the 
dissertation engages with selected topics, including ‘perception’, ‘mental image’ and 
‘meaning-making’, as well as selected theorists and the work that they offer, including 
Nietzsche, Bergson and Deleuze. The purpose of examining the abovementioned topics 
and theoretical works is to formulate a fundamental framework that will help in the 
understanding of the explicit indications, implicit assumptions, applicability and 
limitations of a theory of interpretation. But, in return, how is the interpretative to be 
placed in the midst of these topics and theories? What does Deleuze mean when he 
comments that modern life is confronted by a “distribution” that is both mechanical and 
stereotypical (Deleuze, Difference xviii)? What can be said of this automated divergence 
and displacement? Is there no outside, in the case of this dissertation, of interpretation, 
then?  
 From the discussion developed over the course of this dissertation, the following 
deduction appears sustainable: the interpretative is an expression of be-ing through which 
pure creations can become. For instance, broadly speaking, in order to understand what 
constitutes ‘perception’, two questions need to be answered. They are ‘how is 
information obtained’ and ‘how can it be justified as valid’. These questions arise 
because methods that are used in the gathering of information affect the end result and 
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‘things’ are not what they appear to be. Because ‘things’ do not exist as just ‘are’, they 
need to be interpreted. Thus, the interpretative plays a role in constructing a discourse of 
perception: interpretability is the thinking of the nature of perception-in-itself. In other 
words, every ‘thing’ which is to become can be attributed to a trace that is interpretative 
in essence. In short, some thing is interpreted as something because the interpretative 
produces that very interpretation (‘something’) itself70. 
 Hence, interpretation is the immediacy of be-ing. Further, the immediateness of 
the interpretable is exactly the being of a thing and its difference—the repeatability of the 
re/un/folding —ing; a pure interiority that creates some thing without referring to any 
thing beyond itself. Therefore, interpretation is always concerned with the event of 
creating. That is to say, the interpretative is characterised by the actualisation of the 
undetermined; and, the possibility of creating more and more highlights the workings of 
the virtual and the infinite. As interpretation is concerned with the virtuality of an 
actualising event-in-itself, the process of interpreting creates new events via its very own 
unfolding on its very own plane71. Hence, through interpretation, the presentablity of 
every moment (or, event) is an affirmation of an indivisible creation. If Bergson’s 
assertion on the notion of ‘present moment’ is considered, interpretation and its 
presentness must be the great impulse that underscores the returning dynamism, 
continuity and variability of an immanent whole (Creative 157). As such, the 
                                                 
70 Interpretation is not a representation of the various outcomes that may emerge from the activity of 
reading. The interpretative is the very act of reading/interpreting. With reference to Deleuze’s idea of 
philosophy and deterritorialisation (Dialogues, 1987).   
 
71 Deleuze and Guatttari point out that “the task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities, is always 
to extract an event from things and beings, to set up the new event from things and beings, always to give 
them a new event” (Philosophy? 33).   
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interpretative is constituted in the purity of its individual withinness; and so, it sustains a 
singular (i.e., unilateral) understanding of the auto nomos. In fact, Deleuze asserts that 
Eternal return or returning expresses the common being of all these 
metamorphoses, the measure and the common being of all that is extreme, 
of all the realised degrees of power. It is the being-equal of all that is 
unequal and has been able to fully realise its inequality. All that is extreme 
and becoming the same communicates in an equal and common Being 
which determines its return [. . .] eternal return is the univocity of being, 
the effective realisation of that univocity. In the eternal return, univocal 
being is not only thought and even affirmed, but effectively realised. 
         (Difference 51) 
 Essentially, this dissertation meditates upon traditional as well as basic questions. 
They include ‘What is interpretation?’ and ‘How does the interpretative interpret?’72. In 
an attempt to offer prospective answers to these questions, the thesis proposes a 
perspective that is primarily immanent. That is, the interpretable is demonstrated through 
an affirmation of interpretation in itself within interpretation-in-itself. For instance, the 
interpretation of x depends on the interpretability of its ‘being’, ‘representability’ and 
‘re/un/foldability’—the creation of a creativity. Thus, the becoming of x as ‘x’ is an 
affirmation of its own differentiality and deferentiality. As such, the affirmation of x is 
determined through its ability to determine. This ability refers to an immanent force that 
exists within itself (c.f., Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ and Deleuze’s ‘affirmation through 
difference’). Two salient points extrapolate from immanence and its withinness. First, the 
                                                 
72 These two questions can be transcribed as ‘What is being?’ and ‘How does thought think?’ which are 
fundamental questions in the study of philosophy. 
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act of interpreting is singular though the creating of an interpretation is but a facet of all 
possible creations: the being of interpretation is always one and the same. As the 
interpretable is self-perpetuating and absolute, there can only be a single birthing of the 
re-un-folding: a singular pluralness. Second, interpretation is itself the production of a 
producing difference and deference that affirms a repeated differentiality of differences: 
spontaneity underscores the interpretative. Further, the interpretability of interpretation is 
necessarily arbitrary as the act of interpreting is marked by the involuntary, unconscious 
and becoming: —ing. Hence, it is possible to interpret simply because reading, seeing 
and meaning-making are expressions of a single action: the absolute force of pure 
interpretability (c.f., Spinoza’s ‘univocity of being’, ‘immanence’ and ‘expression’).  
 Consequently, this thesis purports that interpretation is the creator of all 
interrelationships between perception, experience and thought. The interpretability of 
things creates all ‘things’, which is really the actualisation of intra(difference-
repetition)/(in/tangibility). At this point, it is probably apt to consider the indications of 
the proposition mentioned here. The issues that concern the question of interpretation, in 
context of this dissertation, yield an answer which relates the subject to the notion of 
creativity. That is, interpretation is the medium via which events can be expressed as pure 
creatives. Subsequently, interpretation and its workings materialise the virtuality of the 
in/tangible within a state of momentary actualisation. As such, interpretation articulates 
the unpresentable through the presentness of that which cannot be presented—the no-
thing. So, the event of interpretation is a creating that creates within a plane that 
reinforces the pure and the affirming. This assertion bears the following implications. 
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 First, interpretation connotes ‘work-in-progress’. This to say, an interpretation is 
always, so to speak, ‘in the making’, rather than being ‘ready made’. Therefore, the 
motion ‘to interpret’ initiates a ‘process’. After all, if interpretation exists as a ready-
made entity, then, it will be subjected to a parametre of limitations. For instance, in 
Platonic terms, interpretations are but representations of a pre-existent Interpretation. The 
potential (i.e., the ways in which something can be interpreted) that an interpretation can 
exhibit is limited because it is deemed to be a mere testament of the ideal Interpretation. 
If interpretation is purported as an event of pure becoming, it must be understood as a 
singular (re)create-ing-in-itself. Thus, an interpretation is independent of its actualisation 
as ‘an interpretation’—an interpretation is free from any signification, or actuality. 
Instead, a concept of what constitutes interpretation is extracted from the very actualising 
of interpretation itself. With reference to Frege’s method, which was elaborated in the 
introduction to this dissertation, a marker like ‘dog’ can be made to denote all species of 
canine. However, the concept of ‘dog’ does not function in this notational way. In other 
words, the conceptual interpretation of ‘dog’ is independent of any thing that it refers to 
or may come to reference in the future (i.e., there is nothing ‘outside’ of ‘dog’). Hence, 
interpretation operates on a plane that is self-positing, which results in an infinite 
proliferation of the re/un/folding.  
 Second, as something that creates, the interpretative is considered to be 
‘indivisible’, ‘continuous’ and ‘singular’. And so, the wholesomeness of every 
interpretation is affirmed by a plurality that emerges as a singularity. For instance, an 
interpretation is determined by its own possible interpretables. That is to say, the creating 
of every interpretation is equivalent to a specific actualisation which is really the ‘end-
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product’ of an open-ended experiment. Thus interpretation and its creativity enable the 
development, as well as the production of the interpretable(s). Further, an interpretation 
achieves this ‘end’ by stipulating a fundamental consistency (i.e., singularity) upon the 
varying components. Thus, a pure creating ‘becomes’ because the homogeneity of an 
interpretation (re)connects and re-connects a host of heterogeneous interpretables—
transversality. For instance, to a large extent, Bergson’s concept of memory is comprised 
of three aspects: perception, dualism and (un)consciousness. It is apparent that as he 
proceeds to explicate the nature and existence of memory, the subject of ontology is 
being broached. In fact, in Matter in Memory, Bergson offers his point of view on issues, 
including the metaphysical problem of existence and the forms/natures of memory, which 
seem to be responding to Heidegger’s notion of being73. Hence, an interpretation renders 
within itself a tapestry of becomings that are inseparable.  
 Third, interpretation creates interpretables in the absence of conditions that pre-
exist (i.e, there is no a priori). Otherwise, interpretation and its ability to create will be 
contained (and hindered) by the already constituted. Therefore, the interpretative initiates 
new possibilities and fresh relations74 by working through a virtual, rather than an actual 
plane75. And, this creating/making multiplies within a liberated immediacy that enhances 
                                                 
73 In Being and Time (pp. 500-501), Heidegger suggests that Bergson’s theory reverses Platonism without 
being free of it.  
 
74 With reference to Structuralism, relations between markers are thought to be sustained through two 
functions: continuity (i.e., syntagmatic relation) and substitutability (i.e., paradigmatic function)—the 
signifier and signified cohere.  However, if “fresh relations” are to be created, both the signifier and the 
signified must intra-play within themselves and inter-play within each other—the signifier and signified are 
unmediated; simulacra. In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze asserts that “The simulacrum is an image without 
resemblance” (257). It is “the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristics is to elude the present [. . .] 
a pure becoming without measure, a veritable becoming-mad, which never rests” (1).  
 
75 With reference to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘concept’. They say, “the concept is not given, it is 
created; it is to be created. It is not formed but posits itself in itself – it is self-positing. Creation and self-
positing mutually imply each other because what is truly created [. . .] thereby enjoys a self-positing of 
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its own be-ing: the actual extension of a virtual creative potentiality. According to 
Deleuze and Guattari,  
The virtual is no longer the chaotic virtual but rather virtuality that has 
become consistent, that has become an entity formed on a plane of 
immanence that sections the chaos. This is what we call Event, or the part 
that eludes its own actualisation in everything that happens [. . .] It is the 
virtual that is distinct from the actual [ . . . it] has become consistent or 
real on the plane of immanence [. . .] it is a virtual that is real without 
being actual, ideal without being abstract. The event might seem to be 
transcendent because it surveys the state of affairs, but it is pure 
immanence that gives it the capacity to survey itself by itself on the plane. 
What is transcendent, transdescendent, is the state of affairs in which the 
event is actualised.  
(Philosophy? 156) 
For instance, an interpretation represents the actualisation of a virtual potential. Also, the 
possibilities that emerge within an interpretation co-exist without any one schema being 
determined by the other. Thus, as a product of a synthesised discourse, the act of 
interpretation produces a set of internal dynamics, whereby interpretables interact. 
Although the actualised is constitutive of itself, this absoluteness is underscored by a 
fundamental oneness. And, this single-ness is the affect of an experimental force. In 
short, whilst the possibilities of interpreting something are distinct and unique, they fold 
                                                                                                                                                 
itself, or an autopoetic characteristic by which it is recognised. The concept posits itself to the same extent 
that it is created. What depends on a free creativity is also that which, independently and necessarily posit 
itself in itself: the most subjective will be the most objective” (Philosophy? 11).  
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into one another to express a singularity. In the case of this discussion, this homogeneity 
determines the primacy of interpretation.  
 To a large extent, interpretation is neither an unknowable nor hidden process (c.f., 
Bergson, Matter 73). First, the means that lead to an interpretation, such as seeing, 
perceiving and interpreting, are not solely responsible for the creating of an interpretable. 
That is, ‘seeing’, ‘perceiving’ and ‘interpreting’ are merely instruments that contribute to 
the making of an interpretation. Second, interpretability cannot be conceived apart from 
the be-come-ing that produces it. This ‘in-itself-ness’ is that which articulates the being 
of interpretation. Thus, interpretation is an unfolding that enables a multiplicity of 
creatings; the plane of interpretation can be described as an ‘inclusive’ structure that 
encompasses all creations in and within itself—the creating of pure interpretation. 
 Hence, the presentness of an interpretation must be thought of as a production that 
proceeds within the dynamics of a pure becoming. The existence of interpretation is 
described as a presence that creates nothing beyond it-self. In other words, the 
interpretable unfolds a plane of immanence that is immanent only to itself through it-self. 
So, the effect of a total commitment to purity is that interpretation ceases to be 
subordinated to Interpretation (e.g., Platonism), or to a divine transcendence (e.g., St. 
Augustine), or to a subjective consciousness (e.g., Descartes). Thus, the interpretable can 
only be expressed as a pure interiority. As such, apart from the to-be-interpreted, nothing 
else can represent the yet-to-be-interpreted. And, because every interpretable is a 
creating, interpretation and its creativity is ultimately profiled by the infinite and the 
uncompleted.  
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 Presently, it is pertinent for the Conclusion to provide possible answers to the 
following questions. How does interpretation relate itself to it-self? Is it appropriate to 
assume that there is a correlation between interpretations to begin with? If indeed there is 
a relationship to speak about, how can it be understood, especially when interrelations 
between interpretation (as purported in this discussion) are constituted by a repeating 
difference? Can the theory of interpretation that this thesis asserts provide a coherent 
explanation for the repeatability of differentiality-in-itself? Succinctly, how should this 
process, which operates between two and more independent interpretables, be addressed? 
 Prior to responding to the abovementioned questions, it is probably necessary to 
briefly recollect some of the key ideas that have been presented throughout the course of 
this dissertation. First, a multiplicity of multiplicities is privileged over the unities of a 
Unity. Second, experiential transcendentalness opens up new potentialities, relations and 
planes. Third, the becoming of –ing perpetuates a return of difference within the 
continual production of events. Fourth, the be-come-ing of the be-coming ensures an 
immanent producing that takes place within and through every repetition. Fifth, emphasis 
is being placed on the undeterminate (i.e., ‘. . .’), rather than the definitive (i.e., ‘is’). All 
in all, this dissertation interprets interpretation to the creation of a plane upon which 
inter-relations are being intra-established. Therefore, interpretation is a manifestation of 
an infinite many-ness, which transcends any specificity and context. The return-ness 
within interpretation is “at once both production of repetition on the basis of difference 
and selection of difference on the basis of repetition” (Deleuze, Difference 51-52). 
 This thesis is concerned with a logic of interpretation, whereby the concept of 
interpretability is liberated from those interpretations that imprison it (c.f., Deleuze, 
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Difference xv). Subsequently, in order to examine how interpretation differs and defers 
with itself (i.e., the immediacy of interpretation) there is a necessity to study the 
dynamics which constitute it. Presently, it is apparent that the making of an interpretation 
is determined by a self-affirming force. Deleuze describes this self-affirmation as an 
internal, absolute and ultimate difference, which cannot be deemed as the empirical 
difference between two things (Proust 41). So, the determination of a deferring difference 
is dependent on the immediate—the differing and deferring differs and defers from 
nothing that is external to itself. Furthermore, the intra-relation of two things(in-
themselves) is marked by the actualisation of a virtualness which is inherent within them. 
This is to say, the becoming of some thing to some other thing foregrounds the potential 
for the actualisation of becoming-other. For instance, a model aeroplane moves freely 
within a spatial dimensionality that is pre-scribed by its physical make-up. Furthermore, 
this single space encapsulates all the possible movements that it may exhibit (i.e., a 
singular plural).  
 Hence, the interpretability of something, say ‘x’, is not dependent on its 
difference from another something, say ‘y’. Concisely, the differing, the virtuality and the 
creating of an interpretation is not determinable, or mediated by that which it differs 
from, or realised as an actualised state; interpretability is underscored by the unilateral 
and non-relational. After all, the be-come-ing of a multiplicity-in-itself cannot be 
distinctly determined because one becoming is instantaneously differed and deferred by 
another. So, instead of relating the difference between two interpretables, the 
interpretability of an interpretation yields a differencing that inevitably creates more and 
more interpretables. For instance, the difference between ‘dog’ and ‘cat’ is not marked by 
 199
the difference between ‘d-o-g’ and ‘c-a-t’. Rather, the difference that ‘dog’ or ‘cat’ 
produces highlights the manifestation of a variability within ‘d-o-g’ or ‘c-a-t’ itself (i.e., a 
pure creation).  
 If virtual actualities, which makes the becoming of an interpretable, are not 
demonstrated by relations that are ‘empirical’ in essence, how can interpretation come 
into being then? Consider this proposition: A actual virtual becomes a virtual actual due 
to some ‘thing’ that must remain not-discernable—the lacking. Further, the 
undiscernableness of this ‘lack’ is the thing that affirms the momentary passing of in-
between-ness between all interpretables: the no-thing. Thus, the absolute inter-relations 
between interpretables are conceived in terms of pure intra-relations between ‘nothings’. 
This theory, which attempts to explain the concept of nothingness, is a logic that seeks to 
account for the perennial birthing of the undeterminate: the lacking: the not-there. In 
other words, no-thing-ness is the pure between-ness that relates the becoming between 
interpretables (i.e., a between between no-things). From Nietzsche’s standpoint, this  
  1. be[-]coming does not aim at a final state, does not flow into ‘being’.  
  2. becoming is not an illusory state; the world of being may be an illusion  
3. becoming has equal value at every moment: the sum of its values 
remain the same; in other words, it has no value at all, for there is nothing 
against which it could be measured an in relation to which the word 
‘value’ have meaning. 
       (Writings 212)  
 All in all, an important aspect of this dissertation is the wish to address the elusive 
lack and illustrate its negated no-thingness. To put it in another way, the discussion seeks 
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to explicate the question, ‘What is interpretation?’ In order to approach this issue, the 
thesis deploys a two-part strategy. In one part, interpretation is examined as a function. 
And in the other, interpretation is examined as an entity. 
 To demonstrate how interpretation functions, this dissertation has attempted to 
show how meaning is made. Examples include the ‘paradox of heap’, a reading of Heart 
of Darkness and an interpretation of Deleuze interpreting Proust, demonstrate how a 
piece of work yields a text (c.f., Roland Barthes, ‘From Work to Text’). Perhaps, for a 
moment, the methodology employed to interpret these works may come across as 
somewhat ‘Structuralist’76. That is, the interpretation of interpretation is created by 
difference and functions as a difference. In this instance, the interpretability of 
interpretation is enabled by a chain of differences, where ‘x’ is differentiated from ‘y’ 
because it neither looks, nor sounds like ‘y’, and vice versa. Although interpretation 
acquires its polysemic nature as a result of this differentciation, this over-determination 
remains to be an effect of a coherent relation/connection between markers that exist in an 
idiom. As such, interpretation is some thing that possesses the potential to unfold in 
excess; its functioning is affirmed by the repeating and the differencing.  
 Furthermore, interpretation and its repeated differenciation account for, in this 
dissertation anyway, the nothingness that has come to characterise the interpretative. 
Hence, the opening which is sanctioned by the re-differciating points to an ontological 
gap that is in essence, nothing. According to Deleuze, “In this relation, being is difference 
itself. Being is also non-being, [and] non-being is not the being of the negative; [. . .] on 
                                                 
76 An interpretation’s difference from another interpretation appears to be relational in nature i.e., the 
distinction lies in ‘this’ interpretation being different from ‘that’ interpretation’. For instance, Saussure 
purports that because of a difference in their phonetic value, ‘x’ is set apart from ‘y’. Thus, the difference 
between ‘x’ and ‘y’ is determined through a relation.  
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the contrary, non-being is Difference [. . .] For this reason non-being should rather be 
written (non) -being or, better still, ?-being” (Difference 66-67). So, interpretation is 
determined by a varying that opens up within its own differentiality and deferentiality. 
This absolute becoming of a pure interpretable is immanently diverged and displaced 
within itself. This widening circularity, which re/un/folds into the differentciation of a 
decentring and disguising differentiation77, disseminates a distribution that bears the 
becoming of each and every interpretation. It is the one and only force that immediately 
and singularly determines an undeterminable creation: the singular plurality of  
interpretation: virtual/real(actualisation) —virtual/real(actualisation) 
actual/real(actualisation)     actual/real(actualisation) . . . ∞ 
 
 In retrospect, this dissertation is an attempt to study how the issue of meaning-
making is itself guided by another relation: Being and Interpretation. The engagement 
with interpretation and its being and becoming form the basis for the thesis to engage 
with concepts, including (un)representation, (un)mediation, (un)determination and (ex-
)interiority. As the dissertation embraces uncomplete singularity and yet-to-be 
affirmativity, it thinks that interpretation is really a creative event: the being of a 
becoming. In return, the becoming of interpretation is sustained by the presentness of 
multiplicities that expand within an unpresentable unity: the becoming of a being. In 
short, this dissertation seeks to deliver a theory of interpretation that places primacy on 
the absent: the no-thing:—ing. At the heart of interpretation, there is some ‘thing’ that 
defies all appropriation of itself as ‘it self’: it abandons its self; this ‘thing’ is nothing 
                                                 
77 Deleuze puts forward that “with actualisation, a new type of specific and partitive distinction takes the 
place of the fluent ideal distinctions. We call the determination of the virtual content an Idea differentiation; 
we call the actualisation of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts differenciation. It is always in 
relation to a differentiated problem or to the differentiated conditions of a problem that a differenciation of 
species and parts is carried out [. . .] (Difference 258).  
 202
other than the immanent immobility of the fact that there are things—the supplementary 
memorial of the immemorial thing (Nancy 169).  
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